Dominique Lepelley
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Lepelley |
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Affiliations
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Université de la Réunion
/ Faculté de Droit et de Sciences Économiques et Politiques
/ Centre d'Économie et de Management de l'Océan Indien (CEMOI)
Research profile
author of:
- Choix social positionnel et principe majoritaire (RePEc:adr:anecst:y:1998:i:51:p:29-48)
by Dominique Lepelley & Vincent Merlin - The Condorcet Efficiency of Voting Rules with Mutually Coherent Voter Preferences: A Borda Compromise (RePEc:adr:anecst:y:2011:i:101-102:p:107-125)
by William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley & Hatem Smaoui - Introduction to the Special Issue on New Developments in Social Choice and Welfare Theories (RePEc:adr:anecst:y:2011:i:101-102:p:7-11)
by Marc Fleurbaey & Dominique Lepelley & Vincent Merlin - Measurement of Voting Power: a Preliminary Analysis of an Historical French Electoral Episode Through Simulations (RePEc:adr:anecst:y:2011:i:101-102:p:71-85)
by Dominique Lepelley & Laurent Vidu - Une analyse de la loi électorale du 29 juin 1820 (RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_653_0469)
by Michel Le Breton & Dominique Lepelley - Le scrutin binominal paritaire : un regard d’ingénierie électorale (RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_pr2_0105)
by Michel Le Breton & Dominique Lepelley & Vincent Merlin & Nicolas Sauger - La manipulation stratégique des règles de vote : une étude expérimentale (RePEc:cai:reldbu:rel_754_0503)
by Virginie Béhue & Pierre Favardin & Dominique Lepelley - Le système de vote par note à trois niveaux : étude d'un nouveau mode de scrutin (RePEc:cai:repdal:redp_236_0827)
by Hatem Smaoui & Dominique Lepelley - Manipulabilité coalitionnelle du vote par note à trois niveaux : quantification et comparaison à trois autres règles de vote (RePEc:cai:repdal:redp_312_0129)
by Abdelhalim El Ouafdi & Dominique Lepelley & Jérôme Serais & Hatem Smaoui - La détermination du nombre des délégués au sein des structures intercommunales : une application de l'indice de pouvoir de Banzhaf (RePEc:cai:rerarc:reru_042_0259)
by Franck Bisson & Jean Bonnet & Dominique Lepelley - La manipulation stratégique des règles de vote : une étude expérimentale (RePEc:ctl:louvre:2009044)
by Virginie Béhue & Pierre Favardin & Dominique Lepelley - A note on Condorcet's other paradox (RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-09-00345)
by William v. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley - Referendum paradox in a federal union with unequal populations: the three state case (RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-14-00642)
by Dominique Lepelley & Vincent R Merlin & Jean-louis Rouet & Laurent Vidu - Borda elimination rule and monotonicity paradoxes in three-candidate elections (RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-16-00571)
by Hatem Smaoui & Dominique Lepelley & Issofa Moyouwou - The proportion of coalitionally unstable situations under the plurality rule (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:24:y:1987:i:4:p:311-315)
by Lepelley, Dominique & Mbih, Boniface - Condorcet's paradox under the maximal culture condition (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:55:y:1997:i:1:p:85-89)
by Gehrlein, William V. & Lepelley, Dominique - The probability that all weighted scoring rules elect the same winner (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:66:y:2000:i:2:p:191-197)
by Gehrlein, William V. & Lepelley, Dominique - Strong Condorcet efficiency of scoring rules (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:68:y:2000:i:2:p:157-164)
by Lepelley, Dominique & Gehrlein, William V. - The Condorcet efficiency of approval voting and the probability of electing the Condorcet loser (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:29:y:1998:i:3:p:271-283)
by Gehrlein, William V. & Lepelley, Dominique - Correlation, partitioning and the probability of casting a decisive vote under the majority rule (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:64:y:2016:i:c:p:11-22)
by Le Breton, Michel & Lepelley, Dominique & Smaoui, Hatem - On the probability of electing the Condorcet (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:25:y:1993:i:2:p:105-116)
by Lepelley, Dominique - The likelihood of monotonicity paradoxes in run-off elections (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:31:y:1996:i:3:p:133-146)
by Lepelley, Dominique & Chantreuil, Frederic & Berg, Sven - The Condorcet efficiency of Borda Rule with anonymous voters (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:41:y:2001:i:1:p:39-50)
by Gehrlein, William V. & Lepelley, Dominique - Three ways to compute accurately the probability of the referendum paradox (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:62:y:2011:i:1:p:28-33)
by Lepelley, Dominique & Merlin, Vincent & Rouet, Jean-Louis - The impact of voters’ preference diversity on the probability of some electoral outcomes (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:66:y:2013:i:3:p:352-365)
by Gehrlein, William V. & Moyouwou, Issofa & Lepelley, Dominique - A note on Approval Voting and electing the Condorcet loser (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:80:y:2016:i:c:p:115-122)
by Gehrlein, William V. & Lepelley, Dominique & Moyouwou, Issofa - Condorcet's paradox for weak preference orderings (RePEc:eee:poleco:v:17:y:2001:i:1:p:163-177)
by Lepelley, Dominique & Martin, Mathieu - On the Likelihood of Dummy players in Weighted Majority Games (RePEc:ema:worpap:2011-17)
by Fabrice Barthelemy & Dominique Lepelley & Mathieu Martin - La détermination du nombre des délégués au sein des structures intercommunales : une application de l'indice de pouvoir de Banzhaf (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00149378)
by Franck Bisson & Jean Bonnet & Dominique Lepelley - Jean-François Laslier and M. Remzi Sanver (Eds.) : Handbook on Approval Voting, Springer, 2010 (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01088080)
by A. Adametz & Dominique Lepelley - Refining measures of group mutual coherence (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01243405)
by William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley - Should voters be required to rank candidates in an election? (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01243409)
by William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley & Florenz Plassmann - Une analyse de la loi électorale du 29 juin 1820 (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01243411)
by Michel Le Breton & Dominique Lepelley - The impact of voters’ preference diversity on the probability of some electoral outcomes (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01243417)
by William V. Gehrlein & Issofa Moyouwou & Dominique Lepelley - On the likelihood of dummy players in weighted majority games (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01243433)
by Fabrice Barthélémy & Dominique Lepelley & Mathieu Martin - Jean-François Laslier and M. Remzi Sanver (eds.): Handbook on approval voting (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01243445)
by Dominique Lepelley - Voting paradoxes and group coherence: the condorcet efficiency of voting rules (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01243452)
by William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley - La manipulation stratégique des règles de vote : une étude expérimentale (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01243465)
by Virginie Béhue & Pierre Favardin & Dominique Lepelley - A note on Condorcet's other paradox (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01243468)
by William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley - On the probability of observing Borda’s paradox (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01243471)
by William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley - Michel Regenwetter, Bernard Grofman, A.A.J. Marley, and Ilia M. Tsetlin: Behavioral social choice. Probabilistic models, statistical inference and applications (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01243477)
by Dominique Lepelley - The Unexpected Behavior of Plurality Rule (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01243483)
by William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley - The Condorcet ranking efficiency of voting rules (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01245272)
by William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley - The Value of Research Based on Simple Assumptions about Voters’ Preferences (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01245273)
by William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley - Analyse économique du règlement sportif de la coupe du monde de football (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01245280)
by G. Bily & Dominique Lepelley - Modeling crop-livestock integration systems on a regional scale in Reunion Island: sugar cane and dairy cow activities (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01245291)
by Jery Randrianasolo & Philippe Lecomte & Paul Salgado & Dominique Lepelley - Le système de vote par note à trois niveaux : étude d'un nouveau mode de scrutin (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01245306)
by Hatem Smaoui & Dominique Lepelley - The Condorcet Efficiency of Voting Rules with Mutually Coherent Voter Preferences: A Borda Compromise (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01245308)
by William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley & Hatem Smaoui - On Ehrhart polynomials and probability calculations in voting theory (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01245310)
by Dominique Lepelley & Ahmed Louichi & Hatem Smaoui - Book review: Jean-François Laslier and M. Remzi Sanver (eds.) : Handbook on Approval Voting, Springer, 2010 (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01258584)
by Dominique Lepelley - Introduction à la théorie des jeux (2) : jeux coopératifs (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01258585)
by Dominique Lepelley & Michel Paul & Hatem Smaoui - Introduction à la théorie des jeux (1) : jeux non coopératifs (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01258586)
by Dominique Lepelley & Michel Paul & Hatem Smaoui - Choix collectif et procédures de votes (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01258591)
by Dominique Lepelley & Hatem Smaoui - The Impact of Dependence among Voters’ Preferences with Partial Indifference (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01450829)
by Erik Friese & William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley & Achill Schürmann - The Condorcet Efficiency Advantage that Voter Indifference Gives to Approval Voting Over Some Other Voting Rules (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01450834)
by William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley - Le Scrutin Binominal Paritaire : Un Regard d'Ingénierie Electorale (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01452545)
by Michel Le Breton & Dominique Lepelley & Vincent Merlin & Nicolas Sauger - Partage d'un cours d'eau international : l'apport de la théories des jeux coopératifs (Partie 2) (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01452547)
by Dominique Lepelley & Michel Paul & Hatem Smaoui - A note on Approval Voting and electing the Condorcet loser (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01452548)
by William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley & Issofa Moyouwou - Borda elimination rule and monotonicity paradoxes in three-candidate elections (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01452550)
by Hatem Smaoui & Dominique Lepelley & Issofa Moyouwou - Partage d'un cours d'eau international : l'apport de la théories des jeux coopératifs (Partie 1) (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01452551)
by Dominique Lepelley & Michel Paul & Hatem Smaoui - Further Support for Ranking Candidates in Elections (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01452552)
by William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley & Florenz Plassmann - Correlation, partitioning and the probability of casting a decisive vote under the majority rule (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01452554)
by Michel Le Breton & Dominique Lepelley & Hatem Smaoui - Introduction (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01452555)
by Dominique Lepelley & Michel Paul & Hatem Smaoui - Voters’ preference diversity, concepts of agreement and Condorcet’s paradox (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01452557)
by William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley & Issofa Moyouwou - The likehood of monotonicity paradoxes in run-off elections (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01600172)
by Dominique Lepelley & Frederic Chantreuil & Sven Berg - Le Mécanisme Optimal de Vote au Sein du Conseil des Représentants d'un Système Fédéral (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01680778)
by Michel Le Breton & Dominique Lepelley & Antonin Macé & Vincent Merlin - Monotonicity paradoxes in three-candidate elections using scoring elimination rules (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01697627)
by Dominique Lepelley & Issofa Moyouwou & Hatem Smaoui - Exploring the effects of national and regional popular vote Interstate compact on a toy symmetric version of the Electoral College: an electoral engineering perspective (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02097201)
by Olivier de Mouzon & Thibault Laurent & Michel Le Breton & Dominique Lepelley - The Theoretical Shapley-Shubik Probability of an Election Inversion in a Toy Symmetric Version of the U.S. Presidential Electoral System (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02547744)
by Olivier de Mouzon & Thibault Laurent & Michel Le Breton & Dominique Lepelley - The measurement of voting power
[La mesure du pouvoir de vote] (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02672721)
by Nicolas-Gabriel Andjiga & Frederic Chantreuil & Dominique Lepelley - Coalitional manipulability of three scale evaluative voting: Quantification and comparison with three other voting rules
[Manipulabilité coalitionnelle du vote par note à trois niveaux: Quantificat (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03250076)
by Abdelhalim El Ouafdi & Dominique Lepelley & Jérôme Serais & Hatem Smaoui - On the Condorcet efficiency of evaluative voting (and other voting rules) with trichotomous preferences (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03543401)
by Abdelhalim El Ouafdi & Dominique Lepelley & Hatem Smaoui - L'évolution du pouvoir de vote des communes au sein des communautés d'agglomération de La Réunion (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03543420)
by Stéphane Blancard & Dominique Lepelley & Hatem Smaoui - Probabilities of electoral outcomes: from three-candidate to four-candidate elections (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03544908)
by Abdelhalim El Ouafdi & Dominique Lepelley & Hatem Smaoui - Comparing Two Ways for Eliminating Candidates in Three-Alternative Elections Using Sequential Scoring Rules (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03544910)
by Dominique Lepelley & Hatem Smaoui - Remarques sur le mode d'élection des conseillers départementaux (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03546568)
by Dominique Lepelley - Elections, Voting Rules and Paradoxical Outcomes (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03571730)
by William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley - Dummy Players and the Quota in Weighted Voting Games (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03797495)
by Fabrice Barthelemy & Dominique Lepelley & Mathieu Martin & Hatem Smaoui - On the Voting Power of an Alliance and the Subsequent Power of its Members (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00010168)
by Vincent Merlin & Marc Feix & Dominique Lepelley & Jean-Louis Rouet - Some Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00068839)
by Pierre Favardin & Dominique Lepelley - More on Statistical Manipulability of Social Choice Functions (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00069083)
by Fabrice Valognes & Dominique Lepelley - La détermination du nombre de délégués au sein des structures intercommunales : une application de l'indice de pouvoir de Banzhaf (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00069103)
by Franck Bisson & Jean Bonnet & Dominique Lepelley - Voting rules manipulability and social homogeneity (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00069239)
by Dominique Lepelley & Fabrice Valognes - On some limitations of the median voting rule (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00069247)
by Dominique Lepelley & W. V. Gherlhein - La mesure du pouvoir de vote (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00069255)
by Dominique Lepelley & N. Andjiga & F. Chantreuil - Borda rule, Copeland method and strategic manipulation (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00069522)
by Pierre Favardin & Dominique Lepelley & Jérôme Serais - The Probability of Conflicts in a US Presidential Type Election (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00070893)
by Dominique Lepelley & Vincent Merlin & M. Feix & J.-L. Rouet - The Probability of Conflicts in a U.S. Presidential Type Election (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00083476)
by Vincent Merlin & Jean-Lous Rouet & Marc Feix & Dominique Lepelley - Voter équitable dans l'Europe à 27 (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00151628)
by Marc Feix & Dominique Lepelley & Vincent Merlin & Jean-Louis Rouet - On the probability to act in the european union (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00418566)
by Marc Feix & Dominique Lepelley & Vincent Merlin & Jean-Louis Rouet - Three ways to compute accurately the probability of the referendum paradox (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00602133)
by Dominique Lepelley & Vincent Merlin & Jean-Louis Rouet - Introduction to the Special Issue on New Developments in Social Choice and Welfare Theories (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00653166)
by Marc Fleurbaey & Dominique Lepelley & Vincent Merlin - Measurement of Voting Power: a Preliminary Analysis of an Historical French Electoral Episode Through Simulations (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00656832)
by Dominique Lepelley & Laurent Vidu - Introduction to the special issue on new developments in social choice and welfare theories (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00734928)
by Vincent Merlin & Marc Fleurbaey & Dominique Lepelley - Referendum paradox in a federal union with unequal populations: the three state case (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01102577)
by Dominique Lepelley & Vincent Merlin & Jean-Louis Rouet & Laurent Vidu - Le Scrutin Binominal Paritaire : Un Regard d'Ingénierie Electorale (RePEc:hal:spmain:hal-01452545)
by Michel Le Breton & Dominique Lepelley & Vincent Merlin & Nicolas Sauger - To Rank or Not to Rank : A Summary (RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01450826)
by William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley & Florenz Plassmann - Le Mécanisme Optimal de Vote au Sein du Conseil des Représentants d'un Système Fédéral (RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01452556)
by Michel Le Breton & Dominique Lepelley & Vincent Merlin - The Probability of Casting a Decisive Vote: From IC to IAC trhough Ehrhart's Polynomials and Strong Mixing (RePEc:ide:wpaper:25852)
by Le Breton, Michel & Lepelley, Dominique & Smaoui, Hatem - Une Analyse de la Loi Electorale du 29 Juin 1820 (RePEc:ide:wpaper:25853)
by Le Breton, Michel & Lepelley, Dominique - Voting Rules, Manipulability and Social Homogeneity (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:116:y:2003:i:1-2:p:165-84)
by Lepelley, Dominique & Valognes, Fabrice - On Some Limitations of the Median Voting Rule (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:117:y:2003:i:1-2:p:177-90)
by Gehrlein, William V & Lepelley, Dominique - Exploring the effects of national and regional popular vote Interstate compact on a toy symmetric version of the Electoral College: an electoral engineering perspective (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:179:y:2019:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-018-0576-7)
by Olivier Mouzon & Thibault Laurent & Michel Breton & Dominique Lepelley - The Unexpected Behavior of Plurality Rule (RePEc:kap:theord:v:67:y:2009:i:3:p:267-293)
by William Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley - Probabilities of electoral outcomes: from three-candidate to four-candidate elections (RePEc:kap:theord:v:88:y:2020:i:2:d:10.1007_s11238-019-09724-5)
by Abdelhalim El Ouafdi & Dominique Lepelley & Hatem Smaoui - Analyses géométriques et probabilistes des règles de vote, avec une application au scrutin majoritaire à deux tours (RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1999_num_50_4_410114)
by Vincent Merlin & Dominique Lepelley - Le mécanisme optimal de vote au sein du conseil des représentants d’un système fédéral (RePEc:ris:actuec:0168)
by Le Breton, Michel & Lepelley, Dominique & Macé, Antonin & Merlin, Vincent - On the Condorcet efficiency of evaluative voting (and other voting rules) with trichotomous preferences (RePEc:spr:annopr:v:289:y:2020:i:2:d:10.1007_s10479-020-03591-y)
by Abdelhalim El Ouafdi & Dominique Lepelley & Hatem Smaoui - The Condorcet Efficiency Advantage that Voter Indifference Gives to Approval Voting Over Some Other Voting Rules (RePEc:spr:grdene:v:24:y:2015:i:2:d:10.1007_s10726-014-9388-4)
by William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley - Further Support for Ranking Candidates in Elections (RePEc:spr:grdene:v:25:y:2016:i:5:d:10.1007_s10726-016-9470-1)
by William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley & Florenz Plassmann - Comparing Two Ways for Eliminating Candidates in Three-Alternative Elections Using Sequential Scoring Rules (RePEc:spr:grdene:v:28:y:2019:i:4:d:10.1007_s10726-019-09618-5)
by Dominique Lepelley & Hatem Smaoui - Dummy Players and the Quota in Weighted Voting Games (RePEc:spr:grdene:v:30:y:2021:i:1:d:10.1007_s10726-020-09705-y)
by Fabrice Barthelemy & Dominique Lepelley & Mathieu Martin & Hatem Smaoui - Strategic Manipulation in Committees Using the Plurality Rule: Alternative Concepts and Frequency Calculations (RePEc:spr:grdene:v:6:y:1997:i:2:d:10.1023_a:1008623627332)
by Dominique Lepelley & Boniface Mbih - On the Kim and Roush Voting Procedure (RePEc:spr:grdene:v:8:y:1999:i:2:d:10.1023_a:1008610701801)
by Dominique Lepelley & Fabrice Valognes - An Evaluation of the Benefit of Using Two-Stage Election Procedures (RePEc:spr:homoec:v:35:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1007_s41412-017-0055-2)
by William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley & Florenz Plassmann - Scoring run-off paradoxes for variable electorates (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:17:y:2001:i:1:p:53-80)
by Dominique Lepelley & Vincent Merlin - The probability of conflicts in a U.S. presidential type election (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:23:y:2004:i:2:p:227-257)
by Marc Feix & Dominique Lepelley & Vincent Merlin & Jean-Louis Rouet - Constant scoring rules, Condorcet criteria and single-peaked preferences (*) (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:7:y:1996:i:3:p:491-500)
by Dominique Lepelley - A Note on the Probability of Having a Strong Condorcet Winner (RePEc:spr:qualqt:v:33:y:1999:i:1:p:85-96)
by Dominique Lepelley & William Gehrlein - Voters’ preference diversity, concepts of agreement and Condorcet’s paradox (RePEc:spr:qualqt:v:49:y:2015:i:6:p:2345-2368)
by William Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley & Issofa Moyouwou - The impact of dependence among voters’ preferences with partial indifference (RePEc:spr:qualqt:v:51:y:2017:i:6:d:10.1007_s11135-016-0446-7)
by Erik Friese & William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley & Achill Schürmann - Condorcet efficiency of positional voting rules with single-peaked preferences (RePEc:spr:reecde:v:1:y:1994:i:1:p:289-299)
by Dominique Lepelley - original papers : Borda rule, Copeland method and strategic manipulation (RePEc:spr:reecde:v:7:y:2002:i:2:p:213-228)
by Pierre Favardin & Dominique Lepelley & Jérôme Serais - Comparing the manipulability of approval, evaluative and plurality voting with trichotomous preferences (RePEc:spr:snbeco:v:2:y:2022:i:8:d:10.1007_s43546-022-00253-y)
by Abdelhalim El Ouafdi & Dominique Lepelley & Jérôme Serais & Hatem Smaoui - Condorcet efficiencies under the maximal culture condition (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:16:y:1999:i:3:p:471-490)
by William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley - Some Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:26:y:2006:i:3:p:485-509)
by Pierre Favardin & Dominique Lepelley - On the voting power of an alliance and the subsequent power of its members (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:28:y:2007:i:2:p:181-207)
by Marc Feix & Dominique Lepelley & Vincent Merlin & Jean-Louis Rouet - On Ehrhart polynomials and probability calculations in voting theory (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:30:y:2008:i:3:p:363-383)
by Dominique Lepelley & Ahmed Louichi & Hatem Smaoui - Michel Regenwetter, Bernard Grofman, A.A.J. Marley, and Ilia M. Tsetlin: Behavioral social choice. Probabilistic models, statistical inference and applications (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:31:y:2008:i:2:p:351-355)
by Dominique Lepelley - On the probability of observing Borda’s paradox (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:35:y:2010:i:1:p:1-23)
by William Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley - Introduction to the special issue on new developments in social choice and welfare theories (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:39:y:2012:i:2:p:253-257)
by Vincent Merlin & Marc Fleurbaey & Dominique Lepelley - Jean-François Laslier and M. Remzi Sanver (eds.): Handbook on approval voting (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:40:y:2013:i:4:p:1231-1235)
by Dominique Lepelley - On the likelihood of dummy players in weighted majority games (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:41:y:2013:i:2:p:263-279)
by Fabrice Barthélémy & Dominique Lepelley & Mathieu Martin - The likelihood of a Condorcet winner in the logrolling setting (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:49:y:2017:i:2:d:10.1007_s00355-017-1063-7)
by William Gehrlein & Michel Breton & Dominique Lepelley - Monotonicity paradoxes in three-candidate elections using scoring elimination rules (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:50:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1007_s00355-017-1069-1)
by Dominique Lepelley & Issofa Moyouwou & Hatem Smaoui - The theoretical Shapley–Shubik probability of an election inversion in a toy symmetric version of the US presidential electoral system (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:54:y:2020:i:2:d:10.1007_s00355-018-1162-0)
by Olivier Mouzon & Thibault Laurent & Michel Le Breton & Dominique Lepelley - Analyzing the Probability of Election Outcomes with Abstentions (RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-030-48598-6_2)
by William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley - Majority Efficient Representation of the Citizens in a Federal Union (RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-030-48598-6_8)
by Marc Feix & Dominique Lepelley & Vincent Merlin & Jean-Louis Rouet & Laurent Vidu - Elections and Voting Paradoxes (RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-319-64659-6_1)
by William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley - Probabilities of Voting Paradoxes (RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-319-64659-6_2)
by William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley - Measures of Agreement in Voters’ Preferences (RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-319-64659-6_3)
by William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley - Single-Stage Election Procedures (RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-319-64659-6_4)
by William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley - Two-Stage Election Procedures (RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-319-64659-6_5)
by William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley - The Impact of Voter Indifference (RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-319-64659-6_6)
by William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley - Other Voting Rules and Considerations (RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-319-64659-6_7)
by William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley - On the Probability to Act in the European Union (RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-540-79128-7_11)
by Marc R. Feix & Dominique Lepelley & Vincent Merlin & Jean-Louis Rouet - Voting Paradoxes and Their Probabilities (RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-642-03107-6_1)
by William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley - Condorcet’s Paradox and Group Coherence (RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-642-03107-6_2)
by William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley - Other Incompatibility Paradoxes (RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-642-03107-6_3)
by William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley - Other Voting Paradoxes (RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-642-03107-6_4)
by William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley - Condorcet Efficiency and Social Homogeneity (RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-642-03107-6_5)
by William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley - Coherence and the Efficiency Hypothesis (RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-642-03107-6_6)
by William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley - Other Characteristics of Voting Rules (RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-642-03107-6_7)
by William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley - The Significance of Voting Rule Selection (RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-642-03107-6_8)
by William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley - Complete PMR Ranking Efficiencies (RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-642-03107-6_9)
by William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley - The Value of Research Based on Simple Assumptions about Voters’ Preferences (RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-642-20441-8_7)
by William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley - The Impact of Group Coherence on the Condorcet Ranking Efficiency of Voting Rules (RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-642-20441-8_8)
by William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley - Elections, Voting Rules and Paradoxical Outcomes (RePEc:spr:stchwe:978-3-319-64659-6)
by William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley - Voting Paradoxes and Group Coherence (RePEc:spr:stchwe:978-3-642-03107-6)
by William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley - Exploring the Effects on the Electoral College of National and Regional Popular Vote Interstate Compact: An Electoral Engineering Perspective (RePEc:tse:iastwp:32789)
by Laurent, Thibault & Le Breton, Michel & Lepelley, Dominique & de Mouzon, Olivier - The Theoretical Shapley-Shubik Probability of an Election Inversion in a Toy Symmetric Version of the U.S. Presidential Electoral System (RePEc:tse:iastwp:32790)
by Laurent, Thibault & Le Breton, Michel & Lepelley, Dominique & de Mouzon, Olivier - Une Analyse de la Loi Electorale du 29 Juin 1820 (RePEc:tse:wpaper:25862)
by Le Breton, Michel & Lepelley, Dominique - The Probability of Casting a Decisive Vote: From IC to IAC trhough Ehrhart's Polynomials and Strong Mixing (RePEc:tse:wpaper:25866)
by Le Breton, Michel & Lepelley, Dominique & Smaoui, Hatem - Le Mécanisme Optimal de Vote au Sein du Conseil des Représentants d'un Système Fédéral (RePEc:tse:wpaper:30124)
by Le Breton, Michel & Lepelley, Dominique & Macé, Antonin & Merlin, Vincent - Le Scrutin Binominal Paritaire : Un Regard d'Ingénierie Electorale (RePEc:tse:wpaper:30137)
by Le Breton, Michel & Lepelley, Dominique & Merlin, Vincent & Sauger, Nicolas - Correlation, Partitioning and the Probability of Casting a Decisive Vote under the Majority Rule (RePEc:tse:wpaper:30138)
by Le Breton, Michel & Lepelley, Dominique & Smaoui, Hatem - The Theoretical Shapley-Shubik Probability of an Election Inversion in a Toy Symmetric Version of the U.S. Presidential Electoral System (RePEc:tse:wpaper:30551)
by Laurent, Thibault & Le Breton, Michel & Lepelley, Dominique & de Mouzon, Olivier - The Likelihood of a Condorcet Winner in the Logrolling Setting (RePEc:tse:wpaper:31398)
by Gehrlein, William & Le Breton, Michel & Lepelley, Dominique - Exploring the Effects on the Electoral College of National and Regional Popular Vote Interstate Compact: An Electoral Engineering Perspective (RePEc:tse:wpaper:32194)
by Laurent, Thibault & Le Breton, Michel & Lepelley, Dominique & de Mouzon, Olivier - On the voting power of an alliance and the subsequent power of its members (RePEc:tut:cremwp:200605)
by M.R. Feix & D. Lepelley & V. Merlin & J.L. Rouet - On Ehrhart Polynomials and Probability Calculations in Voting Theory (RePEc:tut:cremwp:200610)
by Dominique Lepelley & Ahmed Louichi & Hatem Smaoui - Computer simulations of voting systems (RePEc:wsi:acsxxx:v:03:y:2000:i:01n04:n:s0219525900000145)
by Dominique Lepelley & Ahmed Louichi & Fabrice Valognes