Sander Onderstal

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Identifer

Contact

Affiliations

• Tinbergen Instituut (weight: 1%)
  • EDIRC entry
  • location:
• Universiteit van Amsterdam / Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfskunde (weight: 99%)
  • EDIRC entry
  • location:

Research profile

author of:

• Trading places: An experimental comparison of reallocation mechanisms for priority queuing (RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:28:y:2019:i:4:p:670-686)
  by Anouar El Haji & Sander Onderstal
• Information-Forcing Effects of Non-Disclosure Rules (RePEc:cde:cdewps:338)
  by Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Sander Onderstal & Francesco Parisi & Ram Singh
• Comparing Crowdfunding Mechanisms: Introducing the Generalized Moulin-Shenker Mechanism (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_10081)
  by Andrej Woerner & Sander Onderstal & Arthur Schram
• The Chopstick Auction: A Study of the Exposure Problem in Multi-Unit Auctions (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1782)
  by Florian Englmaier & Pablo Guillen & Loreto Llorente & Sander Onderstal & Rupert Sausgruber
• Signalling in Auctions: Experimental Evidence (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7261)
  by Olivier Bos & Francisco Gomez-Martinez & Sander Onderstal & Tom Truyts
• Auctioning incentive contracts; application to welfare-to-work programs (RePEc:cpb:discus:38)
  by Pierre Koning & S. Onderstal
• Team incentives in public organisations; an experimental study (RePEc:cpb:discus:60)
  by Pierre Koning & J. Vyrastekova & S. Onderstal
• Tight oligopolies: in search of proportionate remedies (RePEc:cpb:docmnt:29)
  by Marcel Canoy & S. Onderstal
• Equal rules or equal opportunities? Demystifying level playing field (RePEc:cpb:docmnt:34)
  by Marja Appelman & S. Onderstal & Joeri Gorter & Mark Lijesen & Richard Venniker
• Better safe than sorry? Reliability policy in network industries (RePEc:cpb:docmnt:73)
  by Rob Aalbers & Victoria Shestalova & Sander Onderstal
• What Clients Want: Choices between Lawyers' Offerings (RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp1460)
  by Flóra Felsö & Sander Onderstal & Jo Seldeslachts
• Does relative grading help male students? Evidence from a field experiment in the classroom (RePEc:eee:ecoedu:v:75:y:2020:i:c:s0272775717308038)
  by Czibor, Eszter & Onderstal, Sander & Sloof, Randolph & van Praag, C. Mirjam
• Bidding for the unemployed: An application of mechanism design to welfare-to-work programs (RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:53:y:2009:i:6:p:715-722)
  by Onderstal, Sander
• Going once, going twice, reported! Cartel activity and the effectiveness of antitrust policies in experimental auctions (RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:70:y:2014:i:c:p:317-336)
  by Hinloopen, Jeroen & Onderstal, Sander
• Firm-specific information and explicit collusion in experimental oligopolies (RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:82:y:2016:i:c:p:132-141)
  by Gomez-Martinez, Francisco & Onderstal, Sander & Sonnemans, Joep
• Equilibrium selection in experimental cheap talk games (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:91:y:2015:i:c:p:14-25)
  by de Groot Ruiz, Adrian & Offerman, Theo & Onderstal, Sander
• The chopstick auction: A study of the exposure problem in multi-unit auctions (RePEc:eee:indorg:v:27:y:2009:i:2:p:286-291)
  by Englmaier, Florian & Guillén, Pablo & Llorente, Loreto & Onderstal, Sander & Sausgruber, Rupert
• Fighting collusion in auctions: An experimental investigation (RePEc:eee:indorg:v:29:y:2011:i:1:p:84-96)
  by Hu, Audrey & Offerman, Theo & Onderstal, Sander
• Cartel stability in experimental first-price sealed-bid and English auctions (RePEc:eee:indorg:v:71:y:2020:i:c:s0167718720300655)
  by Hinloopen, Jeroen & Onderstal, Sander & Treuren, Leonard
• Asymmetric solutions to asymmetric information problems (RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:66:y:2021:i:c:s0144818821000053)
  by Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe & Onderstal, Sander & Parisi, Francesco
• Signalling in auctions: Experimental evidence (RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:187:y:2021:i:c:p:448-469)
  by Bos, Olivier & Gomez-Martinez, Francisco & Onderstal, Sander & Truyts, Tom
• Inequity aversion revisited (RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:54:y:2016:i:c:p:1-16)
  by Yang, Yang & Onderstal, Sander & Schram, Arthur
• Bidding to give in the field (RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:105:y:2013:i:c:p:72-85)
  by Onderstal, Sander & Schram, Arthur J.H.C. & Soetevent, Adriaan R.
• Reprint of: Bidding to give in the field (RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:114:y:2014:i:c:p:87-100)
  by Onderstal, Sander & Schram, Arthur J.H.C. & Soetevent, Adriaan R.
• Signaling in auctions: experimental evidence (RePEc:ete:ceswps:585499)
  by Olivier Bos & Francisco Gomez-Martinez & Sander Onderstal & Tom Truyts
• What clients want: Choices between lawyers' offerings (RePEc:ete:msiper:486733)
  by Flóra Felső & Sander Onderstal & Jo Seldeslachts
• Does Relative Grading Help Male Students? Evidence from a Field Experiment in the Classroom (RePEc:feb:framed:00548)
  by Eszter Czibor & Sander Onderstal & Randolph Sloof & Mirjam van Praag
• Auctions with Financial Externalities (RePEc:fem:femwpa:2003.30)
  by Emiel Maasland & Sander Onderstal
• The Chopstick Auction: A Study of the Exposure Problem in Multi-Unit Auctions (RePEc:fem:femwpa:2004.10)
  by Sander Onderstal & Florian Englmaier & Pablo Guillen & Loreto Llorente & Rupert Sausgruber
• Self-selection and the Power of Incentive Schemes: An Experimental Study (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00716630)
  by Jana Vyrastekova & Sander Onderstal & Pierre Koning
• Signalling in auctions: Experimental evidence (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04120443)
  by Olivier Bos & Francisco Gomez-Martinez & Sander Onderstal & Tom Truyts
• Bidding To Give: An Experimental Comparison Of Auctions For Charity (RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:50:y:2009:i:2:p:431-457)
  by Arthur J.H.C. Schram & Sander Onderstal
• Solids: A Combinatorial Auction for Real Estate (RePEc:inm:orinte:v:44:y:2014:i:4:p:351-363)
  by Dries R. Goossens & Sander Onderstal & Jan Pijnacker & Frits C. R. Spieksma
• Does Relative Grading Help Male Students? Evidence from a Field Experiment in the Classroom (RePEc:iza:izadps:dp8429)
  by Czibor, Eszter & Onderstal, Sander & Sloof, Randolph & van Praag, Mirjam C.
• Going, Going, Gone! A Swift Tour of Auction Theory and its Applications (RePEc:kap:decono:v:154:y:2006:i:2:p:197-249)
  by Emiel Maasland & Sander Onderstal
• Going, Going, Gone! A Swift Tour of Auction Theory and Its Applications (RePEc:kap:decono:v:154:y:2006:i:3:p:481-481)
  by Emiel Maasland & Sander Onderstal
• For those about to talk we salute you: an experimental study of credible deviations and ACDC (RePEc:kap:expeco:v:17:y:2014:i:2:p:173-199)
  by Adrian Groot Ruiz & Theo Offerman & Sander Onderstal
• Seeking rents in the shadow of Coase (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:139:y:2009:i:1:p:171-196)
  by Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Sander Onderstal & Francesco Parisi
• The Pricing Structure of Legal Services: Do Lawyers Offer What Clients Want? (RePEc:kap:revind:v:61:y:2022:i:2:d:10.1007_s11151-022-09868-9)
  by Flóra Felső & Sander Onderstal & Jo Seldeslachts
• Corporate Leniency Programs for Antitrust: Past, Present, and Future (RePEc:kap:revind:v:63:y:2023:i:2:d:10.1007_s11151-023-09913-1)
  by Jeroen Hinloopen & Sander Onderstal & Adriaan Soetevent
• The chopstick auction (RePEc:lmu:muenar:22029)
  by Englmaier, Florian & Guillén, Pablo & Llorente, Loretoe & Onderstal, Sander & Sausgruber, Rupert
• Comparing Crowdfunding Mechanisms: Introducing the Generalized Moulin-Shenker Mechanism (RePEc:rco:dpaper:464)
  by Andrej Woerner & Sander Onderstal & Arthur Schram
• Auctions with Financial Externalities (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:32:y:2007:i:3:p:551-574)
  by Emiel Maasland & Sander Onderstal
• Premium auctions in the field (RePEc:spr:reecde:v:24:y:2020:i:1:d:10.1007_s10058-020-00228-1)
  by Sander Onderstal
• Self-selection and the power of incentive schemes: an experimental study (RePEc:taf:applec:44:y:2012:i:32:p:4211-4219)
  by Jana Vyrastekova & Sander Onderstal & Pierre Koning
• Seeking Rents in the Shadow of Coase (RePEc:tin:wpaper:20060069)
  by Guiseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Sander Onderstal & Francesco Parisi
• Going Once, Going Twice, Reported! (RePEc:tin:wpaper:20090085)
  by Jeroen Hinloopen & Sander Onderstal
• Auctioning Incentive Contracts: An Experimental Study (RePEc:tin:wpaper:20090101)
  by Sander Onderstal & Arthur Van de Meerendonk
• Punching above One's Weight: The Case against Election Campaigns (RePEc:tin:wpaper:20100056)
  by Marco A. Haan & Bart Los & Sander Onderstal & Yohanes E. Riyanto
• The Trust Game behind the Veil of Ignorance: A Note on Gender Differences (RePEc:tin:wpaper:20100063)
  by Jana Vyrastekova & Sander Onderstal
• Self-Selection and the Power of Incentive Schemes: An Experimental Study (RePEc:tin:wpaper:20100074)
  by Jana Vyrastekova & Sander Onderstal & Pierre Koning
• Collusion and the Choice of Auction: An Experimental Study (RePEc:tin:wpaper:20100120)
  by Jeroen Hinloopen & Sander Onderstal
• Inverse Adverse Selection: The Market for Gems (RePEc:tin:wpaper:20110017)
  by Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Sander Onderstal & Francesco Parisi
• Keeping out Trojan Horses: Auctions and Bankruptcy in the Laboratory (RePEc:tin:wpaper:20110024)
  by Sander Onderstal & Ailko van der Veen
• Equilibrium Selection in Cheap Talk Games: ACDC rocks when Other Criteria remain silent (RePEc:tin:wpaper:20110037)
  by Adrian de Groot Ruiz & Theo Offerman & Sander Onderstal
• Power and the Privilege of Clarity: An Analysis of Bargaining Power and Information Transmission (RePEc:tin:wpaper:20110055)
  by Adrian de Groot Ruiz & Theo Offerman & Sander Onderstal
• Bidding to give in the Field: Door-to-Door Fundraisers had it right from the Start (RePEc:tin:wpaper:20110070)
  by Sander Onderstal & Arthur J.C. Schram & Adriaan R. Soetevent
• An Experimental Study of Credible Deviations and ACDC (RePEc:tin:wpaper:20110153)
  by Adrian de Groot Ruiz & Theo Offerman & Sander Onderstal
• What Clients want: Choices between Lawyers' Offerings (RePEc:tin:wpaper:20140020)
  by Flora Felso & Sander Onderstal & Jo Seldeslachts
• Does Relative Grading help Male Students? Evidence from a Field Experiment in the Classroom (RePEc:tin:wpaper:20140116)
  by Eszter Czibor & Sander Onderstal & Randolph Sloof & Mirjam van Praag
• Equilibrium Selection in Experimental Cheap Talk Games (RePEc:tin:wpaper:20150012)
  by Adrian de Groot Ruiz & Theo Offerman & Sander Onderstal
• Firm-Specific Information and Explicit Collusion in Experimental Oligopolies (RePEc:tin:wpaper:20150054)
  by Francisco Gomez-Martin & Sander Onderstal & Joep Sonnemans
• Trading Places: An Experimental Comparison of Reallocation Mechanisms for Priority Queuing (RePEc:tin:wpaper:20150063)
  by Anouar El Haji & Sander Onderstal
• Premium Auctions in the Field (RePEc:tin:wpaper:20170024)
  by Sander Onderstal
• Signaling in Auctions: Experimental Evidence (RePEc:tin:wpaper:20170053)
  by Olivier Bos & Francisco Gomez-Martinez & Sander Onderstal & Tom Truyts
• Cartel stability in experimental first-price sealed-bid and English auctions (RePEc:tin:wpaper:20190009)
  by Jeroen (J.) Hinloopen & Sander (A.M.) Onderstal & Leonard Treuren
• Can Collusion Promote Corporate Social Responsibility? Evidence from the Lab (RePEc:tin:wpaper:20190034)
  by Francisco Gomez Martinez & Sander Onderstal & Maarten Pieter Schinkel
• Can Communication Mitigate Strategic Delays in Investment Timing? (RePEc:tin:wpaper:202200065)
  by Ay?e Gül Mermer & Sander Onderstal & Joep Sonnemans
• Unknown item RePEc:tin:wpaper:20220084 (paper)
• Can Communication Mitigate Strategic Delays in Investment Timing? (RePEc:tin:wpaper:20230033)
  by Ayse Gül Mermer & Sander Onderstal & Joep Sonnemans
• Corporate leniency programs for antitrust: Past, present, and future (RePEc:tin:wpaper:20230045)
  by Jeroen Hinloopen & Sander Onderstal & Adriaan Soetevent
• A Wind Tunnel Test of Wind Farm Auctions (RePEc:tin:wpaper:20230046)
  by Xinyu Li & Marco Haan & Sander Onderstal & Jasper Veldman
• Socially Optimal Mechanisms (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:03bf982d-bc1e-43a1-b63d-3dd26e62c7a6)
  by Onderstal, A.M.
• The Chopstick Auction (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:32a263a6-8738-46bb-8e64-10bdbf4cb105)
  by Onderstal, A.M.
• Auctions for Extra Capacity in an Oligopolistic Market with Network Effects (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:ad47dec0-5d7d-47b8-9dfd-f157a9648801)
  by Onderstal, A.M.
• The Effectiveness of Caps on Political Lobbying (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:d62b421d-8dc2-445f-8bb2-a4cbdfe7e5d7)
  by Matejka, M. & Onderstal, A.M. & De Waegenaere, A.M.B.
• The Trust Game Behind the Veil of Ignorance : A Note on Gender Differences (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:e07294af-b17a-4149-bb44-17842d0b5cb3)
  by Vyrastekova, J. & Onderstal, A.M.
• Optimal Auctions with Financial Externalities (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:f69f3ee8-a267-4e09-82b1-94e340ceecaf)
  by Maasland, E. & Onderstal, A.M.
• Auctions with Financial Externalities (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:f9ffd48b-e33c-4443-895b-0b5cd46dbbca)
  by Maasland, E. & Onderstal, A.M.
• Socially Optimal Mechanisms (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:03bf982d-bc1e-43a1-b63d-3dd26e62c7a6)
  by Onderstal, A.M.
• The Chopstick Auction (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:32a263a6-8738-46bb-8e64-10bdbf4cb105)
  by Onderstal, A.M.
• Papers in auction theory (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:7d84e23f-2bb6-4e3c-a689-5c797ec51da7)
  by Onderstal, A.M.
• Auctions for Extra Capacity in an Oligopolistic Market with Network Effects (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:ad47dec0-5d7d-47b8-9dfd-f157a9648801)
  by Onderstal, A.M.
• Inleiding: Academisch economieonderwijs na de crisis (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:b494562d-68fc-43e9-a02a-583112ae903c)
  by Hollanders, David & Onderstal, S.
• The Effectiveness of Caps on Political Lobbying (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:d62b421d-8dc2-445f-8bb2-a4cbdfe7e5d7)
  by Matejka, M. & Onderstal, A.M. & De Waegenaere, A.M.B.
• The Trust Game Behind the Veil of Ignorance : A Note on Gender Differences (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:e07294af-b17a-4149-bb44-17842d0b5cb3)
  by Vyrastekova, J. & Onderstal, A.M.
• Optimal Auctions with Financial Externalities (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:f69f3ee8-a267-4e09-82b1-94e340ceecaf)
  by Maasland, E. & Onderstal, A.M.
• Auctions with Financial Externalities (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:f9ffd48b-e33c-4443-895b-0b5cd46dbbca)
  by Maasland, E. & Onderstal, A.M.
• How (Not) to Raise Money (RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:113:y:2005:i:4:p:897-926)
  by Jacob K. Goeree & Emiel Maasland & Sander Onderstal & John L. Turner
• Signalling in auctions: Experimental evidence (RePEc:zbw:zewdip:21037)
  by Bos, Olivier & Gomez-Martinez, Francisco & Onderstal, Sander & Truyts, Tom