Alexander Wolitzky
Names
| first: |
Alexander |
| last: |
Wolitzky |
Identifer
Contact
Affiliations
-
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
/ Economics Department
Research profile
author of:
- Cycles of Conflict: An Economic Model (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:104:y:2014:i:4:p:1350-67)
by Daron Acemoglu & Alexander Wolitzky - Capital Taxation under Political Constraints (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:106:y:2016:i:8:p:2304-28)
by Florian Scheuer & Alexander Wolitzky - Learning from Others' Outcomes (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:108:y:2018:i:10:p:2763-2801)
by Alexander Wolitzky - A Few Bad Apples Spoil the Barrel: An Anti-folk Theorem for Anonymous Repeated Games with Incomplete Information (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:110:y:2020:i:12:p:3817-35)
by Takuo Sugaya & Alexander Wolitzky - Unobserved-Offers Bargaining (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:113:y:2023:i:1:p:136-73)
by Alexander Wolitzky - Persuasion with Non-Linear Preferences (RePEc:arx:papers:2206.09164)
by Anton Kolotilin & Roberto Corrao & Alexander Wolitzky - The Economics of Partisan Gerrymandering (RePEc:arx:papers:2304.09381)
by Anton Kolotilin & Alexander Wolitzky - Persuasion and Matching: Optimal Productive Transport (RePEc:arx:papers:2311.02889)
by Anton Kolotilin & Roberto Corrao & Alexander Wolitzky - A search cost model of obfuscation (RePEc:bla:randje:v:43:y:2012:i:3:p:417-441)
by Glenn Ellison & Alexander Wolitzky - Career Concerns and Performance Reporting in Optimal Incentive Contracts (RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:12:y:2012:i:1:n:6)
by Wolitzky Alexander - Capital Taxation under Political Constraints (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_5098)
by Florian Scheuer & Alexander Wolitzky - Cycles of Distrust: An Economic Model (RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000502)
by Daron Acemoglu & Alexander Wolitzky - Sustaining Cooperation: Community Enforcement vs. Specialized Enforcement (RePEc:cla:levrem:786969000000001179)
by Daron Acemoglu & Alexander Wolitzky - Capital Taxation under Political Constraints (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:10418)
by Scheuer, Florian & Wolitzky, Alexander - Deterrence with Imperfect Attribution (RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:114:y:2020:i:4:p:1155-1178_15)
by Baliga, Sandeep & Bueno De Mesquita, Ethan & Wolitzky, Alexander - The Economics of Labor Coercion (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:79:y:2011:i:2:p:555-600)
by Daron Acemoglu & Alexander Wolitzky - Reputational Bargaining With Minimal Knowledge of Rationality (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:80:y:2012:i:5:p:2047-2087)
by Alexander Wolitzky - Fully sincere voting (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:67:y:2009:i:2:p:720-735)
by Wolitzky, Alexander - Indeterminacy of reputation effects in repeated games with contracts (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:73:y:2011:i:2:p:595-607)
by Wolitzky, Alexander - Endogenous institutions and political extremism (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:81:y:2013:i:c:p:86-100)
by Wolitzky, Alexander - Bounding payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring: n-player games (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:175:y:2018:i:c:p:58-87)
by Sugaya, Takuo & Wolitzky, Alexander - Indirect reciprocity with simple records (RePEc:nas:journl:v:117:y:2020:p:11344-11349)
by Daniel Clark & Drew Fudenberg & Alexander Wolitzky - A Search Cost Model of Obfuscation (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:15237)
by Glenn Ellison & Alexander Wolitzky - The Economics of Labor Coercion (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:15581)
by Daron Acemoglu & Alexander Wolitzky - Cycles of Distrust: An Economic Model (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:18257)
by Daron Acemoglu & Alexander Wolitzky - Capital Taxation under Political Constraints (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:20043)
by Florian Scheuer & Alexander Wolitzky - Sustaining Cooperation: Community Enforcement vs. Specialized Enforcement (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:21457)
by Daron Acemoglu & Alexander Wolitzky - A Theory of Equality Before the Law (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:24681)
by Daron Acemoglu & Alexander Wolitzky - Mistrust, Misperception, and Misunderstanding: Imperfect Information and Conflict Dynamics (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:31681)
by Daron Acemoglu & Alexander Wolitzky - A Theory of Equality Before the Law (RePEc:oup:econjl:v:131:y:2021:i:636:p:1429-1465.)
by Daron Acemoglu & Alexander Wolitzky - Sustaining Cooperation: Community Enforcement versus Specialized Enforcement (RePEc:oup:jeurec:v:18:y:2020:i:2:p:1078-1122.)
by Daron Acemoglu & Alexander Wolitzky - Cooperation with Network Monitoring (RePEc:oup:restud:v:80:y:2013:i:1:p:395-427)
by Alexander Wolitzky - The Revelation Principle in Multistage Games
[Information Feedback in a Dynamic Tournament] (RePEc:oup:restud:v:88:y:2021:i:3:p:1503-1540.)
by Takuo Sugaya & Alexander Wolitzky - Record-Keeping and Cooperation in Large Societies
[Has Punishment Played a Role in the Evolution of Cooperation? A Critical Review] (RePEc:oup:restud:v:88:y:2021:i:5:p:2179-2209.)
by Daniel Clark & Drew Fudenberg & Alexander Wolitzky - Capital Taxation under Political Constraints (RePEc:red:sed014:191)
by Alexander Wolitzky & Florian Scheuer - Reputational Bargaining (RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-030-76666-5_3)
by Jack Fanning & Alexander Wolitzky - Assortative Information Disclosure (RePEc:swe:wpaper:2020-08)
by Anton Kolotilin & Alexander Wolitzky - The Economics of Partisan Gerrymandering (RePEc:swe:wpaper:2020-12)
by Anton Kolotilin & Alexander Wolitzky - The Economics of Partisan Gerrymandering (RePEc:swe:wpaper:2023-06)
by Anton Kolotilin & Alexander Wolitzky - Persuasion with Non-Linear Preferences (RePEc:swe:wpaper:2023-07)
by Anton Kolotilin & Roberto Corrao & Alexander Wolitzky - Persuasion and Matching: Optimal Productive Transport (RePEc:swe:wpaper:2023-12)
by Anton Kolotilin & Roberto Corrao & Alexander Wolitzky - Communication with tokens in repeated games on networks (RePEc:the:publsh:1559)
by Wolitzky, Alexander - Mechanism design with maxmin agents: theory and an application to bilateral trade (RePEc:the:publsh:2089)
by Wolitzky, Alexander - Bounding equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring (RePEc:the:publsh:2270)
by Sugaya, Takuo & Wolitzky, Alexander - Bad apples in symmetric repeated games (RePEc:the:publsh:5351)
by Sugaya, Takuo & Wolitzky, Alexander - Dynamic monopoly with relational incentives (RePEc:the:publsh:701)
by , - Maintaining Privacy in Cartels (RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/699975)
by Takuo Sugaya & Alexander Wolitzky - Communication and Community Enforcement (RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/715023)
by Takuo Sugaya & Alexander Wolitzky - The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games With Anonymous Random Matching (RePEc:wly:emetrp:v:88:y:2020:i:3:p:917-964)
by Joyee Deb & Takuo Sugaya & Alexander Wolitzky - Monitoring versus Discounting in Repeated Games (RePEc:wly:emetrp:v:91:y:2023:i:5:p:1727-1761)
by Takuo Sugaya & Alexander Wolitzky