Nicholas Shunda
Names
| first: |
Nicholas |
| last: |
Shunda |
Identifer
Contact
| phone: |
909-748-8569 |
| postal address: |
University of Redlands, Department of Economics, 1200 East Colton Avenue, PO Box 3080, Redlands, CA 92373-0999 |
Affiliations
-
University of Redlands
/ Department of Economics
Research profile
author of:
- Optimal nondiscriminatory auctions with favoritism (RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-13-00718)
by Leandro Arozamena & Nicholas Shunda & Federico Weinschelbaum - On the evolution of prize perceptions in contests (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:116:y:2012:i:3:p:498-501)
by Boudreau, James W. & Shunda, Nicholas - Auctions with a buy price: The case of reference-dependent preferences (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:67:y:2009:i:2:p:645-664)
by Shunda, Nicholas - Sequential auctions with budget constraints: Evidence from fantasy basketball auction drafts (RePEc:eee:soceco:v:62:y:2016:i:c:p:8-22)
by Boudreau, James W. & Shunda, Nicholas - The role of noise in alliance formation and collusion in conflicts (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:179:y:2019:i:3:d:10.1007_s11127-018-0564-y)
by James W. Boudreau & Shane Sanders & Nicholas Shunda - Auctioning with Aspirations: Keep Them Low (Enough) (RePEc:pra:mprapa:16242)
by Shunda, Nicholas - On the evolution of prize perceptions in contests (RePEc:pra:mprapa:24640)
by Boudreau, James W. & Shunda, Nicholas - Tacit Collusion in Repeated Contests with Noise (RePEc:pra:mprapa:65671)
by Boudreau, James W. & Shunda, Nicholas - The Role of Noise in Alliance Formation and Collusion in Conflicts (RePEc:pra:mprapa:81533)
by Boudreau, James W. & Sanders, Shane & Shunda, Nicholas - Optimal nondiscriminatory auctions with favoritism (RePEc:sad:wpaper:110)
by Federico Weinschelbaum & Leandro Arozamena & Nicolas Shunda - Auctioning with Aspirations: Keep Them Low (Enough) (RePEc:uct:alumni:2009-02)
by Nicholas Shunda - Strategic Behavior in Day-Ahead and Real-Time Markets for Electricity: Offer Cost or Payment Cost Minimization? (RePEc:uct:uconnp:2005-48)
by Nicholas Shunda - A Model of Rights (RePEc:uct:uconnp:2005-53)
by Nicholas Shunda - Auctions with a Buy Price: The Case of Reference-Dependent Preferences (RePEc:uct:uconnp:2007-42)
by Nicholas Shunda - Optimal nondiscriminatory auctions with favoritism (RePEc:udt:wpecon:2012-03)
by Leandro Arozamena & Nicholas Shunda & Federico Weinschelbaum