Vasiliki Skreta

Names

first:	Vasiliki
last:	Skreta

Identifer

RePEc Short-ID:

psk88

Contact

homepage:

http://vskreta.wixsite.com/vskreta

Affiliations

University of Texas-Austin / Department of Economics (weight: 50%)
- EDIRC entry
- location:
University College London (UCL) / Department of Economics (weight: 50%)
- EDIRC entry
- location:

Research profile

author of:

Optimal Interventions in Markets with Adverse Selection (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:102:y:2012:i:1:p:1-28)
by Thomas Philippon & Vasiliki Skreta
Heterogeneity, Inattention, and Bayesian Updates (RePEc:aea:aejmac:v:12:y:2020:i:1:p:282-309)
by Raffaella Giacomini & Vasiliki Skreta & Javier Turen
Mechanism Design with Limited Commitment (RePEc:arx:papers:1811.03579)
by Laura Doval & Vasiliki Skreta
Constrained Information Design (RePEc:arx:papers:1811.03588)
by Laura Doval & Vasiliki Skreta
Optimal mechanism for the sale of a durable good (RePEc:arx:papers:1904.07456)
by Laura Doval & Vasiliki Skreta
Purchase history and product personalization (RePEc:arx:papers:2103.11504)
by Laura Doval & Vasiliki Skreta
Score-based mechanisms (RePEc:arx:papers:2403.08031)
by Eduardo Perez-Richet & Vasiliki Skreta
Incentive-driven Inattention (RePEc:bcb:wpaper:485)
by Wagner Piazza Gaglianone & Raffaella Giacomini & João Victor Issler & Vasiliki Skreta
Selling through referrals (RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:27:y:2018:i:4:p:669-685)
by Daniele Condorelli & Andrea Galeotti & Vasiliki Skreta
Immunity (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_4445)
by Karthik Reddy & Moritz Schularick & Vasiliki Skreta
Models, Inattention and Expectation Updates (RePEc:cfm:wpaper:1602)
by Raffaella Giacomini & Vasiliki Skreta & Javier Turen
Optimal Auction Design under Non-Commitment (RePEc:cla:levarc:506439000000000176)
by Vasiliki Skreta
A Note on Mechanism Design for Complicated Type Spaces (RePEc:cla:levarc:506439000000000180)
by Vasiliki Skreta
On the Informed Seller Problem: Optimal Information Disclosure (RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000001789)
by Vasiliki Skreta
The Role of Outside Options in Auction Design (RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000140)
by Nicolas Figueroa & Vasiliki Skreta
On the Informed Seller Problem: Optimal Information Disclosure (RePEc:cla:levrem:843644000000000222)
by Vasiliki Skreta
Optimal Auctions with General Distributions (RePEc:cla:levrem:843644000000000227)
by Vasiliki Skreta
A Note on Optimal Auctions (RePEc:cla:levrem:843644000000000232)
by Vasiliki Skreta & Nicolas Figueroa
What to Put on the Table (RePEc:cla:levrem:843644000000000374)
by Vasiliki Skreta & Nicolas Figueroa
Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms (RePEc:cla:najeco:391749000000000488)
by Vasiliki Skreta
Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms (RePEc:cla:uclaol:342)
by Vasiliki Skreta
Extensions on "Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms" (RePEc:cla:uclaol:343)
by Vasiliki Skreta
Technical Appendix for "Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms" (RePEc:cla:uclaol:344)
by Vasiliki Skreta
Optimal Auction Design for Multiple Objects with Externalities (RePEc:cla:uclaol:345)
by Vasiliki Skreta
Optimal Auction Design under Non-Commitment (RePEc:cla:uclaol:346)
by Vasiliki Skreta
Revenue Equivalence for Arbitrary Type Spaces (RePEc:cla:uclaol:347)
by Vasiliki Skreta
Interconnection Negotiations between Telecommunication Networks and Universal Service Objectives (RePEc:cla:uclaol:348)
by Vasiliki Skreta
Mechanism Design under Non-Commitment (RePEc:cla:uclatw:121473000000000001)
by Vasiliki Skreta
Models, Inattention and Expectation Updates (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11004)
by Skreta, Vasiliki & Giacomini, Raffaella & TurÃ©n, Javier
Selling Through Referrals (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12048)
by Skreta, Vasiliki & Condorelli, Daniele & Galeotti, Andrea
Information Design under Falsification (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12271)
by Skreta, Vasiliki & Perez-Richet, Eduardo
Incentive-driven Inattention (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13619)
by Skreta, Vasiliki & Giacomini, Raffaella & Gaglianone, Wagner & Issler, Joao
Optimal mechanism for the sale of a durable good (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13967)
by Skreta, Vasiliki & Doval, Laura
Test Design under Falsification (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:15627)
by Skreta, Vasiliki & Perez-Richet, Eduardo
Purchase history and product personalization (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:15969)
by Skreta, Vasiliki & Doval, Laura
Optimal Interventions in Markets with Adverse Selection (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:7737)
by Philippon, Thomas & Skreta, Vasiliki
Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1802)
by Mikhail Golosov & Vasiliki Skreta & Aleh Tsyvinski & Andrea Wilson
Optimal Auction Design For Multiple Objects with Externalities (RePEc:ecm:latm04:287)
by Vasiliki Skreta & Nicolas Figueroa
Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms (RePEc:ecm:wc2000:1521)
by Vasiliki Skreta
The Role of Outside Options in Auction Design (RePEc:edj:ceauch:231)
by Nicolás Figueroa & Vasiliki Skreta
Note on Optimal Auctions (RePEc:edj:ceauch:232)
by Nicolás Figueroa & Vasiliki Skreta
What to put in the table (RePEc:edj:ceauch:237)
by Nicolas Figueroa & Vasiliki Skreta
A note on optimal allocation mechanisms (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:102:y:2009:i:3:p:169-173)
by Figueroa, Nicols & Skreta, Vasiliki
Asymmetric partnerships (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:115:y:2012:i:2:p:268-271)
by Figueroa, Nicolás & Skreta, Vasiliki
Mechanism design for arbitrary type spaces (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:91:y:2006:i:2:p:293-299)
by Skreta, Vasiliki
Incentive-driven inattention (RePEc:eee:econom:v:231:y:2022:i:1:p:188-212)
by Gaglianone, Wagner Piazza & Giacomini, Raffaella & Issler, João Victor & Skreta, Vasiliki
The role of optimal threats in auction design (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:144:y:2009:i:2:p:884-897)
by Figueroa, Nicolás & Skreta, Vasiliki
Dynamic strategic information transmission (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:151:y:2014:i:c:p:304-341)
by Golosov, Mikhail & Skreta, Vasiliki & Tsyvinski, Aleh & Wilson, Andrea
Optimal auction design under non-commitment (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:159:y:2015:i:pb:p:854-890)
by Skreta, Vasiliki
Informed seller with taste heterogeneity (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:165:y:2016:i:c:p:456-471)
by Koessler, Frédéric & Skreta, Vasiliki
Ratings shopping and asset complexity: A theory of ratings inflation (RePEc:eee:moneco:v:56:y:2009:i:5:p:678-695)
by Skreta, Vasiliki & Veldkamp, Laura
Models, inattention and expectation updates (RePEc:ehl:lserod:86245)
by Giacomini, Raffaella & Skreta, Vasiliki & Turen, Javier
Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission (RePEc:eie:wpaper:1110)
by Mikhail Golosov & Vasiliki Skreta & Aleh Tsyvinski & Andrea Wilson
Incentive-driven Inattention (RePEc:fgv:epgewp:811)
by Gaglianone, Wagner Piazza & Giacomini, Raffaella & Issler, João Victor & Skreta, Vasiliki
Test Design Under Falsification (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03873972)
by Eduardo Perez-Richet & Vasiliki Skreta
Informed seller with taste heterogeneity (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01379293)
by Frédéric Koessler & Vassiliki Skreta
Selling with Evidence (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01884387)
by Frédéric Koessler & Vasiliki Skreta
Informed seller with taste heterogeneity (RePEc:hal:pseose:halshs-01379293)
by Frédéric Koessler & Vassiliki Skreta
Informed seller with taste heterogeneity (RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-01379293)
by Frédéric Koessler & Vassiliki Skreta
Selling with Evidence (RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-01884387)
by Frédéric Koessler & Vasiliki Skreta
Informed Information Design (RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-03107866)
by Frédéric Koessler & Vasiliki Skreta
Test Design Under Falsification (RePEc:hal:spmain:hal-03393136)
by Eduardo Perez & Vasiliki Skreta
Test Design Under Falsification (RePEc:hal:spmain:hal-03873972)
by Eduardo Perez-Richet & Vasiliki Skreta
Test Design Under Falsification (RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-03393136)
by Eduardo Perez & Vasiliki Skreta
Informed Information Design (RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-03107866)
by Frédéric Koessler & Vasiliki Skreta
Test Design Under Falsification (RePEc:hal:wpspec:hal-03393136)
by Eduardo Perez & Vasiliki Skreta
Models, Inattention and Bayesian Updates (RePEc:ioe:doctra:515)
by Javier Turen & Raffaella Giacomini & Vasiliki Skreta
Ratings Shopping and Asset Complexity: A Theory of Ratings Inflation (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14761)
by Vasiliki Skreta & Laura Veldkamp
Optimal Interventions in Markets with Adverse Selection (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:15785)
by Thomas Philippon & Vasiliki Skreta
Reflecting on the First 20 Years of the Journal of the European Economic Association (RePEc:oup:jeurec:v:21:y:2023:i:5:p:e1-e33.)
by Pierre Dubois & Jonas Hjort & Guido Lorenzoni & Nicola Pavoni & Giovanni Peri & Vasiliki Skreta & Romain Wacziarg & Andrea Weber
Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms -super-1 (RePEc:oup:restud:v:73:y:2006:i:4:p:1085-1111)
by Vasiliki Skreta
Dynamic Optimal Non-linear Taxation Under Non-commitment (RePEc:red:sed004:181)
by Aleh Tsyvinski & Mikhail Golosov & Vasiliki Skreta
Optimal Auction Design For Multiple Objects with Externalities (RePEc:red:sed005:866)
by Vasiliki Skreta & Nicolas Figueroa
Gone Shopping: A Theory of Ratings Inflation (RePEc:red:sed008:916)
by Laura Veldkamp & Vasiliki Skreta
Optimal Interventions in Markets with Adverse Selection (RePEc:red:sed010:1333)
by Vasiliki Skreta & Thomas Philippon
Test Design Under Falsification (RePEc:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/31aa5v8jtp9p48jlhrq44psjoa)
by Eduardo Perez & Vasiliki Skreta
Test Design Under Falsification (RePEc:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/31aa5v8jtp9p48jlhrq44psjoa)
by Eduardo Perez & Vasiliki Skreta
On the informed seller problem: optimal information disclosure (RePEc:spr:reecde:v:15:y:2011:i:1:p:1-36)
by Vasiliki Skreta
Optimal allocation mechanisms with single-dimensional private information (RePEc:spr:reecde:v:15:y:2011:i:3:p:213-243)
by Nicolás Figueroa & Vasiliki Skreta
On the Informed Seller Problem: Optimal Information Disclosure (RePEc:ste:nystbu:08-10)
by Vasiliki Skreta
What to Put on the Table (RePEc:ste:nystbu:08-11)
by Vasiliki Skreta & Nicolas Figueroa
The Role of Outside Options in Auction Design (RePEc:ste:nystbu:08-12)
by Vasiliki Skreta & Nicolas Figueroa
A Note on Optimal Allocation Mechanisms (RePEc:ste:nystbu:08-13)
by Vasiliki Skreta & Nicolas Figueroa
Optimal Auction Design Under Non-Commitment (RePEc:ste:nystbu:08-14)
by Vasiliki Skreta
Optimal Auctions with General Distribution (RePEc:ste:nystbu:08-15)
by Vasiliki Skreta
Ratings Shopping and Asset Complexity: A Theory of Ratings Inflation (RePEc:ste:nystbu:08-28)
by Vasiliki Skreta & Laura Veldkamp
Optimal Interventions in Markets with Adverse Selection (RePEc:ste:nystbu:11-11)
by Thomas Philippon & Vasiliki Skreta
Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission (RePEc:ste:nystbu:11-17)
by Mikhail Golosov & Vasiliki Skreta & Aleh Tsyvinski & Andrea Wilson
Immunity (RePEc:ste:nystbu:12-17)
by Karthik Reddy & Moritz Schularick & Vasiliki Skreta
Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission (RePEc:ste:nystbu:13-03)
by Mikhail Golosov & Vasiliki Skreta & Aleh Tsyvinski & Andrea Wilson
Immunity (RePEc:ste:nystbu:13-04)
by Karthik Reddy & Moritz Schularick & Vasiliki Skreta
Selling Through Referrals (RePEc:ste:nystbu:13-06)
by Daniele Condorelli & Andrea Galeotti & Vasiliki Skreta
Optimal Auction Design Under Non-Commitment (RePEc:ste:nystbu:13-08)
by Vasiliki Skreta
Selling with evidence (RePEc:the:publsh:2885)
by Koessler, Frederic & Skreta, Vasiliki
Optimal mechanism for the sale of a durable good (RePEc:the:publsh:4485)
by Doval, Laura & Skreta, Vasiliki
Informed Information Design (RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/724843)
by Frédéric Koessler & Vasiliki Skreta
Test Design Under Falsification (RePEc:wly:emetrp:v:90:y:2022:i:3:p:1109-1142)
by Eduardo Perez‐Richet & Vasiliki Skreta
Mechanism Design With Limited Commitment (RePEc:wly:emetrp:v:90:y:2022:i:4:p:1463-1500)
by Laura Doval & Vasiliki Skreta
Immunity (RePEc:wly:iecrev:v:61:y:2020:i:2:p:531-564)
by Karthik Reddy & Moritz Schularick & Vasiliki Skreta

The profile is maintained by Vasiliki Skreta

Permanent link: http://authors.repec.org/pro/psk88/