Francesc Llerena Garrés
Names
| first: |
Francesc |
| middle: |
Llerena |
| last: |
Garrés |
Identifer
Contact
Affiliations
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Universitat Rovira I Virgili Tarragona
/ Facultat de Ciències Econòmiques i Empresarials
/ Centre de Recerca en Economia Industrial i Economia Pública (CREIP)
Research profile
author of:
- Sequential decisions in allocation problems (RePEc:bar:bedcje:2004116)
by Josep Maria Izquierdo Aznar & Francesc Llerena & Carlos Rafels Pallarola - Max-convex decompositions for cooperative TU games (RePEc:bar:bedcje:2004123)
by Francesc Llerena & Carlos Rafels Pallarola - The set of undominated imputations and the core: an axiomatic approach (RePEc:bar:bedcje:2005144)
by Francesc Llerena & Carlos Rafels Pallarola - Von Neumann-Morgenstern solution and convex descompositions of TU games (RePEc:bar:bedcje:2010245)
by Francesc Llerena & Carles Rafels - The Lorenz-maximal core allocations and the kernel in some classes of assignment games (RePEc:bar:bedcje:2010246)
by Francesc Llerena & Marina Nunez & Carles Rafels - A geometric chracterization of the nucleolus of the assignment game (RePEc:bar:bedcje:2011260)
by Francesc Llerena & Marina Nunez & Carles Rafels - An axiomatization of the nucleolus of the assignment game (RePEc:bar:bedcje:2012286)
by Francesc Llerena (Universitat Rovira i Virgili - CREIP) & Marina Nunez (Universitat de Barcelona) & Carles Rafels (Universitat de Barcelona) - On reasonable outcomes and the core in cooperative TU games (RePEc:bge:wpaper:160)
by Francesc Llerena & Carles Rafels - A simple procedure for computing strong constrained egalitarian allocations (RePEc:bge:wpaper:327)
by Francesc Llerena & Carles Rafels & Cori Vilella - A geometric characterization of the nucleolus of the assignment game (RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-11-00667)
by Francesc Llerena & Marina Nunez - An axiomatic characterization of the strong constrained egalitarian solution (RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-12-00697)
by Francesc Llerena & Cori Vilella - On the Lorenz-maximal allocations in the imputation set (RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-15-00652)
by Francesc Llerena & Llúcia Mauri - An axiomatization of the core of games with restricted cooperation (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:95:y:2007:i:1:p:80-84)
by Llerena, Francesc - The vector lattice structure of the n-person TU games (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:54:y:2006:i:2:p:373-379)
by Llerena, Francesc & Rafels, Carles - Sequentially compatible payoffs and the core in TU-games (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:50:y:2005:i:3:p:318-330)
by Izquierdo, Josep M. & Llerena, Francesc & Rafels, Carles - Monotonicity and weighted prenucleoli: A characterization without consistency (RePEc:hhs:sdueko:2018_004)
by Calleja, Pedro & Llerena, Francesc & Sudhölter, Peter - Welfare egalitarianism in surplus-sharing problems and convex games (RePEc:hhs:sdueko:2019_006)
by Calleja, Pedro & Llerena, Francesc & Sudhölter, Peter - Constrained welfare egalitarianism in surplus-sharing problems (RePEc:hhs:sdueko:2020_001)
by Calleja, Pedro & Llerena, Francesc & Sudhölter, Peter - Una nota sobre valoración de opciones americanas y arbitraje (RePEc:iec:inveco:v:24:y:2000:i:1:p:207-218)
by Francesc Llerena-Garrés - Monotonicity and Weighted Prenucleoli: A Characterization Without Consistency (RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:45:y:2020:i:3:p:1056-1068)
by Pedro Calleja & Francesc Llerena & Peter Sudhölter - Convex decomposition of games and axiomatizations of the core and the D-core (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:35:y:2007:i:4:p:603-615)
by Francesc Llerena & Carles Rafels - An axiomatization of the nucleolus of assignment markets (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:44:y:2015:i:1:p:1-15)
by Francesc Llerena & Marina Núñez & Carles Rafels - Reduced games and egalitarian solutions (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:45:y:2016:i:4:d:10.1007_s00182-015-0504-8)
by Francesc Llerena & Llúcia Mauri - Path monotonicity, consistency and axiomatizations of some weighted solutions (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:48:y:2019:i:1:d:10.1007_s00182-019-00661-9)
by Pedro Calleja & Francesc Llerena - The equity core and the Lorenz-maximal allocations in the equal division core (RePEc:spr:mathme:v:81:y:2015:i:2:p:235-244)
by Francesc Llerena & Cori Vilella - Rationality, aggregate monotonicity and consistency in cooperative games: some (im)possibility results (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:48:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s00355-016-0966-z)
by Pedro Calleja & Francesc Llerena - Stable sets and max-convex decompositions of TU games (RePEc:spr:topjnl:v:21:y:2013:i:2:p:313-322)
by Francesc Llerena & Carles Rafels - Generalized three-sided assignment markets: core consistency and competitive prices (RePEc:spr:topjnl:v:24:y:2016:i:3:d:10.1007_s11750-016-0409-0)
by Ata Atay & Francesc Llerena & Marina Núñez - An axiomatic characterization of the strong constrained egalitarian solution (RePEc:urv:wpaper:2072/203157)
by Llerena Garrés, Francesc & Vilella Bach, Misericòrdia - The equity core and the Lorenz-maximal allocations in the equal division core (RePEc:urv:wpaper:2072/212194)
by Llerena Garrés, Francesc & Vilella Bach, Misericòrdia