Elmar G. Wolfstetter

Names

first:	Elmar
middle:	G.
last:	Wolfstetter

Identifer

RePEc Short-ID:

pwo38

Contact

homepage:	https://sites.google.com/view/wolfstetter
postal address:	Institut f. Wirtschaftstheorie I Humboldt University at Berlin Spandauer Str. 1 10178 Berlin Germany

Affiliations

Humboldt-Universität Berlin / Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät (weight: 47%)
- EDIRC entry
- location:
Korea University / Department of Economics (weight: 6%)
- EDIRC entry
- location:
Humboldt-Universität Berlin / Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät / Institut für Wirtschaftstheorie I (weight: 47%)
- EDIRC entry
- location:

Research profile

author of:

Outsourcing via reverse auction with a built‐in menu of change orders (RePEc:bla:buecrs:v:75:y:2023:i:1:p:202-208)
by Elmar G. Wolfstetter
Auctions: An Introduction (RePEc:bla:jecsur:v:10:y:1996:i:4:p:367-420)
by Wolfstetter, Elmar
Liability Insurance and Choice of Cars: A Large Game Approach (RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:17:y:2015:i:6:p:943-963)
by Sjur Didrik Flåm & Elmar G. Wolfstetter
Prizes and lemons: procurement of innovation under imperfect commitment (RePEc:bla:randje:v:42:y:2011:i:4:p:664-680)
by Wei Ding & Elmar G. Wolfstetter
Research Joint Ventures, Optimal Licensing, and the R&D Subsidy Policy (RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:8:y:2008:i:1:n:20)
by Fan Cuihong & Wolfstetter Elmar G
Immediate Demand Reduction in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions (new title: Immediate demand reduction in simultaneous ascending-bid auctions: a uniqueness result) (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1315)
by Frank Riedel & Elmar G. Wolfstetter
Partnership Dissolution, Complementarity, and Investment Incentives (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1325)
by Jianpei Li & Elmar G. Wolfstetter
Bid Rigging – An Analysis of Corruption in Auctions (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1488)
by Yvan Lengwiler & Elmar G. Wolfstetter
A Sealed-Bid Auction that Matches the English Auction (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_249)
by Motty Perry & Elmar G. Wolfstetter & Shmuel Zamir
Auctions when Bidders Prepare by Investing in Ideas (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_258)
by Thomas D. Jeitschko & Elmar G. Wolfstetter
Implementing Efficient Market Structure (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_269)
by Veronika Grimm & Frank Riedel & Elmar G. Wolfstetter
Auctions and Corruption (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_401)
by Yvan Lengwiler & Elmar G. Wolfstetter
Security Bid Auctions for Agency Contracts (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_4554)
by Byoung Heon Jun & Elmar G. Wolfstetter
Auctions with Imperfect Commitment when the Reserve May Serve as a Signal (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_4586)
by Byoung Heon Jun & Elmar G. Wolfstetter
Low Price Equilibrium in Multi-Unit Auctions: The GSM Spectrum Auction in Germany (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_506)
by Veronika Grimm & Frank Riedel & Elmar G. Wolfstetter
The Swiss UMTS Spectrum Auction Flop: Bad Luck or Bad Design (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_534)
by Elmar G. Wolfstetter
The Third Generation (UMTS) Spectrum Auction in Germany (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_584)
by Veronika Grimm & Frank Riedel & Elmar G. Wolfstetter
Induced Price Leadership and (Counter-)Spying Rivals' Play under Incomplete Information (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7476)
by Cuihong Fan & Byoung Heon Jun & Elmar G. Wolfstetter
Universal High-Speed Broadband Provision: An Alternative Policy Approach (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_9014)
by Elmar G. Wolfstetter
Strategic Leaks in First-Price Auctions and Tacit Collusion: The Case of Spying and Counter-Spying (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_9021)
by Cuihong Fan & Byoung Heon Jun & Elmar G. Wolfstetter
First-Price Auctions when the Ranking of Valuations is Common Knowledge (RePEc:crs:wpaper:99-18)
by Michael Landsberger & Jacob Rubinstein & Elmar Wolfstetter & Shmuel Zamir
Topics in Microeconomics (RePEc:cup:cbooks:9780521645348)
by Wolfstetter,Elmar
Surplus Labour, Synchronised Labor Costs and Marx's Labour Theory of Value (RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:83:y:1973:i:331:p:787-809)
by Wolfstetter, E
Positive Profits with Negative Surplus Value: A Comment (RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:86:y:1976:i:344:p:864-72)
by Wolfstetter, Elmar
Implementing Efficient Market Structure (RePEc:ecm:wc2000:0268)
by Veronika Grimm & Frank Riedel & Elmar Wolfstetter
Auctions and corruption: An analysis of bid rigging by a corrupt auctioneer (RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:34:y:2010:i:10:p:1872-1892)
by Lengwiler, Yvan & Wolfstetter, Elmar
Signal jamming in a sequential auction (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:108:y:2010:i:1:p:58-61)
by Ding, Wei & Jeitschko, Thomas D. & Wolfstetter, Elmar G.
The merger-paradox: A tournament-based solution (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:127:y:2015:i:c:p:35-38)
by Fan, Cuihong & Wolfstetter, Elmar G.
Underemployment and normal leisure (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:15:y:1984:i:1-2:p:157-163)
by Brown, Murray & Wolfstetter, Elmar
Per unit vs. ad valorem royalty licensing (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:170:y:2018:i:c:p:71-75)
by Fan, Cuihong & Jun, Byoung Heon & Wolfstetter, Elmar G.
Procuring substitutes with (fine-tuned) first-price auctions (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:171:y:2018:i:c:p:115-118)
by Arozamena, Leandro & Weinschelbaum, Federico & Wolfstetter, Elmar G.
A new class of sufficient conditions for the first-order approach to the principal-agent problem (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:21:y:1986:i:1:p:1-6)
by Brown, Murray & Chiang, Shin Hwan & Ghosh, Satyajit & Wolfstetter, Elmar
Bid shading and risk aversion in multi-unit auctions with many bidders (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:56:y:1997:i:2:p:195-200)
by Nautz, D. & Wolfstetter, E.
Auctions when bidders prepare by investing in ideas (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:68:y:2000:i:1:p:61-66)
by Jeitschko, Thomas D. & Wolfstetter, Elmar
Efficient (re-)scheduling: An auction approach (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:89:y:2005:i:2:p:187-192)
by Pettersen Strandenes, Siri & Wolfstetter, Elmar
Procurement with costly bidding, optimal shortlisting, and rebates (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:98:y:2008:i:3:p:327-334)
by Fan, Cuihong & Wolfstetter, Elmar
Bidding behavior in asymmetric auctions: An experimental study (RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:49:y:2005:i:7:p:1891-1913)
by Guth, Werner & Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta & Wolfstetter, Elmar
A Sealed-Bid Auction That Matches the English Auction (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:33:y:2000:i:2:p:265-273)
by Perry, Motty & Wolfstetter, Elmar & Zamir, Shmuel
License auctions with royalty contracts for (winners and) losers (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:63:y:2008:i:1:p:91-106)
by Giebe, Thomas & Wolfstetter, Elmar
Licensing process innovations when losersʼ messages determine royalty rates (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:82:y:2013:i:c:p:388-402)
by Fan, Cuihong & Jun, Byoung Heon & Wolfstetter, Elmar G.
Spectrum license auctions with exit (and call) options: Alternative remedies for the exposure problem (RePEc:eee:iepoli:v:27:y:2014:i:c:p:13-23)
by Hu, Luke & Wolfstetter, Elmar G.
Universal high-speed broadband provision: A simple auction approach (RePEc:eee:iepoli:v:60:y:2022:i:c:s0167624522000336)
by Wolfstetter, Elmar G.
A dynamic model of Bertrand competition with entry (RePEc:eee:indorg:v:17:y:1999:i:4:p:513-525)
by Elberfeld, Walter & Wolfstetter, Elmar
Low price equilibrium in multi-unit auctions: the GSM spectrum auction in Germany (RePEc:eee:indorg:v:21:y:2003:i:10:p:1557-1569)
by Grimm, Veronika & Riedel, Frank & Wolfstetter, Elmar
Horizontal mergers with synergies: Cash vs. profit-share auctions (RePEc:eee:indorg:v:31:y:2013:i:5:p:382-391)
by Ding, Wei & Fan, Cuihong & Wolfstetter, Elmar G.
Auctions with imperfect commitment when the reserve may signal the cost to re-auction (RePEc:eee:indorg:v:40:y:2015:i:c:p:11-21)
by Jun, Byoung Heon & Wolfstetter, Elmar G.
Optimal bid disclosure in patent license auctions under alternative modes of competition (RePEc:eee:indorg:v:47:y:2016:i:c:p:1-32)
by Fan, Cuihong & Jun, Byoung Heon & Wolfstetter, Elmar G.
Optimal licensing of technology in the face of (asymmetric) competition (RePEc:eee:indorg:v:60:y:2018:i:c:p:32-53)
by Fan, Cuihong & Jun, Byoung Heon & Wolfstetter, Elmar G.
Optimal risk shifting vs efficient employment in Illyria: The labor-managed firm under asymmetric information (RePEc:eee:jcecon:v:11:y:1987:i:2:p:163-179)
by Meran, Georg & Wolfstetter, Elmar
Spying in Bertrand markets under incomplete information: Who benefits and is it stable? (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:102:y:2022:i:c:s0304406822000647)
by Fan, Cuihong & Jun, Byoung Heon & Wolfstetter, Elmar G.
Chiseling, monitoring, and the price mechanism: A social choice dilemma (RePEc:eee:poleco:v:7:y:1991:i:3:p:367-379)
by Adolph, Brigitte & Wolfstetter, Elmar & Svindland, Eirik
How to allocate R&D (and other) subsidies: An experimentally tested policy recommendation (RePEc:eee:respol:v:35:y:2006:i:9:p:1261-1272)
by Giebe, Thomas & Grebe, Tim & Wolfstetter, Elmar
Licensing a common value innovation when signaling strength may backfire (RePEc:iek:wpaper:1010)
by Cuihong Fan & Byoung Heon Jun & Elmar G. Wolfstetter
Security bid auctions for agency contracts (RePEc:iek:wpaper:1303)
by Byoung Heon Jun & Elmar G. Wolfstetter
Auctions with imperfect commitment when the reserve may serve as a signal (RePEc:iek:wpaper:1304)
by Byoung Heon Jun & Elmar G. Wolfstetter
To spy or not to (fire the) spy: The benefits of acquiring information about rivals¡¯ play in Bertrand competition (RePEc:iek:wpaper:1609)
by Cuihong Fan & Byoung Heon Jun & Elmar G. Wolfstetter
Optimal Licensing of Non-Drastic and (Super-)Drastic Innovations: The Case of the Inside Patent Holder (RePEc:iek:wpaper:1610)
by Cuihong Fan & Byoung Heon Jun & Elmar G. Wolfstetter
Optimal Licensing of Technology in the Face of (Asymmetric) Competition (RePEc:iek:wpaper:1705)
by Cuihong Fan & Byoung Heon Jun & Elmar G. Wolfstetter
Per Unit vs. Ad Valorem Royalty Licensing (RePEc:iek:wpaper:1706)
by Cuihong Fan & Byoung Heon Jun & Elmar G. Wolfstetter
Unsichere Rente: Wie reagieren Arbeitsangebot und Ersparnis?/Social Security Insecurity: How do Labor Supply and Savings Respond to Increasing Risk? (RePEc:jns:jbstat:v:208:y:1991:i:2:p:140-152:n:3)
by Prinz Aloys & Wolfstetter Elmar
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) (RePEc:mhr:jinste)
from Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen as editor
Scale Economies and the Dynamics of Recurring Auctions (RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:40:y:2002:i:3:p:403-414)
by Thomas D. Jeitschko & Elmar Wolfstetter
Wage-Indexation, Informational Externalities, and Monetary Policy (RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:43:y:1991:i:3:p:368-90)
by Adolph, Brigitte & Wolfstetter, Elmar
Partnership dissolution, complementarity, and investment incentives (RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:62:y:2010:i:3:p:529-552)
by Jianpei Li & Elmar Wolfstetter
Tripartite Income-Employment Contracts and Coalition Incentive Compatibility (RePEc:rje:randje:v:20:y:1989:i:autumn:p:291-307)
by Murray Brown & Elmar Wolfstetter
Spying and imperfect commitment in first-price auctions: a case of tacit collusion (RePEc:spr:etbull:v:11:y:2023:i:2:d:10.1007_s40505-023-00257-3)
by Cuihong Fan & Byoung Heon Jun & Elmar G. Wolfstetter
Vaccination Gap, Vaccination Fraud and Inefficient Testing (RePEc:spr:intere:v:57:y:2022:i:5:d:10.1007_s10272-022-1072-3)
by Hanno Beck & Aloys Prinz & Elmar Wolfstetter
Immediate demand reduction in simultaneous ascending-bid auctions: a uniqueness result (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:29:y:2006:i:3:p:721-726)
by Frank Riedel & Elmar Wolfstetter
Optimal licensing under incomplete information: the case of the inside patent holder (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:66:y:2018:i:4:d:10.1007_s00199-017-1077-5)
by Cuihong Fan & Byoung Heon Jun & Elmar G. Wolfstetter
Licensing a common value innovation when signaling strength may backfire (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:43:y:2014:i:1:p:215-244)
by Cuihong Fan & Byoung Jun & Elmar Wolfstetter
Price leadership, spying, and secret price changes: a Stackelberg game with imperfect commitment (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:52:y:2023:i:3:d:10.1007_s00182-023-00840-9)
by Cuihong Fan & Byoung Heon Jun & Elmar G. Wolfstetter
Security bid auctions for agency contracts (RePEc:spr:reecde:v:18:y:2014:i:4:p:289-319)
by Byoung Jun & Elmar Wolfstetter
First-price auctions when the ranking of valuations is common knowledge (RePEc:spr:reecde:v:6:y:2001:i:3:p:461-480)
by Jacob Rubinstein & Elmar Wolfstetter & Michael Landsberger & Shmuel Zamir
How to Allocate R&D (and Other) Subsidies: An Experimentally Tested Policy Recommendation (RePEc:trf:wpaper:108)
by Giebe, Thomas & Grebe, Tim & Wolfstetter, Elmar G.
Research Joint Ventures, Optimal Licensing, and R&D Subsidy Policy (RePEc:trf:wpaper:165)
by Fan, Cuihong & Wolfstetter, Elmar G.
Procurement with Costly Bidding, Optimal Shortlisting, and Rebates (RePEc:trf:wpaper:166)
by Fan, Cuihong & Wolfstetter, Elmar G.
License Auctions with Royalty Contracts for (Winners and) Losers (RePEc:trf:wpaper:199)
by Giebe, Thomas & Wolfstetter, Elmar G.
Signal-Jamming in a Sequential Auction (RePEc:trf:wpaper:261)
by Ding, Wei & Jeitschko, Thomas D. & Wolfstetter, Elmar G.
Prizes and Lemons: Procurement of Innovation under Imperfect Commitment (RePEc:trf:wpaper:262)
by Ding, Wei & Wolfstetter, Elmar G.
Auctioning Process Innovations when Losersâ€™ Bids Determine Royalty Rates (RePEc:trf:wpaper:291)
by Fan, Cuihong & Jun, Byoung Heon & Wolfstetter, Elmar G.
Licensing a common value innovation when signaling strength may backfire (RePEc:trf:wpaper:292)
by Fan, Cuihong & Jun, Byoung Heon & Wolfstetter, Elmar G.
On Liability Insurance for Automobiles (RePEc:trf:wpaper:321)
by Flåm, Sjur Didrik & Wolfstetter, Elmar G.
Horizontal mergers with synergies: first-price vs. profit-share auction (RePEc:trf:wpaper:336)
by Ding, Wei & Fan, Cuihong & Wolfstetter, Elmar G.
A Proxy Bidding Mechanism that Elicits all Bids in an English Clock Auction Experiment (RePEc:trf:wpaper:36)
by Engelmann, Dirk & Wolfstetter, Elmar G.
Security bid auctions for agency contracts (RePEc:trf:wpaper:371)
by Jun, Byoung Heon & Wolfstetter, Elmar G.
Bid Rigging. An Analysis of Corruption in Auctions (RePEc:trf:wpaper:39)
by Lengwiler, Yvan & Wolfstetter, Elmar G.
License auctions with exit (and entry) options: Alternative remedies for the exposure problem (RePEc:trf:wpaper:394)
by Hu, Luke & Wolfstetter, Elmar G.
Auctions with imperfect commitment when the reserve may signal the auctioneer's type (RePEc:trf:wpaper:403)
by Jun, Byoung Heon & Wolfstetter, Elmar G.
Optimal bid disclosure in license auctions with downstream interaction (RePEc:trf:wpaper:467)
by Fan, Cuihong & Jun, Byoung Heon & Wolfstetter, Elmar G.
The Merger-Paradox: A Tournament-Based Solution (RePEc:trf:wpaper:478)
by Fan, Cuihong & Wolfstetter, Elmar G.
Licensing Innovations: The Case of the Inside Patent Holder (RePEc:trf:wpaper:510)
by Fan, Cuihong & Jun, Byoung Heon & Wolfstetter, Elmar G.
Research Joint Ventures, Licensing, and Industrial Policy (RePEc:trf:wpaper:89)
by Fan, Cuihong & Wolfstetter, Elmar G.
Corruption in Procurement Auctions (RePEc:trf:wpaper:90)
by Lengwiler, Yvan & Wolfstetter, Elmar G.
Procurement of Goods and Services â€“ Scope and Government (RePEc:trf:wpaper:93)
by Wolfstetter, Elmar G.
License Auctions with Royalty Contracts for Losers (RePEc:trf:wpaper:96)
by Giebe, Thomas & Wolfstetter, Elmar G.
A Dynamic Model of Bertrand Competition with Entry (RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:9701003)
by Elmar Wolfstetter & Walter Elberfeld
First-Price Auctions when the Ranking of Valuations (RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:9701004)
by Elmar Wolfstetter & Michael Landsberger & Jakob Rubinstei & Shmuel Zamir
Chain Store Paradoxon (RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:9701005)
by Elmar Wolfstetter & Brigitte Adolph
Another Bertrand Paradox (RePEc:zbw:sfb373:199412)
by Wolfstetter, Elmar
Auctions: An Introduction (RePEc:zbw:sfb373:199413)
by Wolfstetter, Elmar
A Simple Solution of Some Auction Games (RePEc:zbw:sfb373:199523)
by Wolfstetter, E.
Wiederholter Bertrand Wettbewerb bei unvollständiger Information (RePEc:zbw:sfb373:19959)
by Wolfstetter, E.
Third- and higher-price auctions (RePEc:zbw:sfb373:19963)
by Wolfstetter, Elmar
Optimal Bids in Multi-Unit Auctions when Demand is Price Elastic (RePEc:zbw:sfb373:199633)
by Nautz, D. & Wolfstetter, E.
First-Price Auctions when the Ranking of Valuations is Common Knowledge (RePEc:zbw:sfb373:199636)
by Landsberger, M. & Rubinstein, J. & Wolfstetter, E. & Zamir, S.
Regulation of Monopoly (RePEc:zbw:sfb373:199637)
by Wolfstetter, E.
Economics of Matching: The Marriage Problem (RePEc:zbw:sfb373:199638)
by Wolfstetter, E.
Oligopoly and Industrial Organization (RePEc:zbw:sfb373:199639)
by Wolfstetter, E.
Preisregeln für Auktionen und Ausschreibungen: Eine Diskussion (RePEc:zbw:sfb373:19964)
by Wolfstetter, Elmar
Stochastic Dominance: Theorie and Applications (RePEc:zbw:sfb373:199640)
by Wolfstetter, E.
Reputation and Imperfectly Observable Commitment: The Chain Store Paradox Revisited (RePEc:zbw:sfb373:199685)
by Adolph, B. & Wolfstetter, E.
Auktionen und Ausschreibungen: Bedeutungen und Grenzen des linkage-Prinzips (RePEc:zbw:sfb373:199831)
by Wolfstetter, Elmar
Scale economies and the dynamics of recurring auctions (RePEc:zbw:sfb373:199862)
by Jeitschko, Thomas D. & Wolfstetter, Elmar
A sealed-bid auction that matches the English auction (RePEc:zbw:sfb373:199863)
by Perry, Motty & Wolfstetter, Elmar & Zamir, Shmuel
Auctions when bidders prepare by investing in ideas (RePEc:zbw:sfb373:200018)
by Jeitschko, Thomas D. & Wolfstetter, Elmar
Implementing efficient market structure (RePEc:zbw:sfb373:200019)
by Grimm, Veronika & Riedel, Frank & Wolfstetter, Elmar
Auctions and corruption (RePEc:zbw:sfb373:200040)
by Lengwiler, Yvan & Wolfstetter, Elmar
Bidding behavior in asymmetric auctions: An experimental study (RePEc:zbw:sfb373:200115)
by Güth, Werner & Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta & Wolfstetter, Elmar
Low price equilibrium in multi-unit auctions: The GSM spectrum auction in Germany (RePEc:zbw:sfb373:200131)
by Grimm, Veronika & Riedel, Frank & Wolfstetter, Elmar
The Swiss UMTS spectrum auction flop: Bad luck or bad design? (RePEc:zbw:sfb373:200150)
by Wolfstetter, Elmar
The third generation (UMTS) spectrum auction in Germany (RePEc:zbw:sfb373:200170)
by Grimm, Veronika & Riedel, Frank & Wolfstetter, Elmar

The profile is maintained by Elmar G. Wolfstetter

Permanent link: http://authors.repec.org/pro/pwo38/