Bruno Versaevel
Names
| first: |
Bruno |
| last: |
Versaevel |
Identifer
Contact
Affiliations
-
Université de Lyon
/ Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne) (weight: 10%)
-
EMLYON Business School (weight: 90%)
Research profile
author of:
- Optimal collusion with limited liability (RePEc:bla:ijethy:v:9:y:2013:i:3:p:203-227)
by Etienne Billette de Villemeur & Laurent Flochel & Bruno Versaevel - R&D Delegation in a Duopoly with Spillovers (RePEc:bpj:bejeap:v:9:y:2009:i:1:n:55)
by Versaevel Bruno & Vencatachellum Désiré - Mieux qu’un compromis, une troisième voie : le panier de brevets pour accélérer l’accès aux vaccins et traitements contre la COVID-19 (RePEc:cai:edddbu:edd_351_0017)
by Etienne Billette de Villemeur & Vianney Dequiedt & Bruno Versaevel - Horizontal R and D cooperation and spillovers: evidence from France (RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-08o30004)
by Bruno Versaevel & Désiré Vencatachellum - On the tacit collusion equilibria of a dynamic duopoly investment game (RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-12-00608)
by Richard Ruble & Bruno Versaevel - Dynamic competition and intellectual property rights in a model of product development (RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:100:y:2019:i:c:p:270-296)
by Billette de Villemeur, Etienne & Ruble, Richard & Versaevel, Bruno - Caveat preemptor: Coordination failure and success in a duopoly investment game (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:118:y:2013:i:2:p:250-254)
by de Villemeur, Etienne Billette & Ruble, Richard & Versaevel, Bruno - Investment timing and vertical relationships (RePEc:eee:indorg:v:33:y:2014:i:c:p:110-123)
by Billette de Villemeur, Etienne & Ruble, Richard & Versaevel, Bruno - Patent pools and dynamic R&D incentives (RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:36:y:2013:i:c:p:59-69)
by Dequiedt, Vianney & Versaevel, Bruno - Market shares, R&D agreements, and the EU block exemption (RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:37:y:2014:i:c:p:15-25)
by Ruble, Richard & Versaevel, Bruno - From private to public common agency (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:111:y:2003:i:2:p:305-309)
by Billette de Villemeur, Etienne & Versaevel, Bruno - One lab, two firms, many possibilities: On R&D outsourcing in the biopharmaceutical industry (RePEc:eee:jhecon:v:65:y:2019:i:c:p:260-283)
by Billette de Villemeur, Etienne & Versaevel, Bruno - Co-ordination costs and vertical integration in production franchise networks: a common agency model (RePEc:eee:reecon:v:56:y:2002:i:2:p:157-186)
by Versaevel, Bruno - Testing Optimal Punishment Mechanisms under Price Regulation: the Case of the Retail Market for Gasoline (RePEc:gat:wpaper:0611)
by Robert Gagné & Simon van Norden & Bruno Versaevel - Market Share, R&D Cooperation, and EU Competition Policy (RePEc:gat:wpaper:0910)
by Richard Ruble & Bruno Versaevel - On the timing of vertical relationships (RePEc:gat:wpaper:1118)
by Etienne Billette de Villemeur & Richard Ruble & Bruno Versaevel - Coordination and Cooperation in Investment Timing with Externalities? (RePEc:gat:wpaper:1128)
by Etienne Billette de Villemeur & Richard Ruble & Bruno Versaevel - One Lab, Two Firms, Many Possibilities: on R&D outsourcing in the biopharmaceutical industry (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02107357)
by Etienne Billette de Villemeur & Bruno Versaevel - Implications des licences FRAND pour la concurrence : un regard économique (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02280942)
by Emilie Dargaud & Richard Ruble & Bruno Versaevel - From private to public common agency (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02311683)
by Etienne Billette de Villemeur & Bruno Versaevel - Dynamic competition and intellectual property rights in a model of product development (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02312286)
by Etienne Billette de Villemeur & Richard Ruble & Bruno Versaevel - Implications des licences FRAND pour la concurrence : un regard économique (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02312403)
by Emilie Dargaud & Richard Ruble & Bruno Versaevel - R&D Delegation in a Duopoly with Spillovers (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02312541)
by Bruno Versaevel & Désiré Vencatachellum - Mise en oeuvre de la collusion et détection : approches actives et passives (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02312544)
by Richard Ruble & Bruno Versaevel - Quel rôle pour un critère de part de marché dans la réglementation de la coopération en recherche et développement ? (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02312713)
by Richard Ruble & Bruno Versaevel - Caveat preemptor : Coordination Failure and Success in a Duopoly Investment Game (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02312926)
by Etienne Billette de Villemeur & Richard Ruble & Bruno Versaevel - Market shares, R&D agreements, and the EU block exemption (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02313022)
by Richard Ruble & Bruno Versaevel - Investment Timing and Vertical Relationships (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02313058)
by Etienne Billette de Villemeur & Richard Ruble & Bruno Versaevel - Quelles spécificités des accords de distribution en ligne ? (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02313206)
by Richard Ruble & Bruno Versaevel - Développements récents de l'approche économique des sanctions dans le cas des cartels (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02313276)
by Emilie Dargaud & Richard Ruble & Bruno Versaevel - Alertness, Leadership, and Nascent Market Dynamics (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02313312)
by Bruno Versaevel - Dynamique des marchés et ajustement de la protection intellectuelle (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02379248)
by Richard Ruble & Bruno Versaevel - Pool patents to get COVID vaccines and drugs to all (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03186951)
by Etienne Billette de Villemeur & Vianney Dequiedt & Bruno Versaevel - Covid-19: Should intellectual property rights be challenged?
[Covid-19 : doit-on remettre en question les droits de propriété intellectuelle?] (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03212246)
by Etienne Billette de Villemeur & Vianney Dequiedt & Bruno Versaevel - Better than a compromise, a third way: patent pool to accelerate access to vaccines and treatments against Covid-19
[Mieux qu’un compromis, une troisième voie : le panier de brevets pour accélérer (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03967701)
by Vianney Dequiedt & Bruno Versaevel & Etienne Billette de Villemeur - Biopharmaceutical R&D outsourcing: Short-term gain for long-term pain? (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03967759)
by Jack Scannell & Bruno Versaevel & Etienne Billette de Villemeur - Testing Optimal Punishment Mechanisms under Price Regulation: the Case of the Retail Market for Gasoline (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00142516)
by Robert Gagné & Simon van Norden & Bruno Versaevel - From Private to Public Common Agency (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00161728)
by Bruno Versaevel & Etienne Billette de Villemeur - Horizontal R&D Cooperation and Spillovers: Evidence from France (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00353349)
by Désiré Vencatachellum & Bruno Versaevel - Mise en oeuvre de la collusion et détection : approches actives et passives (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00590300)
by Richard Ruble & Bruno Versaevel - Tacit Collusion in Investment Timing (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00590306)
by Richard Ruble & Bruno Versaevel - Timing Vertical Relationships (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00590310)
by Etienne Billette de Villemeur & Richard Ruble & Bruno Versaevel - Timing Vertical Relationships (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00590313)
by Etienne Billette de Villemeur & Richard Ruble & Bruno Versaevel - Timing Vertical Relationships (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00618051)
by Etienne Billette de Villemeur & Richard Ruble & Bruno Versaevel - Quel rôle pour la part de marché quand le droit de la concurrence porte son regard sur la coopération et l'innovation (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00664808)
by Richard Ruble & Bruno Versaevel - Timing Vertical Relationships (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00673936)
by Etienne Billette de Villemeur & Richard Ruble & Bruno Versaevel - Timing Vertical Relationships (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00673939)
by Etienne Billette de Villemeur & Richard Ruble & Bruno Versaevel - Optimal Collusion with Limited Liability and Policy Implications (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00673947)
by Bruno Versaevel - Optimal Collusion with Limited Liability (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00755569)
by Etienne Billette de Villemeur & Laurent Flochel & Bruno Versaevel - Caveat Preemptor : Coordination Failure and Success in a Duopoly Investment Game (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00755574)
by Etienne Billette de Villemeur & Richard Ruble & Bruno Versaevel - On the tacit collusion equilibria of a dynamic duopoly investment game (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00755642)
by Richard Ruble & Bruno Versaevel - Alertness, Leadership, and Nascent Market Dynamics (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00755656)
by Bruno Versaevel - Patent Pools and Dynamic R&D Incentives (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00755661)
by Bruno Versaevel - Patent pools and dynamic R&D incentives (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00833828)
by Vianney Dequiedt & Bruno Versaevel - Market shares, R&D agreements, and the EU block exemption (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00879047)
by Richard Ruble & Bruno Versaevel - R&D Delegation in a Duopoly with Spillovers (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00956711)
by Désiré Vencatachellum & Bruno Versaevel - Patent Pools and R&D Dynamics (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00956721)
by Bruno Versaevel - Alertness, Leadership, and Nascent Market Dynamics (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00956748)
by Bruno Versaevel - Alertness, Leadership, and Nascent Market Dynamics (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00956753)
by Bruno Versaevel - Alertness, Leadership, and Nascent Market Dynamics (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00956755)
by Bruno Versaevel - Développements récents de l'approche économique des sanctions dans le cas des cartels (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01087899)
by Emilie Dargaud & Richard Ruble & Bruno Versaevel - Innovation and Imitation Incentives in Dynamic Duopoly (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01146991)
by Richard Ruble & Etienne Billette de Villemeur & Bruno Versaevel - Développements récents de l'approche économique des sanctions dans le cas des cartels (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01232703)
by Emilie Dargaud & Richard Ruble & Bruno Versaevel - Alertness, Leadership, and Nascent Market Dynamics (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01232708)
by Bruno Versaevel - Innovation and Imitation Incentives in Dynamic Duopoly (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01232714)
by Richard Ruble & Etienne Billette de Villemeur & Bruno Versaevel - On the timing of innovation and imitation in dynamic duopoly (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01302009)
by Bruno Versaevel - On the Optimal Timing of Innovation and Imitation (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01421418)
by Richard Ruble & Etienne Billette de Villemeur & Bruno Versaevel - One lab, two firms, many Possibilities: On R&D outsourcing in the biopharmaceutical industry (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01960426)
by Bruno Versaevel - One lab, two firms, many Possibilities: On R&D outsourcing in the biopharmaceutical industry (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01960435)
by Bruno Versaevel - Dynamic competition and intellectual property rights in a model of product development (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-02092324)
by Etienne Billette de Villemeur & Richard Ruble & Bruno Versaevel - Investment timing and vertical relationships (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-02096674)
by Etienne Billette de Villemeur & Richard Ruble & Bruno Versaevel - Dynamic competition and intellectual property rights in a model of product development (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-02233688)
by Etienne Billette de Villemeur & Richard Ruble & Bruno Versaevel - Dynamique des marchés et ajustement de la protection Intellectuelle (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-02390660)
by Richard Ruble & Bruno Versaevel - Optimal Collusion with Limited Liability and Policy Implications (RePEc:ide:wpaper:11169)
by Flochel, Laurent & Versaevel, Bruno & de Villemeur, Étienne - On the Timing of Vertical Relationships (RePEc:ide:wpaper:22883)
by Ruble, Richard & Versaevel, Bruno & de Villemeur, Étienne - Conflict and Cooperation on R&D Markets (RePEc:ide:wpaper:609)
by Versaevel, Bruno & de Villemeur, Étienne - Testing Optimal Punishment Mechanisms under Price Regulation: the Case of the Retail Market for Gasoline (RePEc:iea:carech:0612)
by Robert Gagné & Simon van Norden & Bruno Versaevel - Pool patents to get COVID vaccines and drugs to all (RePEc:nat:nature:v:591:y:2021:i:7851:d:10.1038_d41586-021-00759-9)
by Etienne Billette de Villemeur & Vianney Dequiedt & Bruno Versaevel - Biopharmaceutical R&D outsourcing: Short-term gain for long-term pain? (RePEc:pra:mprapa:108233)
by Billette de Villemeur, Etienne & Scannell, Jack & Versaevel, Bruno - Better than a compromise, a third way: Using patent pooling to accelerate access to vaccines and treatments against Covid-19 (RePEc:pra:mprapa:117765)
by Billette de Villemeur, Etienne & Dequiedt, Vianney & Versaevel, Bruno - Optimal collusion with limited liability (RePEc:pra:mprapa:38481)
by Billette de Villemeur, Etienne & Flochel, Laurent & Versaevel, Bruno - Investment Timing and Vertical Relationships (RePEc:pra:mprapa:47804)
by Billette de Villemeur, Etienne & Ruble, Richard & Versaevel, Bruno - Innovation and imitation incentives in dynamic duopoly (RePEc:pra:mprapa:59453)
by Billette de Villemeur, Etienne & Ruble, Richard & Versaevel, Bruno - On the timing of innovation and imitation (RePEc:pra:mprapa:69161)
by Billette de Villemeur, Etienne & Ruble, Richard & Versaevel, Bruno - When should a winner take all, or pay some? Innovation and imitation incentives in a dynamic duopoly (RePEc:pra:mprapa:75465)
by Billette de Villemeur, Etienne & Ruble, Richard & Versaevel, Bruno - One Lab, Two Firms, Many Possibilities: on R&D outsourcing in the biopharmaceutical industry (RePEc:pra:mprapa:76903)
by Billette de Villemeur, Etienne & Versaevel, Bruno - La spéculation sur le marché des actions : un phénomène monétaire ? (RePEc:prs:recofi:ecofi_0987-3368_1994_num_29_2_2054)
by Bruno Versaevel - Alertness, Leadership, and Nascent Market Dynamics (RePEc:spr:dyngam:v:5:y:2015:i:4:p:440-466)
by Bruno Versaevel - Timing Vertical Relationships (RePEc:tse:wpaper:22908)
by Ruble, Richard & Versaevel, Bruno & de Villemeur, Étienne