Francoise Forges

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Contact

Affiliations

• Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) / Centre de Recherches en Mathématiques de la Décision (CEREMADE) (weight: 50%)
  • EDIRC entry
  • location:
• Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) / Laboratoire d'Économie de Dauphine (LEDa) (weight: 50%)
  • EDIRC entry
  • location:

Research profile

author of:

• Transmission stratégique de l'information et certification (repec:adr:anecst:y:2008:i:89:p:3-61)
  by Frédéric Koessler & Françoise Forges
• Games with Incomplete Information: From Repetition to Cheap Talk and Persuasion (repec:adr:anecst:y:2020:i:137:p:3-30)
  by Françoise Forges
• Core-stable Rings in Second Price Auctions with Common Values (repec:ags:feemdp:96668)
  by Forges, Francoise & Orzach, Ram
• Rational Choice in Strategic Environments: Further Observations (repec:bla:scandj:v:100:y:1998:i:2:p:529-535)
  by Olivier De Wolf & Françoise Forges
• Incentives and the Core of an Exchange Economy: A Survey (repec:bro:econwp:2000-22)
  by Francoise Forges & Enrico Minelli & Rajiv Vohra
• The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the absence of wealth effects (repec:bro:econwp:2001-01)
  by Francoise Forges & Jean-Francois Mertens & Rajiv Vohra
• Cooperative Games with Incomplete Information: Some Open Problems (repec:bro:econwp:2011-15)
  by Francoise Forges & Roberto Serrano
• Collusion dans les enchères. Quelques apports des jeux coopératifs (repec:cai:recosp:reco_585_0965)
  by Riham Barbar & Françoise Forges
• Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information (repec:cai:recosp:reco_744_0529)
  by Françoise Forges
• Leonid Hurwicz, Eric Maskin, Roger Myerson et la Théorie des Mécanismes (repec:cai:repdal:redp_176_0873)
  by Françoise Forges
• Appariement : des modèles de Lloyd Shapley à la conception de marchés d'Alvin Roth (repec:cai:repdal:redp_235_0663)
  by Françoise Forges & Guillaume Haeringer & Vincent Iehlé
• Coopération en information incomplète : quelques modèles stratégiques (repec:cai:repdal:redp_274_0467)
  by Françoise Forges
• J.-F. Mertens (1946-2012) : des jeux répétés à l'analyse « coût-bénéfice » (repec:cai:rferfe:rfe_123_0019)
  by Françoise Forges
• Long Persuasion Games (repec:ces:ceswps:_1669)
  by Francoise Forges & Frédéric Koessler
• The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in Exchange Economies with and without Indivisibilities (repec:ces:ceswps:_1686)
  by Francoise Forges
• Afriat’s Theorem for General Budget Sets (repec:ces:ceswps:_1703)
  by Francoise Forges & Enrico Minelli
• Core-stable Rings in Auctions with Independent Private Values (repec:ces:ceswps:_3067)
  by Omer Biran & Francoise Forges
• Implementation of Communication Equilibria by Correlated Cheap Talk: The Two-Player Case (repec:ces:ceswps:_3360)
  by Péter Vida & Francoise Forges
• Afriat's Theorem for Indivisible Goods (repec:ces:ceswps:_4498)
  by Francoise Forges & Vincent Iehlé
• Bayesian Repeated Games and Reputations (repec:ces:ceswps:_4700)
  by Francoise Forges & Antoine Salomon
• An Approach to Communication Equilibrium (repec:cla:levarc:516)
  by F. Forges
• Communication devices in repeated games with incomplete information (Part 1) (repec:cor:louvco:1984006)
  by Forges, F.
• Communication devices in repeated games with incomplete information (Part 2) (repec:cor:louvco:1984011)
  by Forges, F.
• Communication devices in repeated games with incomplete information (Part 3) (repec:cor:louvco:1984012)
  by Forges, F.
• An approach to communication equilibria (repec:cor:louvco:1984035)
  by Forges, F.
• Negotiation without a deadline:a job market example (repec:cor:louvco:1986039)
  by Forges, F.
• Universal mechanisms (repec:cor:louvco:1987004)
  by Forges, F.
• Can sunspots replace a mediator ? (repec:cor:louvco:1987045)
  by Forges, F.
• Repeated games of incomplete information: non-zero-sum (repec:cor:louvco:1988005)
  by FORGES, Françoise
• Infinitely repeated games with incomplete information (repec:cor:louvco:1988006)
  by FORGES, Françoise
• Non-zero sum repeated games and information transmission (repec:cor:louvco:1988025)
  by FORGES, Françoise
• Sunspot equilibrium as a game-theoretical solution concept (repec:cor:louvco:1990029)
  by FORGES, Françoise
• Some Thoughts on Efficiency and Information (repec:cor:louvco:1990071)
  by Forges, F.
• Posterior efficiency (repec:cor:louvco:1991045)
  by Forges, F.
• Correlated equilibrium and sunspot equilibrium (repec:cor:louvco:1991053)
  by Forges, F.
• Five Legitimate Definitions of Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information (repec:cor:louvco:1993009)
  by FORGES , Françoise
• A Note on Pareto Optimality in Differential Information Economies (repec:cor:louvco:1993043)
  by FORGES , Françoise
• Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms and Rational Expectations (repec:cor:louvco:1994044)
  by FORGES, Françoise & MINELLI , Enrico
• Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information (repec:cor:louvco:1994058)
  by FORGES, Françoise & MINELLI , Enrico
• On Strategic Equilibria and Rational Choice (repec:cor:louvco:1995048)
  by DE WOLF , Olivier & FORGES , Françoise
• The ex ante incentive compatible core in the absence of wealth effects (repec:cor:louvco:2001001)
  by FORGES, Françoise & MERTENS, Jean-François & VOHRA, Rajiv
• Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey (repec:cor:louvco:2001043)
  by FORGES, Françoise & MINELLI, Enrico & VOHRA, Rajiv
• Correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information revisited (repec:cor:louvco:2006041)
  by FORGES, Françoise
• Repeated games of incomplete information: Non-zero sum (repec:cor:louvrp:1012)
  by FORGES, Françoise
• Five legitimate definitions of correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete informations (repec:cor:louvrp:1071)
  by FORGES, Françoise
• Posterior efficiency (repec:cor:louvrp:1077)
  by FORGES, Françoise
• A note on Pareto optimality in differential information economies (repec:cor:louvrp:1111)
  by Forges, F.
• Correlated equilibrium and sunspot equilibrium (repec:cor:louvrp:1140)
  by Forges, F. & Peck, J.
• Différences d'information, solutions concurrentielles et stratégies révélatrices (repec:cor:louvrp:1165)
  by Forges, F.
• Rational choice in strategic environments: further observations (repec:cor:louvrp:1338)
  by DE WOLF, Olivier & FORGES, Françoise
• A note on the incentive compatible core (repec:cor:louvrp:1523)
  by FORGES, Françoise & MINELLI, Enrico
• Incentive compatible core and competitive equilibria in differential information economies (repec:cor:louvrp:1555)
  by FORGES, Françoise & HEIFETZ , Aviad & MINELLI, Enrico
• J.-F. Mertens (1946-2012): des jeux répétés à l'analyse "coût-bénéfice" (repec:cor:louvrp:2563)
  by FORGES, Françoise
• MD interview: interview with Jean François Mertens (1946-2012) (repec:cor:louvrp:2564)
  by FORGES, Françoise
• Infinitely repeated games of incomplete information: symmetric case with random signals (repec:cor:louvrp:503)
  by FORGES, Françoise
• Note on Nash equilibria in infinitely repeated games with incomplete information (repec:cor:louvrp:573)
  by Forges, F.
• Correlated equilibria in a class of repeated games with incomplete information (repec:cor:louvrp:663)
  by FORGES, Françoise
• A counterexample to the folk theorem with discounting (repec:cor:louvrp:673)
  by Forges, F. & Mertens, J.F. & Neyman, A.
• Correlated equilibria in repeated games with lack of information on one side: a model with verifiable types (repec:cor:louvrp:700)
  by FORGES, Françoise
• An approach to communication equilibria (repec:cor:louvrp:721)
  by FORGES, Françoise
• Communication equilibria in repeated games with incomplete information (repec:cor:louvrp:809)
  by FORGES, Françoise
• Can sunspots replace a mediator? (repec:cor:louvrp:825)
  by FORGES, Françoise
• Correlated equilibrium in two-person zero-sum games (repec:cor:louvrp:883)
  by FORGES, Françoise
• Equilibria with communication in a job market example (repec:cor:louvrp:885)
  by FORGES, Françoise
• Universal mechanisms (repec:cor:louvrp:914)
  by FORGES, Françoise
• Repeated games with incomplete information (repec:cor:louvrp:933)
  by FORGES, Françoise
• Sunspot eqilibrium as a game-theoretical solution concept (repec:cor:louvrp:952)
  by FORGES, Françoise
• Game Theory and Industrial Economics. An Introduction (repec:ctl:louvir:1989004)
  by FORGES Françoise & THISSE Jacques-François
• Différences d'information, solutions concurrentielles et stratégies révélatrices (repec:ctl:louvir:1994007)
  by Forges, Françoise
• Différences d’information, solutions concurentielles et stratégies révélatrices (repec:ctl:louvre:1995014)
  by Françoise FORGES
• Interview With Jean-François Mertens (1946–2012) (repec:cup:macdyn:v:18:y:2014:i:08:p:1832-1853_00)
  by Forges, Françoise
• Mécanismes d'échange en présence d'externalités (repec:dau:thesis:123456789/7238)
  by Forges, Françoise (ed.) Biran, Omer
• An Approach to Communication Equilibria (repec:ecm:emetrp:v:54:y:1986:i:6:p:1375-85)
  by Forges, Francoise M
• Correlated Equilibrium in Two-Person Zero-Sum Games (repec:ecm:emetrp:v:58:y:1990:i:2:p:515)
  by Forges, Francoise
• Universal Mechanisms (repec:ecm:emetrp:v:58:y:1990:i:6:p:1341-64)
  by Forges, Francoise
• The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the Absence of Wealth Effects (repec:ecm:emetrp:v:70:y:2002:i:5:p:1865-1892)
  by Francoise Forges & Jean-Francois Mertens & Rajiv Vohra
• Tenable Threats when Nash Equilibrium is the Norm (RePEc:edn:esedps:301)
  by Francoise Forges & Jozsef Sakovics
• Information disclosure to Cournot duopolists (repec:eee:ecolet:v:126:y:2015:i:c:p:167-170)
  by Eliaz, Kfir & Forges, Françoise
• A counterexample to the folk theorem with discounting (repec:eee:ecolet:v:20:y:1986:i:1:p:7-7)
  by Forges, F. & Mertens, J. F. & Neyman, A.
• A note on Pareto optimality in differential information economies (repec:eee:ecolet:v:46:y:1994:i:1:p:27-31)
  by Forges, Francoise
• Repeated games of incomplete information: Non-zero-sum (repec:eee:gamchp:1-06)
  by Forges, Francoise
• Strategic information transmission with sender's approval: The single-crossing case (repec:eee:gamebe:v:134:y:2022:i:c:p:242-263)
  by Sémirat, Stéphan & Forges, Françoise
• A Property of Nash Equilibria in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information (repec:eee:gamebe:v:18:y:1997:i:2:p:159-175)
  by Forges, Francoise & Minelli, Enrico
• Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms in Bayesian Games (repec:eee:gamebe:v:25:y:1998:i:2:p:292-310)
  by Forges, Francoise & Minelli, Enrico
• Posterior Efficiency (repec:eee:gamebe:v:6:y:1994:i:2:p:238-261)
  by Forges Francoise
• Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values (repec:eee:gamebe:v:73:y:2011:i:1:p:52-64)
  by Biran, Omer & Forges, Françoise
• A folk theorem for Bayesian games with commitment (repec:eee:gamebe:v:78:y:2013:i:c:p:64-71)
  by Forges, Françoise
• Long persuasion games (repec:eee:jetheo:v:143:y:2008:i:1:p:1-35)
  by Forges, Françoise & Koessler, Frédéric
• Afriat's theorem for general budget sets (repec:eee:jetheo:v:144:y:2009:i:1:p:135-145)
  by Forges, Françoise & Minelli, Enrico
• Bayesian repeated games and reputation (repec:eee:jetheo:v:159:y:2015:i:pa:p:70-104)
  by Salomon, Antoine & Forges, Françoise
• Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms and Rational Expectations (repec:eee:jetheo:v:75:y:1997:i:2:p:388-406)
  by Forges, Francoise & Minelli, Enrico
• A Note on the Incentive Compatible Core (repec:eee:jetheo:v:98:y:2001:i:1:p:179-188)
  by Forges, Francoise & Minelli, Enrico
• Interacting mechanisms: A perspective on generalized principal–agent problems (repec:eee:mateco:v:114:y:2024:i:c:s0304406824000831)
  by Forges, Françoise & Koessler, Frédéric & Salamanca, Andrés
• “Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies”: Back to the roots (repec:eee:mateco:v:114:y:2024:i:c:s0304406824001046)
  by Forges, Françoise & Ray, Indrajit
• Can sunspots replace a mediator? (repec:eee:mateco:v:17:y:1988:i:4:p:347-368)
  by Forges, Francoise
• Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey (repec:eee:mateco:v:38:y:2002:i:1-2:p:1-41)
  by Forges, Francoise & Minelli, Enrico & Vohra, Rajiv
• Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types (repec:eee:mateco:v:41:y:2005:i:7:p:793-811)
  by Forges, Francoise & Koessler, Frederic
• Core-stable rings in second price auctions with common values (repec:eee:mateco:v:47:y:2011:i:6:p:760-767)
  by Forges, Françoise & Orzach, Ram
• Afriat’s theorem for indivisible goods (repec:eee:mateco:v:54:y:2014:i:c:p:1-6)
  by Forges, Françoise & Iehlé, Vincent
• Sender–receiver games with cooperation (repec:eee:mateco:v:76:y:2018:i:c:p:52-61)
  by Forges, Françoise & Horst, Ulrich
• The ex ante incentive compatible core of the assignment game (repec:eee:matsoc:v:47:y:2004:i:2:p:135-151)
  by Forges, Francoise
• The Incentive Compatible Core of a Quasi-Linear Economy (repec:ema:worpap:2000-34)
  by F. Forges & J. F. Mertens & R. Vohra
• Computionally Efficient Coordination in Games Trees (repec:ema:worpap:2002-05)
  by F. Forges & B. von Stengel
• The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core of the Assignment Game (repec:ema:worpap:2002-07)
  by F. Forges
• Communication Equilibria with Partially Verifiable Types (repec:ema:worpap:2003-10)
  by F. Forges & Frederic Koessler
• Long Persuasion Games (repec:ema:worpap:2006-01)
  by Francoise Forges & Frederic Koessler
• Transmission stratégique de l'information et certification (Strategic Information Transmission and Certification) (repec:ema:worpap:2006-04)
  by Frederic Koessler & Francoise Forges
• Multistage communication with and without verifiable types (repec:ema:worpap:2006-14)
  by Frederic Koessler & Francoise Forges
• Self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations (repec:ema:worpap:96-05)
  by F. Forges & E. Minelli
• Rational Choice in Strategic Environments : Further Observations (repec:ema:worpap:96-23)
  by O. De Wolf & F. Forges
• Self-fulfilling Mechanisms in Bayesian Games (repec:ema:worpap:96-24)
  by F. Forges & E. Minelli
• Ex post individually rational trading mechanisms (repec:ema:worpap:98-10)
  by F. Forges.
• Le cœur d'une économie d'échange en information asymétrique (repec:ema:worpap:98-29)
  by F. Forges
• A note on the incentive compatible core (repec:ema:worpap:99-02)
  by F. Forges & E. Minelli
• Incentive compatible core and competitive equilibria in differential information economies (repec:ema:worpap:99-06)
  by F. Forges & A. Heifetz & E. Minelli
• Core-stable Rings in Second Price Auctions with Common Values (repec:fem:femwpa:2010.119)
  by Françoise Forges & Ram Orzach
• Property of Nash Equilibria in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information (repec:fth:pnegmi:9518)
  by Forges,F. & Minelli,E.
• Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms and Rational Expectations (repec:fth:pnegmi:9605)
  by Forges, F. & Minelli, E.
• Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms in Bayesian Games (repec:fth:pnegmi:9624)
  by Forges, F. & Minelli, E.
• Ex Post Individually Rational Trading Mechanisms (repec:fth:pnegmi:9810)
  by Forges, F.
• Le coeur d'une economie d'echange en information asymetrique (repec:fth:pnegmi:9829)
  by Forges, F.
• Incentive Compatible Core and Competitive Equilibria in Differential Information Economics (repec:fth:pnegmi:99-06)
  by Forges, F. & Heifetz, A. & Minelli, E.
• Incentive Compatible Core and Competitive Equilibria in Differential Information Economies (repec:fth:teavfo:34-99)
  by Forges, F. & Heifetz, A. & Minelli, E.
• Strategic information transmission with sender's approval: the single-crossing case (repec:gbl:wpaper:2021-03)
  by Sémirat, S. & Forges, F.
• Long persuasion games (repec:hal:journl:hal-00360719)
  by Frédéric Koessler & Francoise Forges
• Afriat's theorem for generalized budget sets (repec:hal:journl:hal-00360726)
  by Francoise Forges & Enrico Minelli
• Extensive form correlated equilibrium: definition and computational complexity (repec:hal:journl:hal-00360729)
  by Francoise Forges & Bernhard von Stengel
• Multistage communication with and without verifiable types (repec:hal:journl:hal-00360739)
  by Frédéric Koessler & Francoise Forges
• Collusion dans les enchères: quelques apports de jeux coopératifs (repec:hal:journl:hal-00360742)
  by Francoise Forges & Riham Barbar
• Correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information revisited (repec:hal:journl:hal-00360743)
  by Francoise Forges
• Feasible mechanisms in economies with type-dependent endowments (repec:hal:journl:hal-00360744)
  by Francoise Forges
• Transmission stratégique de l'information et certification (repec:hal:journl:hal-00360746)
  by Françoise Forges & Frédéric Koessler
• Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values (repec:hal:journl:hal-00632260)
  by Omer Biran & Francoise Forges
• Core-stable rings in second price auctions with common values (repec:hal:journl:hal-00659016)
  by Francoise Forges & Ram Orzach
• Appariement: des modèles de Lloyd Shapley à la conception de marchés d'Alvin Roth (repec:hal:journl:hal-00822561)
  by Francoise Forges & Guillaume Haeringer & Vincent Iehlé
• Bayesian repeated games and reputation (repec:hal:journl:hal-01252921)
  by Antoine Salomon & Francoise Forges
• Information disclosure to Cournot duopolists (repec:hal:journl:hal-01252926)
  by Eliaz Kfir & Francoise Forges
• A folk theorem for Bayesian games with commitment (repec:hal:journl:hal-01252953)
  by Francoise Forges
• Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: the two-player case (repec:hal:journl:hal-01252955)
  by Vida Peter & Francoise Forges
• Corrigendum to “Self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations” (repec:hal:journl:hal-01519845)
  by Enrico Minelli & Françoise Forges
• Cooperative Games with Incomplete Information : Some Open Problems (repec:hal:journl:hal-01519884)
  by Françoise Forges & Roberto Serrano
• J.-F. Mertens (1946-2012) : Des jeux répétés a l'analyse "coùt-bénéfice" (repec:hal:journl:hal-01519888)
  by Françoise Forges
• Unknown
• Feasibility and individual rationality in two-person Bayesian games (repec:hal:journl:hal-02276751)
  by Francoise Forges & Ulrich Horst & Antoine Salomon
• Leonid Hurwicz, Eric Maskin, Roger Myerson et la théorie des mécanismes (repec:hal:journl:hal-02276813)
  by Francoise Forges
• Sender-receiver games with cooperation (repec:hal:journl:hal-02313962)
  by Françoise Forges & Ulrich Horst
• Coopération en information incomplète: quelques modèles stratégiques (repec:hal:journl:hal-02315008)
  by Françoise Forges
• Games with incomplete information: from repetition to cheap talk and persuasion (repec:hal:journl:hal-02315317)
  by Françoise Forges
• Strategic information transmission with sender's approval (repec:hal:journl:hal-02440627)
  by Françoise Forges & Jérôme Renault
• Folk theorems for Bayesian (public good) games (repec:hal:journl:hal-02447604)
  by Françoise Forges
• Games and Incentives (repec:hal:journl:hal-02455043)
  by Françoise Forges & Johannes Horner
• Strategic information transmission with sender’s approval: the single crossing case (repec:hal:journl:hal-03231673)
  by Stéphan Sémirat & Françoise Forges
• Games with incomplete information: from repetition to cheap talk and persuasion (repec:hal:journl:hal-03537868)
  by Françoise Forges
• Interview with Jean-François Mertens (1946-2012) (repec:hal:journl:hal-03659507)
  by Françoise Forges
• “Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies”: Back to the roots (repec:hal:journl:hal-04929273)
  by Françoise Forges & Indrajit Ray
• Tenable threats when Nash equilibrium is the norm (repec:hal:journl:hal-05492828)
  by Françoise Forges & József Sákovics
• Essential Data, Budget Sets and Rationalization (repec:hal:journl:halshs-00727806)
  by Francoise Forges & Vincent Iehlé
• Afriat's theorem for indivisible goods (repec:hal:journl:halshs-00870052)
  by Francoise Forges & Vincent Iehlé
• Long persuasion games (repec:hal:pseptp:hal-00360719)
  by Frédéric Koessler & Francoise Forges
• Multistage communication with and without verifiable types (repec:hal:pseptp:hal-00360739)
  by Frédéric Koessler & Francoise Forges
• Transmission stratégique de l'information et certification (repec:hal:pseptp:hal-00360746)
  by Françoise Forges & Frédéric Koessler
• Bayesian repeated games and reputation (repec:hal:wpaper:hal-00803919)
  by Francoise Forges & Antoine Salomon
• Feasibility and individual rationality in two-person Bayesian games (repec:hal:wpaper:hal-01094061)
  by Francoise Forges & Ulrich Horst & Antoine Salomon
• Tenable threats when Nash equilibrium is the norm (repec:hal:wpaper:hal-03537845)
  by J. Sakovics & Françoise Forges
• Forward-neologism-proof equilibrium and better response dynamics (repec:hal:wpaper:hal-04189188)
  by Stéphan Sémirat & Françoise Forges
• Interacting mechanisms: a perspective on generalized principal-agent problems (repec:hal:wpaper:hal-04535703)
  by Françoise Forges & Frédéric Koessler & Andrés Salamanca Lugo
• Cooperative games with incomplete information: Some open problems (repec:imd:wpaper:wp2011-14)
  by Françoise Forges & Roberto Serrano
• Unknown
• Unknown
• Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information Revisited (repec:kap:theord:v:61:y:2006:i:4:p:329-344)
  by Françoise Forges
• Trading Games With Asymmetric Information (repec:nwu:cmsems:880)
  by Francoise Forges
• Equilibria with Communication in a Job Market Example (repec:oup:qjecon:v:105:y:1990:i:2:p:375-398.)
  by Françoise Forges
• Essential Data, Budget Sets and Rationalization (repec:pra:mprapa:36519)
  by Forges, Françoise & Iehlé, Vincent
• Sender-Receiver Games with Cooperation (repec:rco:dpaper:17)
  by Forges, Françoise & Horst, Ulrich
• Incentive compatible core and competitive equilibria in differential information economies (repec:spr:joecth:v:18:y:2001:i:2:p:349-365)
  by Aviad Heifetz & Françoise Forges & Enrico Minelli
• Correlated Equilibrium and Sunspot Equilibrium (repec:spr:joecth:v:5:y:1995:i:1:p:33-50)
  by Forges, Francoise & Peck, James
• Essential data, budget sets and rationalization (repec:spr:joecth:v:54:y:2013:i:3:p:449-461)
  by Françoise Forges & Vincent Iehlé
• Feasibility and individual rationality in two-person Bayesian games (repec:spr:jogath:v:45:y:2016:i:1:d:10.1007_s00182-015-0520-8)
  by Françoise Forges & Ulrich Horst & Antoine Salomon
• Strategic information transmission with sender’s approval (repec:spr:jogath:v:50:y:2021:i:2:d:10.1007_s00182-021-00757-1)
  by Françoise Forges & Jérôme Renault
• Tenable threats when Nash equilibrium is the norm (repec:spr:jogath:v:51:y:2022:i:3:d:10.1007_s00182-022-00806-3)
  by Françoise Forges & József Sákovics
• Feasible Mechanisms in Economies with Type-Dependent Endowments (repec:spr:sochwe:v:26:y:2006:i:2:p:403-419)
  by Françoise Forges
• Non-Zero Sum Repeated Games and Information Transmission (repec:spr:sprchp:978-1-4612-2648-2_6)
  by Françoise Forges
• Incentive compatible core and competitive equilibria in differential information economies (repec:spr:steccp:978-3-540-26979-3_11)
  by Françoise Forges & Aviad Heifetz & Enrico Minelli
• Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: The two-player case (repec:the:publsh:944)
  by , & ,
• Strategic information transmission with sender’s approval (repec:tse:wpaper:125607)
  by Renault, Jérôme & Forges, Françoise
• Afriat's Theorem for General Budget Sets (repec:ubs:wpaper:ubs0609)
  by Francoise Forges & Enrico Minelli
• Multistage Communication With And Without Verifiable Types (repec:wsi:igtrxx:v:10:y:2008:i:02:n:s0219198908001844)
  by Frédéric Koessler & Françoise Forges
• Cooperative Games With Incomplete Information: Some Open Problems (repec:wsi:igtrxx:v:15:y:2013:i:02:n:s0219198913400094)
  by Françoise Forges & Roberto Serrano