Takakazu Honryo
Names
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Takakazu |
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Honryo |
Identifer
Contact
Affiliations
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Doshisha University
/ Department of Economics
Research profile
author of:
- Fundamental difficulty underlying international harmonization of competition policies (RePEc:bla:ijethy:v:7:y:2011:i:1:p:111-118)
by Makoto Yano & Takakazu Honryo - Short‐Run Trade Surplus Creation In A Two‐Sector Setting (RePEc:bla:jecrev:v:57:y:2006:i:4:p:476-482)
by Takakazu Honryo & Makoto Yano - A Two‐Country Game of Competition Policies (RePEc:bla:reviec:v:19:y:2011:i:2:p:207-218)
by Makoto Yano & Takakazu Honryo - Idiosyncratic Information and Vague Communication (RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:115:y:2021:i:1:p:165-178_12)
by Honryo, Takakazu & Yano, Makoto - Strategic stability of equilibria in multi-sender signaling games (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:127:y:2021:i:c:p:102-112)
by Vida, Péter & Honryo, Takakazu - Wasteful procedures? (RePEc:eee:jebusi:v:122:y:2022:i:c:s0148619522000248)
by Arve, Malin & Honryo, Takakazu - Risky shifts as multi-sender signaling (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:174:y:2018:i:c:p:273-287)
by Honryo, Takakazu - Dynamic persuasion (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:178:y:2018:i:c:p:36-58)
by Honryo, Takakazu - Trade imbalances and harmonization of competition policies (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:46:y:2010:i:4:p:438-452)
by Yano, Makoto & Honryo, Takakazu - Strong Forward Induction in Monotonic Multi-Sender Signaling Games (RePEc:ema:worpap:2022-08)
by Peter Vida & Takakazu Honryo & Helmuts Azacis - Strategic stability of equilibria in multi-sender signaling games (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03637788)
by Takakazu Honryo & Péter Vida - A Two-Country Game of Competition Policies (RePEc:kyo:wpaper:698)
by Makoto Yano & Takakazu Honryo - A Fundamental Difficulty Underlying International Harmonization of Competition Policies (RePEc:kyo:wpaper:700)
by Makoto Yano & Takakazu Honryo - Signaling Competence in Elections (RePEc:trf:wpaper:442)
by Honryo, Takakazu - Delegation and Communication (RePEc:trf:wpaper:524)
by Arve, Malin & Honryo, Takakazu