Bezalel Peleg

Names

first:	Bezalel
last:	Peleg

Identifer

RePEc Short-ID:

ppe258

Contact

homepage:	http://www.ma.huji.ac.il/~pelegba
phone:	972-2-6584134

Research profile

author of:

Strategy-Proof Voting Schemes With Continuous Preferences (RePEc:aub:autbar:91.88)
by Barbera, S. & Peleg, B.
The least core, nucleolus, and kernel of homogeneous weighted majority games (RePEc:bie:wpaper:193)
by Rosenmüller, Joachim & Peleg, Bezalel
The kernel of homogeneous games with steps (RePEc:bie:wpaper:209)
by Peleg, Bezalel & Rosenmüller, Joachim & Sudhölter, Peter
An axiomatisation of Nash equilibria in economic situations (RePEc:bie:wpaper:230)
by Peleg, Bezalel & Sudhölter, Peter
A formal approach to Nash's program (RePEc:bie:wpaper:247)
by Peleg, Bezalel
The canonical extensive form of a game form. Part I - Symmetries (RePEc:bie:wpaper:253)
by Peleg, Bezalel & Rosenmüller, Joachim & Sudhölter, Peter
Partial equilibrium in pure exchange economies (RePEc:bie:wpaper:254)
by Peleg, Bezalel
The canonical extensive form of a game form. Part II - Representation (RePEc:bie:wpaper:257)
by Sudhölter, Peter & Rosenmüller, Joachim
A note on existence of equilibria in generalized economies (RePEc:bie:wpaper:258)
by Peleg, Bezalel
Nucleoli as maximizers of collective satisfaction functions (RePEc:bie:wpaper:262)
by Sudhölter, Peter & Peleg, Bezalel
Single peakedness and coalition proofness (RePEc:bie:wpaper:290)
by Peleg, Bezalel & Sudhölter, Peter
The positive prekernel of a cooperative game (RePEc:bie:wpaper:292)
by Peleg, Bezalel & Sudhölter, Peter
A note on an axiomatization of the core of market games (RePEc:bie:wpaper:323)
by Sudhölter, Peter & Peleg, Bezalel
The dummy paradox of the bargaining set (RePEc:bie:wpaper:324)
by Peleg, Bezalel & Sudhölter, Peter
Co‐evolution of Preferences and Information in Simple Games of Trust (RePEc:bla:germec:v:1:y:2000:i:1:p:83-110)
by Werner Güth & Hartmut Kliemt & Bezalel Peleg
Co-evolution of Preferences and Information in Simple Games of Trust (RePEc:bpj:germec:v:1:y:2000:i:1:p:83-110)
by Güth Werner & Kliemt Hartmut & Peleg Bezalel
Condorcet Jury Theorem: The Dependent Case (RePEc:cla:levarc:122247000000002115)
by Bezalel Peleg & Shmuel Zamir
Condorcet Jury Theorem: The Dependent Case (RePEc:cla:levarc:122247000000002422)
by Bezalel Peleg & Shmuel Zamir
Bargaining Sets of Majority Voting Games (RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000935)
by Ron Holzman & Bezalel Peleg & Peter Sudholter
Lexicographic Composition of Simple Games (RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000001223)
by Barry ONeill & Bezalel Peleg
Mediators Enable Truthful Voting (RePEc:cla:levrem:843644000000000039)
by Bezalel Peleg & Ariel D Procaccia
Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible representations of committees (RePEc:cor:louvco:1986042)
by d’ASPREMONT, C. & PELEG, B.
Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible representations of committees (RePEc:cor:louvrp:808)
by d'ASPREMONT, Claude & PELEG, Bezalel
Game Theoretic Analysis of Voting in Committees (RePEc:cup:cbooks:9780521074650)
by Peleg,Bezalel
Lexicographic Composition of Simple Games (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1559)
by Barry O'Neill & Bezalel Peleg
Utility Functions for Partially Ordered Topological Spaces (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:38:y:1970:i:1:p:93-96)
by Peleg, Bezalel
A Price Characterization of Efficient Random Variables (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:43:y:1975:i:2:p:283-92)
by Peleg, Bezalel & Yaari, M E
Consistent Voting Systems (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:46:y:1978:i:1:p:153-61)
by Peleg, Bezalel
Distribution of Power under Stochastic Social Choice Rules (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:54:y:1986:i:4:p:909-21)
by Pattanaik, Prasanta K & Peleg, Bezalel
A difficulty with Nash's program: A proof of a special case (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:55:y:1997:i:3:p:305-308)
by Peleg, Bezalel
Almost all equilibria in dominant strategies are coalition - proof (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:60:y:1998:i:2:p:157-162)
by Peleg, Bezalel
Axiomatizations of the core (RePEc:eee:gamchp:1-13)
by Peleg, Bezalel
Choosing k from m: Feasible elimination procedures reconsidered (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:103:y:2017:i:c:p:254-261)
by Peleg, Bezalel & Peters, Hans
An Axiomatization of Nash Equilibria in Economic Situations (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:18:y:1997:i:2:p:277-285)
by Peleg, Bezalel & Sudholter, Peter
Short-rune stable matchings between bees and flowers (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:4:y:1992:i:2:p:232-251)
by Peleg, B. & Shmida, A.
The least core, nucleolus, and kernel of homogeneous weighted majority games (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:4:y:1992:i:4:p:588-605)
by Peleg, Bezalel & Rosenmuller, Joachim
Lexicographic composition of simple games (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:62:y:2008:i:2:p:628-642)
by O'Neill, Barry & Peleg, Bezalel
My joint work with Michael Maschler (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:64:y:2008:i:2:p:370-371)
by Peleg, Bezalel
Nash consistent representation of effectivity functions through lottery models (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:65:y:2009:i:2:p:503-515)
by Peleg, Bezalel & Peters, Hans
Efficiency prices in an infinite-dimensional space (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:2:y:1970:i:1:p:41-85)
by Peleg, Bezalel & Yaari, Menahem E.
A note on the extension of an order on a set to the power set (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:32:y:1984:i:1:p:172-175)
by Kannai, Yakar & Peleg, Bezalel
Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:42:y:1987:i:1:p:1-12)
by Bernheim, B. Douglas & Peleg, Bezalel & Whinston, Michael D.
Linear measures of inequality for cooperative games (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:53:y:1991:i:2:p:328-344)
by Einy, Ezra & Peleg, Bezalel
Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:10:y:1982:i:1:p:115-145)
by Moulin, H. & Peleg, B.
An axiomatization of the core of cooperative games without side payments (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:14:y:1985:i:2:p:203-214)
by Peleg, Bezalel
The modified golden rule of a multi-sector economy (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:1:y:1974:i:2:p:193-198)
by Peleg, Bezalel & Ryder, Harl Jr.
A note on Gale's example (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:1:y:1974:i:2:p:209-211)
by Aumann, R. J. & Peleg, B.
Axiomatic characterizations of the Walras correspondence for generalized economies (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:25:y:1996:i:3:p:355-372)
by van den Nouweland, A. & Peleg, B. & Tijs, S.
Efficient random variables (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:2:y:1975:i:2:p:243-252)
by Peleg, Bezalel
The canonical extensive form of a game form: Part II. Representation (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:33:y:2000:i:3:p:299-338)
by Sudholter, Peter & Rosenmuller, Joachim & Peleg, Bezalel
Stable voting procedures for committees in economic environments (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:36:y:2001:i:2:p:117-140)
by Keiding, Hans & Peleg, Bezalel
On the non-emptiness of the Mas-Colell bargaining set (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:41:y:2005:i:8:p:1060-1068)
by Peleg, Bezalel & Sudholter, Peter
On the continuity of representations of effectivity functions (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:42:y:2006:i:7-8:p:827-842)
by Keiding, Hans & Peleg, Bezalel
A theory of coalition formation in committees (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:7:y:1980:i:2:p:115-134)
by Peleg, Bezalel
A proof that the core of an ordinal convex game is a von Neumann-Morgenstern solution (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:11:y:1986:i:1:p:83-87)
by Peleg, Bezalel
On ring formation in auctions (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:32:y:1996:i:1:p:1-37)
by Guth, Werner & Peleg, Bezalel
Nash consistent representation of constitutions: a reaction to the Gibbard paradox (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:43:y:2002:i:2:p:267-287)
by Peleg, Bezalel & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton
Representation of effectivity functions by acceptable game forms: a complete characterization (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:47:y:2004:i:3:p:275-287)
by Peleg, Bezalel
Judgments aggregation by a sequential majority procedure (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:95:y:2018:i:c:p:37-46)
by Peleg, Bezalel & Zamir, Shmuel
Feasible elimination procedures in social choice: An axiomatic characterization (RePEc:eee:reecon:v:71:y:2017:i:1:p:43-50)
by Peleg, Bezalel & Peters, Hans
Game-theoretic analysis of voting in committees (RePEc:eee:socchp:1-08)
by Peleg, Bezalel
A Continuous Double Implementation of the Constrained Walras Equilibrium (RePEc:fth:cornel:94-26)
by Peleg, B.
Double Implementation of the Lindahl Equilibrium by a Continuous Mechanism (RePEc:fth:pnegmi:9524)
by Peleg, B.
The Consistency Principle for Games in Strategic Form (RePEc:fth:tilbur:9306)
by Peleg, B. & Tijs, S.
On Ring Formation in Auctions (RePEc:fth:tilbur:9357)
by Guth, W. & Peleg, B.
Automata, Matching and Foraging Behavior of Bees (RePEc:fth:tilbur:9378)
by Thuijsman, F. & Peleg, B. & Amitai, M. & Shmida, A.
Representations of Political Power Structures by Strategically Stable Game Forms: A Survey (RePEc:gam:jgames:v:8:y:2017:i:4:p:46-:d:116103)
by Bezalel Peleg & Ron Holzman
On the impact of independence of irrelevant alternatives (RePEc:hhs:sdueko:2010_006)
by Peleg, Bezalel & Sudhölter, Peter & Zarzuelo, José M.
On Bargaining Sets of Convex NTU Games (RePEc:hhs:sdueko:2014_019)
by Peleg, Bezalel & Sudhölter, Peter
Complete Characterization of Acceptable Game Forms by Effectivity Functions (RePEc:huj:dispap:dp283)
by Bezalel Peleg
Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters (RePEc:huj:dispap:dp308)
by Bezalel Peleg & Hans Peters
Constitutional implementation of social choice correspondences (RePEc:huj:dispap:dp323)
by Bezalel Peleg & Hans Peters & Ton Storcken
On the Continuity of Representations of Effectivity Functions (RePEc:huj:dispap:dp324)
by Hans Keiding & Bezalel Peleg
On the Non-Emptiness of the Mas-Colell Bargaining Set (RePEc:huj:dispap:dp360)
by Bezalel Peleg & Peter Sudholter
Bargaining Sets of Voting Games (RePEc:huj:dispap:dp376)
by Bezalel Peleg & Peter Sudholter
Binary Effectivity Rules (RePEc:huj:dispap:dp378)
by Hans Keiding & Bezalel Peleg
Nash Consistent Representation of Effectivity Functions through Lottery Models (RePEc:huj:dispap:dp404)
by Bezalel Peleg & Hans Peters
Bargaining Sets of Majority Voting Games (RePEc:huj:dispap:dp410)
by Ron Holzman & Bezalel Peleg & Peter Sudholter
Lexicographic Composition of Simple Games (RePEc:huj:dispap:dp415)
by Barry O'Neill & Bezalel Peleg
Mediators Enable Truthful Voting (RePEc:huj:dispap:dp451)
by Bezalel Peleg & Ariel D. Procaccia
Implementation by Mediated Equilibrium (RePEc:huj:dispap:dp463)
by Bezalel Peleg & Ariel D. Procaccia
Condorcet Jury Theorem: The Dependent Case (RePEc:huj:dispap:dp477)
by Bezalel Peleg & Shmuel Zamir
Michael Maschler: In Memoriam (RePEc:huj:dispap:dp493)
by Robert J. Aumann & Ein-Ya Gura & Sergiu Hart & Bezalel Peleg & Hana Shemesh & Shmuel Zamir
On Bayesian-Nash Equilibria Satisfying the Condorcet Jury Theorem: The Dependent Case (RePEc:huj:dispap:dp527)
by Bezalel Peleg & Shmuel Zamir
On the Impact of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (RePEc:huj:dispap:dp561)
by Bezalel Peleg & Peter Sudholter & Jose M. Zarzuelo
Representation of constitutions under incomplete information (RePEc:huj:dispap:dp634)
by Bezalel Peleg & Shmuel Zamir
Consistent Voting Systems Revisited: Computation and Axiomatic Characterization (RePEc:huj:dispap:dp649)
by Bezalel Peleg
Choosing k from m: feasible elimination procedures reconsidered (RePEc:huj:dispap:dp671)
by Bezalel Peleg & Hans Peters
On Bargaining Sets of Convex NTU Games (RePEc:huj:dispap:dp681)
by Bezalel Peleg & Peter Sudholter
Feasible elimination procedures in social choice: an axiomatic characterization (RePEc:huj:dispap:dp693)
by Bezalel Peleg & Hans Peters
Sequential aggregation judgments: Logical derivation of relevance relation (RePEc:huj:dispap:dp703)
by Bezalel Peleg & Shmuel Zamir
Sequential aggregation of judgments (RePEc:huj:dispap:dp708)
by Bezalel Peleg & Shmuel Zamir
Representations of Political Power Structures by Strategically Stable Game Forms: A Survey (RePEc:huj:dispap:dp715)
by Bezalel Peleg & Ron Holzman
Self-implementation of social choice correspondences in strong equilibrium (RePEc:huj:dispap:dp717)
by Bezalel Peleg & Hans Peters
Judgements aggregation by a sequential majority procedure (RePEc:huj:dispap:dp719)
by Bezalel Peleg & Shmuel Zamir
Markets with Countably Many Commodities (RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:11:y:1970:i:3:p:369-77)
by Peleg, Bezalel & Yaari, Menahem E
A Weakly Maximal Golden-Rule Program for a Multi-Sector Economy (RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:14:y:1973:i:3:p:574-79)
by Peleg, Bezalel
An Axiomatization of the Walras Correspondence in Infinite Dimensional Spaces (RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:38:y:1997:i:4:p:853-64)
by Majumdar, Mukul & Peleg, Bezalel
An Axiomatization of the Core of Market Games (RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:14:y:1989:i:3:p:448-456)
by Bezalel Peleg
An Axiomatization of the Core of Market Games: A Correction (RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:18:y:1993:i:3:p:765-765)
by Bezalel Peleg
A Note on an Axiomatization of the Core of Market Games (RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:27:y:2002:i:2:p:441-444)
by Peter Sudhölter & Bezalel Peleg
Bargaining Sets of Majority Voting Games (RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:32:y:2007:i:4:p:857-872)
by Ron Holzman & Bezalel Peleg & Peter Sudhölter
Geometric Properties of the Kernel, Nucleolus, and Related Solution Concepts (RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:4:y:1979:i:4:p:303-338)
by M. Maschler & B. Peleg & L. S. Shapley
The Dutta-Ray Solution on the Class of Convex Games: A Generalization and Monotonicity Properties (RePEc:kud:kuiedp:0329)
by Jens Leth Hougaard & Bezalel Peleg & Lars Peter Østerdal
On the Continuity of Representations of Effectivity Functions (RePEc:kud:kuiedp:0330)
by Hans Keiding & Bezalel Peleg
Stable Voting Procedures for Committees in Economic Environments (RePEc:kud:kuiedp:9920)
by Hans Keiding & Bezalel Peleg
Representation of Effectivity Functions in Coalition Proof Nash Equilibrium: A Complete Characterization (RePEc:kud:kuiedp:9921)
by Hans Keiding & Bezalel Peleg
On Optimal Consumption Plans in a Multi-sector Economy (RePEc:oup:restud:v:39:y:1972:i:2:p:159-169.)
by Bezalel Peleg & Harl E. Ryder
On the Existence of a Consistent Course of Action when Tastes are Changing (RePEc:oup:restud:v:40:y:1973:i:3:p:391-401.)
by Bezalel Peleg & Menahem E. Yaari
Efficiency Analysis for Multivariate Distributions (RePEc:oup:restud:v:42:y:1975:i:1:p:87-91.)
by David Levhari & Jacob Paroush & Bezalel Peleg
A Solution to the Problem of Mass Elections (RePEc:pal:intecp:978-1-349-11573-0_16)
by Bezalel Peleg
Discussion of Dutta’s Paper (RePEc:pal:intecp:978-1-349-25214-5_2)
by Bezalel Peleg
A Note on Optimal Development in a Multi-sector Nonconvex Economy (RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-349-11696-6_11)
by Mukul Majumdar & Bezalel Peleg
On Perfectly Coalition-proof Nash Equilibria (RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-349-11696-6_13)
by Bezalel Peleg
Representation of constitutions under incomplete information (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:57:y:2014:i:2:p:279-302)
by Bezalel Peleg & Shmuel Zamir
Minimal of consitent solutions for strategic games,in paticular for potential games (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:7:y:1995:i:1:p:81-93)
by Bezalel Peleg & Stef Tijs & Jos Potters
Minimality of Consistent Solutions for Strategic Games, in Particular for Potential Games (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:7:y:1996:i:1:p:81-93)
by Peleg, Bezalel & Potters, Jos A M & Tijs, Stef H
When will payoff maximization survive? An indirect evolutionary analysis (RePEc:spr:joevec:v:11:y:2001:i:5:p:479-499)
by Werner G, th & Bezalel Peleg
On the Reduced Game Property and Its Converse (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:15:y:1986:i:3:p:187-200)
by Peleg, B
On the Reduced Game Property and Its Converse: A Correction (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:16:y:1987:i:4:p:290)
by Peleg, B
The Consistency Principle for Games in Strategic Forms (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:25:y:1996:i:1:p:13-34)
by Peleg, Bezalel & Tijs, Stef
The MC-value for monotonic NTU-games (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:27:y:1998:i:1:p:37-47)
by Bezalel Peleg & Stef Tijs & Peter Borm & Gert-Jan Otten
Correlated equilibria of games with many players (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:29:y:2000:i:3:p:375-389)
by Hans Keiding & Bezalel Peleg
On the set of Lorenz-maximal imputations in the core of a balanced game (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:30:y:2001:i:2:p:147-165)
by Jens Leth Hougaard & Lars Thorlund-Petersen & Bezalel Peleg
Constitutional implementation of social choice correspondences (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:33:y:2005:i:3:p:381-396)
by Bezalel Peleg & Hans Peters & Ton Storcken
Implementation by mediated equilibrium (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:39:y:2010:i:1:p:191-207)
by Bezalel Peleg & Ariel Procaccia
Binary effectivity rules (RePEc:spr:reecde:v:10:y:2006:i:3:p:167-181)
by Hans Keiding & Bezalel Peleg
Double implementation of the Lindahl equilibrium by a continuous mechanism (RePEc:spr:reecde:v:2:y:1996:i:1:p:311-324)
by Bezalel Peleg
A continuous double implementation of the constrained Walras equilibrium (RePEc:spr:reecde:v:2:y:1996:i:1:p:89-97)
by Bezalel Peleg
Single-peakedness and coalition-proofness (RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:4:p:381-387)
by Peter Sudhölter & Bezalel Peleg
original papers : Constitutional implementation (RePEc:spr:reecde:v:7:y:2002:i:2:p:187-204)
by Eyal Winter & Bezalel Peleg
On the impact of independence of irrelevant alternatives: the case of two-person NTU games (RePEc:spr:series:v:3:y:2012:i:1:p:143-156)
by Bezalel Peleg & Peter Sudhölter & José Zarzuelo
Effectivity functions, game forms, games, and rights (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:15:y:1997:i:1:p:67-80)
by Bezalel Peleg
Nucleoli as maximizers of collective satisfaction functions (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:15:y:1998:i:3:p:383-411)
by Bezalel Peleg & Peter SudhÃlter
Representation of effectivity functions in coalition proof Nash equilibrium: A complete characterization (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:19:y:2002:i:2:p:241-263)
by Hans Keiding & Bezalel Peleg
Consistent Voting Systems with a Continuum of Voters (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:27:y:2006:i:3:p:477-492)
by B Pezaleleleg & Hans Peters
Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:27:y:2006:i:3:p:493-493)
by Bezalel Peleg & Hans Peters
Extending the Condorcet Jury Theorem to a general dependent jury (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:39:y:2012:i:1:p:91-125)
by Bezalel Peleg & Shmuel Zamir
Unknown item RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:7:y:1990:i:1:p:31-38 (article)
Introduction to Part I (RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-642-13875-1_1)
by Bezalel Peleg & Hans Peters
Exactly and strongly consistent representations of effectivity functions (RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-642-13875-1_10)
by Bezalel Peleg & Hans Peters
Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters (RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-642-13875-1_11)
by Bezalel Peleg & Hans Peters
Constitutions, effectivity functions, and game forms (RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-642-13875-1_2)
by Bezalel Peleg & Hans Peters
Nash consistent representations (RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-642-13875-1_3)
by Bezalel Peleg & Hans Peters
Acceptable representations (RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-642-13875-1_4)
by Bezalel Peleg & Hans Peters
Strongly consistent representations (RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-642-13875-1_5)
by Bezalel Peleg & Hans Peters
Nash consistent representation through lottery models (RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-642-13875-1_6)
by Bezalel Peleg & Hans Peters
On the continuity of representations of constitutions (RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-642-13875-1_7)
by Bezalel Peleg & Hans Peters
Introduction to Part II (RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-642-13875-1_8)
by Bezalel Peleg & Hans Peters
Feasible elimination procedures (RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-642-13875-1_9)
by Bezalel Peleg & Hans Peters
Strategic Social Choice (RePEc:spr:stchwe:978-3-642-13875-1)
by Bezalel Peleg & Hans Peters
Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games (RePEc:spr:thdlic:978-3-540-72945-7)
by Bezalel Peleg & Peter Sudhölter
Automata, matching and foraging behavior of bees (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:30655884-9ed3-4d6d-a332-1aaa35d66499)
by Thuijsman, F. & Peleg, B. & Amitai, M. & Shmida, A.
When will the fittest survive? : an indirect evolutionary analysis (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:35431967-233e-496e-a853-0027cfb0241a)
by Güth, W. & Peleg, B.
The consistency principle for games in strategic form (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:896509c3-ef2c-446d-811f-eae2ef9d0458)
by Peleg, B. & Tijs, S.H.
On Ring Formation in Auctions (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:a248853a-fd51-4346-a263-02f1f46dd757)
by Güth, W. & Peleg, B.
Axiomatic characterizations of the Walras correspondence for generalized economies (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:fceb975e-c04e-4baf-af99-a64c6069d1b2)
by van den Nouweland, C.G.A.M. & Peleg, B. & Tijs, S.H.
Axiomatic characterizations of solutions for Bayesian games (RePEc:tiu:tiurem:b16fc7d9-aee7-4f36-95f2-3b62ed360b21)
by van Heumen, R.W.J. & Peleg, B. & Tijs, S.H. & Borm, P.E.M.
Minimality of consistent solutions for strategic games, in particular for potential games (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:159e2ef3-4411-4900-9bf1-bfed1c0a9e60)
by Peleg, B. & Potters, J.A.M. & Tijs, S.H.
Automata, matching and foraging behavior of bees (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:30655884-9ed3-4d6d-a332-1aaa35d66499)
by Thuijsman, F. & Peleg, B. & Amitai, M. & Shmida, A.
When will the fittest survive? : an indirect evolutionary analysis (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:35431967-233e-496e-a853-0027cfb0241a)
by Güth, W. & Peleg, B.
Axiomatic characterizations of the Walras correspondence for generalized economies (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:6ac8c569-8178-4176-9ecf-0f9603030431)
by van den Nouweland, C.G.A.M. & Peleg, B. & Tijs, S.H.
Axiomatic characterizations of solutions for Bayesian games (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:6cc729cb-f5e8-496a-a365-38279dc6123d)
by van Heumen, R. & Peleg, B. & Tijs, S.H. & Borm, P.E.M.
The consistency principle for games in strategic form (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:896509c3-ef2c-446d-811f-eae2ef9d0458)
by Peleg, B. & Tijs, S.H.
The MC-value for monotonic NTU-games (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:9f03343a-8e36-453a-868d-a98dcf91db7f)
by Otten, G.J.M. & Borm, P.E.M. & Peleg, B. & Tijs, S.H.
On Ring Formation in Auctions (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:a248853a-fd51-4346-a263-02f1f46dd757)
by Güth, W. & Peleg, B.
Axiomatic characterizations of solutions for Bayesian games (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:b16fc7d9-aee7-4f36-95f2-3b62ed360b21)
by van Heumen, R.W.J. & Peleg, B. & Tijs, S.H. & Borm, P.E.M.
The consistency principle for games in strategic form (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:fc27db2d-b84c-44ba-95a1-00b1cada25b5)
by Peleg, B. & Tijs, S.H.
Axiomatic characterizations of the Walras correspondence for generalized economies (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:fceb975e-c04e-4baf-af99-a64c6069d1b2)
by van den Nouweland, C.G.A.M. & Peleg, B. & Tijs, S.H.
Choosing k from m: feasible elimination procedures reconsidered (RePEc:unm:umagsb:2014033)
by Peleg, B. & Peters, H.J.M.
Feasible elimination procedures in social choice : an axiomatic characterization (RePEc:unm:umagsb:2016001)
by Peleg, B. & Peters, H.J.M.
Self-implementation of social choice correspondences in strong Equilibrium (RePEc:unm:umagsb:2018005)
by Peleg, Bezalel & Peters, Hans
Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters (RePEc:unm:umamet:2002024)
by Peleg, B. & Peters, H.J.M.
Constitutional implementation of social choice correspondences (RePEc:unm:umamet:2003025)
by Peleg, B. & Peters, H.J.M. & Storcken, A.J.A.
On the effect of risk aversion in bimatrix games (RePEc:unm:umamet:2005030)
by Berden, C. & Peters, H.J.M.
Nash consistent representation of effectivity functions through lottery models (RePEc:unm:umamet:2005031)
by Peleg, B. & Peters, H.J.M.
Utility functions of money for clear games (RePEc:wly:navlog:v:12:y:1965:i:1:p:57-63)
by Bezalel Peleg
An inductive method for constructing mimmal balanced collections of finite sets (RePEc:wly:navlog:v:12:y:1965:i:2:p:155-162)
by Bezalel Peleg
The Positive Prekernel Of A Cooperative Game (RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:02:y:2000:i:04:n:s0219198900000196)
by Peter Sudhölter & Bezalel Peleg
The Dutta-Ray Solution On The Class Of Convex Games: A Generalization And Monotonicity Properties (RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:07:y:2005:i:04:n:s0219198905000624)
by Jens Leth Hougaard & Bezalel Peleg & Lars Peter Østerdal
On Bargaining Sets of Convex NTU Games (RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:17:y:2015:i:04:n:s0219198915500085)
by Bezalel Peleg & Peter Sudhölter
Partial Equilibrium in Pure Exchange Economies (RePEc:zbw:sfb373:199672)
by Peleg, B.
A Formal Approach to Nash´s Program (RePEc:zbw:sfb373:19968)
by Peleg, B.
When will the fittest survive? -An indirect evolutionary analysis- (RePEc:zbw:sfb373:199771)
by Güth, W. & Peleg, B.
Co-evolution of preferences and information in simple games of trust (RePEc:zbw:sfb373:199872)
by Güth, Werner & Kliemt, Hartmut & Peleg, Bezalel

The profile is maintained by Bezalel Peleg

Permanent link: http://authors.repec.org/pro/pzi1/