Salvador Barberà
Names
first:
Salvador
last:
Barberà
in English:
Salvador BARBERA
Contact
email:
[email address hidden, enable JavaScript to see it]
homepage:
http://pareto.uab.es/sbarbera
phone:
34 93 581 18 14
postal address:
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona;
Facultat d'Economia i Empresa;
Edifici B;
08193 Bellaterra (BARCELONA);
SPAIN
Affiliations
Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE)
→ Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
→ Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica
→ Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica
location: Barcelona, Spain
email: research@barcelonagse.eu[email hidden, enable JavaScript to see it]
fax: +34 93 542-1223
Research profile
author of:
Choosing How Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules by Jackson, Matthew O. & Barbera, Salvador
Collective Probabilistic Judgements. by Barbera, Salvador & Valenciano, Federico
Ranking Sets of Objects by BARBERA, Salvador & BOSSERT, Walter & PATTANAIK, Prasanta K.
Corrigendum to "On coalition formation: durable coalition structures": [Mathematical Social Sciences 45 (2003) 185-203] by Barbera, Salvador & Gerber, Anke
On coalition formation: durable coalition structures by Barbera, Salvador & Gerber, Anke
On the Weights of Nations: Assigning Voting Weights in a Heterogeneous Union by Barbera, Salvador & Matthew O. Jackson
Strategy-Proofness and Pivotal Voters: A Direct Proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem. by Barbera, Salvador
Corrigendum to "Strategy-proof social choice correspondences" [J. Econ. Theory 101 (2001) 374-394] by Barbera, Salvador & Dutta, Bhaskar & Sen, Arunava
Falmagne and the Rationalizability of Stochastic Choices in Terms of Random Orderings. by Barbera, Salvador & Pattanaik, Prasanta K.
The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms That Do Not Leave "Too Much" to Chance. by Barbera, Salvador
Self-Selection Consistent Functions by Barbera, Salvador & Bevia, Carmen
Voting by Committees. by Barbera, Salvador & Sonnenschein, Hugo & Zhou, Lin
An introduction to strategy-proof social choice functions by Salvador Barberà
Supporting others and the evolution of influence by Barbera, Salvador & Perea, Andres
A Note on Group Strategy-Proof Decision Schemes. by Barbera, Salvador
Top Dominance and the Possibility of Strategy-Proof Stable Solutions to Matching Problems. by Alcalde, Jose & Barbera, Salvador
A Note on the Impossibility of a Satisfactory Concept of Stability for Coalition Formation Games by Salvador Barberï¿½ & Anke Gerber
Voting under Constraints by Barbera, Salvador & Masso, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro
Strategy-Proof Exchange. by Barbera, Salvador & Jackson, Matthew O.
Strategy-proof Social Choice Correspondences by Barbera, Salvador & Dutta, Bhaskar & Sen, Arunava
Voting by committees under constraints by Barbera, Salvador & Masso, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro
Strategy-Proof Allotment Rules by Barbera, Salvador & Jackson, Matthew O. & Neme, Alejandro
Strategy-proof probabilistic rules for expected utility maximizers by Barbera, Salvador & Bogomolnaia, Anna & van der Stel, Hans
Preference for Flexibility and the Opportunities of Choice by Salvador Barberà & Birgit Grodal
Voting for Voters: A Model of Electoral Evolution by Salvador Barberà & Michael Maschler & Jonathan Shalev
The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms That Do Not Leave 'Too Much' to Chance by Salvador Barbera
Stable Condorcet Rules by Salvador Barber?Author-Name: Carmen Bevi?Author-Email: Carmen. Bevia@uab. es
Choosing How to Choose: Self Stable Majority Rules by Salvador Barbera & Matthew O. Jackson
Editor's note by Salvador Barberà
On the Weights of Nations: Assigning Voting Weights in a Heterogenous Union by Salvador BARBER?Author-Email: salvador. barbera@uab. es & Matthew O. JACKSON
A Characterization of Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions for Economies with Pure Public Goods by Salvador Barbera & Matthew Jackson
Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions by Salvador BARBER?Author-Email: salvador. barbera@uab. es & Matthew O. JACKSON
Free Triples, Large Indifference Classes and the Majority Rule by Salvador Barber?Author-Email: salvador. barbera@uab. es & Lars Ehlers
Voting by Committees Under Constraints by Salvador Barbera & Jordi Masso & Alejandro Neme
Maximal domains of preferences preserving strategy-proofness for generalized median voter schemes by Alejandro Neme & Jordi MassÔ & Salvador BarberÁ
original papers : Incentive compatible reward schemes for labour-managed firms by Bhaskar Dutta & Salvador BarberÁ
Notes on a Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions. by Barbera, S.
Strategy-Proof Allotment Rules by Salvador Barbera
On the Weights of Nations: Assigning Voting Weights in a Heterogeneous Union by Salvador Barbera & Matthew O. Jackson
Generalized Median Voter Schemes and Committees. by Barbera, S. & Gul, F. & Stacchetti, E.
Strategy-Proof Exchange by Salvador Barbera & Matthew O. Jackson
Self-Selection Consistent Choices by Salvador Barbera & Carmen Bevia
Voting by Committees by Salvador Barbera & Hugo Sonnenschein & Lin Zhou
Top Dominance and the Possibility of Strategy-Proof Stable Solutions to Matching Problems. by Alcalde, J. & Barberà, S.
Protective Behaviour in Matching Models. by Barbera, S. & Dutta, B.
Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Rules for Expected Utility Maximizers. by Barbera, S. & Bogomolnaia, A. & van der Stel, H.
Ranking Sets of Objects. by Barbera, S. & Bossert, W. & Pattanaik, P. K.
STRATEGY-PROOF VOTING SCHEMES WITH CONTINUOUS PREFERENCES by BARBERA, S. & PELEG, B.
VOTING BY QUOTA AND COMMITTEE. by BARBERA, S. & SONNENSCHEIN, H.
Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges. by Barbera, S. & Masso, J. & Serizawa, S.
Voting Under Constraints. by Barbera, S. & Masso, J. & Neme, A.
Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges by Barbera, S. & Masso, J. & Serizawa, S.
Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges. by Masso, J. & Barbera, S.
Voting for Voters: A Model of Electoral Evolution by Barbera, S. & Maschler, M. & Shalev, J.
Self-Selection Consistent Functions by Carmen Bevi? & Salvador Barber?
Extending an order on a Set to the power set: Some remarks on Kannai and Peleg's approach by Barbera, Salvador & Pattanaik, Prasanta K.
Stable voting schemes by Barbera, Salvador
Pivotal voters : A new proof of arrow's theorem by Barbera, Salvador
Locating public facilities by majority: Stability, consistency and group formation by Barbera, Salvador & Bevia, Carmen
Preference aggregation with randomized social orderings by Barbera, Salvador & Sonnenschein, Hugo
Generalized Median Voter Schemes and Committees by Barbera Salvador & Gul Faruk & Stacchetti Ennio
General, direct and self-implementation of social choice functions via protective equilibria by Barbera, Salvador & Dutta, Bhaskar
Implementability via protective equilibria by Barbera, Salvador & Dutta, Bhaskar
Manipulation of social decision functions by Barbera, Salvador
On the Weights of Nations: Assigning Voting Weights in a Heterogeneous Union by Salvador Barbera & Matthew O. Jackson
A note on the impossibility of a satisfactory concept of stability for coalition formation games by Barbera, Salvador & Gerber, Anke
On some axioms for ranking sets of alternatives by Barbera, S. & Barrett, C. R. & Pattanaik, Prasanta K.
How to choose a non-controversial list with k names by Salvador Barberà & Danilo Coelho
Free Triples, Large Indifference Classes and the Majority Rule by EHLERS, Lars & BARBERÀ, Salvador
Top Monotonicity: A Common Root for Single Peakedness, Single Crossing and the Median Voter Result by Salvador Barberà & Bernardo Moreno
Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide? by Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno
A special issue of the IJGT in honor of Michael Maschler by Zamir, Shmuel & Barbera, Salvador
Voting for voters: a model of electoral evolution. by BARBERA, Salvador & MASCHLER, Michael & SHALEV, Jonathan
Michael Maschler in Barcelona by Barberà, Salvador
Free Triples, Large Indifference Classes and the Majority Rule by EHLERS, Lars & BARBERÀ, Salvador
Memorial by Salvador Barberà & Shmuel Zamir
Single-dipped preferences by Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno
Designing Decisions Rules for Transnational Infraestructure Projects by Salvador Barberà
Strategy-proof social choice by Salvador Barberà
On the rule of k names by Barberà, Salvador & Coelho, Danilo
A Note on the Impossibility of a Satisfactory Concept of Stability for Coalition Formation Games by Salvador Barberà & Anke Gerber
Preference for Flexibility and the Opportunities of Choice by Salvador Barberà & Birgit Grodal
Group strategy-proof social choice functions with binary ranges and arbitrary domains: characterization results by Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno
Free Triples, Large Indifference Classes and the Majority Rule by Salvador Barberà & Lars Ehlers
Protective behavior in matching models by Barberà, S. & Dutta, B.
Locating Public Facilities by Majority: Stability, Consistency and Group Formation by Salvador Barberà & Carmen Bevia
How to choose a non-controversial list with k names by Salvador Barberà & Danilo Coelho
On the rule of K names by Salvador Barberà & Danilo Coelho
Individual versus group strategy-proofness: When do they coincide? by Barberà, Salvador & Berga, Dolors & Moreno, Bernardo
A Theorem on Preference Aggregation by Salvador Barberà
Voting by Committees under Constraints by Salvador Barberà & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme
Chapter Twenty-Five - Strategyproof Social Choice by Barberà, Salvador edited by
Free triples, large indifference classes and the majority rule by Salvador Barberà & Lars Ehlers
Two Necessary Conditions for Strategy-Proofness: on What Domains are they also Sufficient? by Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno
Strategy-proof social choice by Salvador Barberà
On the Weights of Nations: Assigning Voting Weights in a Heterogeneous Union by Salvador Barberà & Matthew O. Jackson
On the rule of K names by Salvador Barberà & Danilo Coelho
A Note on the Impossibility of a Satisfactory Concept of Stability for Coalition Formation Games by Salvador Barberà & Anke Gerber
Locating Public Facilities by Majority: Stability, Consistency and Group Formation by Carmen Beviá & Salvador Barberà
Domains, Ranges and Strategy-Proofness: The Case of Single-dipped Preferences by Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno
Preference for Flexibility and the Opportunities of Choice by Salvador Barberà & Birgit Grodal
Top monotonicity: A common root for single peakedness, single crossing and the median voter result by Barberà, Salvador & Moreno, Bernardo
Two Necessary Conditions for Strategy-Proofness: on What Domains are they also Sufficient? by Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno
Two necessary conditions for strategy-proofness: On what domains are they also sufficient? by Barberà, Salvador & Berga, Dolors & Moreno, Bernardo
Top monotonicity: A common root for single peakedness, single crossing and the median voter result by Salvador Barberà & Bernardo Moreno
Preference for flexibility and the opportunities of choice by Barberà, Salvador & Grodal, Birgit
Domains, ranges and strategy-proofness: the case of single-dipped preferences by Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno
A Theorem on Preference Aggregation by Salvador Barberà
Group Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions with Binary Ranges and Arbitrary Domains: Characterization Results by Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno
How to choose a non-controversial list with k names by Salvador Barberà & Danilo Coelho
Free Triples, Large Indifference Classes and the Majority Rule by Salvador Barberà & Lars Ehlers
Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions by Salvador Barberà & Matthew O. Jackson
Voting by Committees under Constraints by Salvador Barberà & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme
Designing Decisions Rules for Transnational Infraestructure Projects by Salvador Barberà
Individual versus group strategy proofedness: when do they coincide? by Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno
Balancing the Power to Appoint Officers by Salvador Barberà & Danilo Coelho
Meritocracy, Egalitarianism and the Stability of Majoritarian Organizations by Salvador Barberà & Carmen Beviá & Clara Ponsatí
Group strategy-proof social choice functions with binary ranges and arbitrary domains: characterization results by Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno
Voting by Committees under Constraints by Salvador BARBER? & Jordi MassóAuthor-Email: jordi. masso@uab. es & Alejandro NEME
Maximin, leximin, and the protective criterion: Characterizations and comparisons by Barbara, Salvador & Jackson, Matthew
Sequential Voting and Agenda Manipulation: The Case of Forward Looking Tie-Breaking by Salvador Barberà & Anke Gerber
Group strategy-proofness in private good economies without money: matching, division and house allocation by Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno
Ordinal Relative Satisficing Behavior: Theory and Experiments by Salvador Barberà & Alejandro Neme
Majority and Positional Voting in a Probabilistic Framework by Salvador Barbera
Meritocracy, egalitarianism and the stability of majoritarian organizations by Barberà, Salvador & Beviá, Carmen & Ponsatí, Clara
Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions by Salvador Barbera & Matthew O. Jackson
Group Strategy-Proofness in Private Good Economies by Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno
Sequential voting and agenda manipulation by Barberà, Salvador & Gerber, Anke
Supporting others and the evolution of influence by Perea, Andrés & Barberá, Salvador
Immunity to Credible Deviations from the Truth by Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno
Group Strategy-Proofness in Private Good Economies by Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno
Information Disclosure under Strategy-proof Social Choice Functions by Salvador Barberà & Antonio Nicolò
Deciding on what to Decide by Salvador Barberà & Anke Gerber
Restricted Environments and Incentive Compatibility in Interdependent Values Models by Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno
A Model of Protests, Revolution, and Information by Salvador Barberà & Matthew O. Jackson
Designing Decisions Rules for Transnational Infrastructure Projects by Barberá, Salvador
A Model of Protests, Revolution, and Information by Salvador Barbera & Matthew O. Jackson
Immunity to credible deviations from the truth by Barberà, Salvador & Berga, Dolors & Moreno, Bernardo
Balancing the power to appoint officers by Barberà, Salvador & Coelho, Danilo
On the advantages and disadvantages of being the first mover under rules of k names by Salvador BarberÃ & Danilo Coelho
Arrow on domain conditions: a fruitful road to travel by Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno
Daunou’s Voting Rule and the Lexicographic Assignment of Priorities by Salvador Barberà & Walter Bossert & Kotaro Suzumura