Eberhard Feess
Names
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Eberhard |
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Feess |
Identifer
Contact
| email: |
eberhard.feess at domain vuw.ac.nz
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| homepage: |
https://people.wgtn.ac.nz/eberhard.feess |
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| postal address: |
Prof. Dr. Eberhard Feess
RH 715, Rutherford House, 23 Lambton Quay, Wellington, 6011, New Zealand |
Affiliations
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Victoria University of Wellington
/ Wellington School of Business and Government
Research profile
author of:
- Contracts As Rent‐Seeking Devices: Evidence From German Soccer (RePEc:bla:ecinqu:v:53:y:2015:i:1:p:714-730)
by Eberhard Feess & Michael Gerfin & Gerd Muehlheusser - High‐powered Contracts, Self‐selection and Welfare in Settings with Externalities (RePEc:bla:econom:v:87:y:2020:i:346:p:328-363)
by Eberhard Feess & M. Vittoria Levati & Marcel Rieser & Ivan Soraperra - Why it Pays to Conceal: On the Optimal Timing of Acquiring Verifiable Information (RePEc:bla:germec:v:12:y:2011:i:1:p:100-123)
by Eberhard Feess & Michael Schieble & Markus Walzl - You Are One Of Us Now! How Do Share Prices Of Rivals React To Privatization? (RePEc:bla:jindec:v:57:y:2009:i:2:p:265-293)
by Z. Ayca Altintig & K. Peren Arin & Eberhard Feess & Christoph Schumacher - Moral Hazard, Risk Sharing, and the Optimal Pool Size (RePEc:bla:jrinsu:v:86:y:2019:i:2:p:297-313)
by Frauke von Bieberstein & Eberhard Feess & José F. Fernando & Florian Kerzenmacher & Jörg Schiller - The Impact of Religion and the Degree of Religiosity on Work Ethic: A Multilevel Analysis (RePEc:bla:kyklos:v:67:y:2014:i:4:p:506-534)
by Eberhard Feess & Helge Mueller & Sabrina G. Ruhnau - International Technology Transfers and Competition (RePEc:bla:reviec:v:17:y:2009:i:5:p:1038-1052)
by Eberhard Feess & Michael Hoeck & Oliver Lorz - The Impact of Transfer Fees on Professional Sports: An Analysis of the New Transfer System for European Football (RePEc:bla:scandj:v:105:y:2003:i:1:p:139-154)
by Eberhard Feess & Gerd Muehlheusser - Revenue Sharing In Professional Sports Leagues (RePEc:bla:scotjp:v:56:y:2009:i:2:p:255-265)
by Eberhard Feess & Frank Stähler - Why it Pays to Conceal: On the Optimal Timing of Acquiring Verifiable Information (RePEc:bpj:germec:v:12:y:2011:i:1:p:100-123)
by Feess Eberhard & Walzl Markus & Schieble Michael - Reporter's Privilege and Incentives to Leak (RePEc:bpj:rlecon:v:5:y:2009:i:1:n:28)
by Baum Ido & Feess Eberhard & Wohlschlegel Ansgar - Optimal Law Enforcement with Sophisticated and Naive Offenders (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7106)
by Berno Buechel & Eberhard Feess & Gerd Muehlheusser - Lying and Reciprocity (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7368)
by Simon Dato & Eberhard Feess & Petra Nieken - Moral Transgressions by Groups: What Drives Individual Voting Behavior? (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_8384)
by Eberhard Feess & Florian Kerzenmacher & Gerd Muehlheusser - Insurance for Catastrophes - Indemnity vs. Parametric Insurance with Imperfect Information (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_9631)
by Eberhard Feess & Cathrin Jordan & Ilan Noy - Autonomous Vehicles: Moral Dilemmas and Adoption Incentives (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_9825)
by Eberhard Feess & Gerd Muehlheusser - Lying in Competitive Environments: A Clean Identification of Behavioral Impacts (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_9861)
by Simon Dato & Eberhard Feess & Petra Nieken - The Basel II Accord: Internal Ratings and Bank Differentiation (RePEc:cfs:cfswop:wp200425)
by Eberhard Feess & Ulrich Hege - Basel II and the Value of Bank Differentiation (RePEc:ebg:heccah:0879)
by Hege, Ulrich & Feess, Eberhard - Patent Licensing and Price Discrimination (RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-05d40047)
by Sandro Gleave & Eberhard Feess - The Impact Of Liability For Malpractice On The Optimal Reimbursement Schemes For Health (RePEc:ecj:ac2004:82)
by Sonja Ossig & Eberhard Feess - The impact of liability for malpractice on the optimal reimbursement schemes for health services (RePEc:ecm:feam04:396)
by Sonja Ossig & Eberhard Feess - Why higher punishment may reduce deterrence (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:104:y:2009:i:2:p:69-71)
by Feess, Eberhard & Wohlschlegel, Ansgar - Delegated expertise--when are good projects bad news? (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:82:y:2004:i:1:p:77-82)
by Feess, Eberhard & Walzl, Markus - Why costless auditing may reduce social welfare (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:90:y:2006:i:3:p:407-411)
by Feess, Eberhard & Schumacher, Christoph - Liability and information transmission: The advantage of negligence based rules (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:92:y:2006:i:1:p:63-67)
by Feess, Eberhard & Wohlschlegel, Ansgar - Utilitarian or deontological models of moral behavior—What predicts morally questionable decisions? (RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:149:y:2022:i:c:s0014292122001556)
by Feess, Eberhard & Kerzenmacher, Florian & Timofeyev, Yuriy - Transfer fee regulations in European football (RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:47:y:2003:i:4:p:645-668)
by Feess, Eberhard & Muehlheusser, Gerd - Surplus division and investment incentives in supply chains: A biform-game analysis (RePEc:eee:ejores:v:234:y:2014:i:3:p:763-773)
by Feess, Eberhard & Thun, Jörn-Henrik - Estimating risk preferences of bettors with different bet sizes (RePEc:eee:ejores:v:249:y:2016:i:3:p:1102-1112)
by Feess, Eberhard & Müller, Helge & Schumacher, Christoph - Competing trade mechanisms and monotone mechanism choice (RePEc:eee:ejores:v:280:y:2020:i:3:p:1108-1121)
by Feess, Eberhard & Grund, Christian & Walzl, Markus & Wohlschlegel, Ansgar - Lying opportunities and incentives to lie: Reference dependence versus reputation (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:111:y:2018:i:c:p:274-288)
by Feess, Eberhard & Kerzenmacher, Florian - Lying and reciprocity (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:118:y:2019:i:c:p:193-218)
by Dato, Simon & Feess, Eberhard & Nieken, Petra - Morally questionable decisions by groups: Guilt sharing and its underlying motives (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:140:y:2023:i:c:p:380-400)
by Feess, Eberhard & Kerzenmacher, Florian & Muehlheusser, Gerd - The role of insurance in the adjudication of multiparty accidents (RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:19:y:1999:i:1:p:69-85)
by Feess, Eberhard & Hege, Ulrich - Safety monitoring, capital structure, and "financial responsibility" (RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:23:y:2003:i:3:p:323-339)
by Feess, Eberhard & Hege, Ulrich - Reimbursement schemes for hospitals, malpractice liability, and intrinsic motivation (RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:27:y:2007:i:4:p:423-441)
by Feess, Eberhard & Ossig, Sonja - Optimal fine reductions for self-reporting: The impact of loss aversion (RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:70:y:2022:i:c:s0144818822000230)
by Feess, Eberhard & Sarel, Roee - The impact of fine size and uncertainty on punishment and deterrence: Theory and evidence from the laboratory (RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:149:y:2018:i:c:p:58-73)
by Feess, Eberhard & Schildberg-Hörisch, Hannah & Schramm, Markus & Wohlschlegel, Ansgar - Optimal law enforcement with sophisticated and naïve offenders (RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:177:y:2020:i:c:p:836-857)
by Buechel, Berno & Feess, Eberhard & Muehlheusser, Gerd - Misreporting in teams with individual decision making: The impact of information and communication (RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:209:y:2023:i:c:p:509-532)
by Feess, Eberhard & Schilling, Thomas & Timofeyev, Yuriy - Why are corrupt countries less successful in consolidating their budgets? (RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:95:y:2011:i:7-8:p:521-530)
by Arin, K. Peren & Chmelarova, Viera & Feess, Eberhard & Wohlschlegel, Ansgar - Why are corrupt countries less successful in consolidating their budgets? (RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:95:y:2011:i:7:p:521-530)
by Arin, K. Peren & Chmelarova, Viera & Feess, Eberhard & Wohlschlegel, Ansgar - The Manager and the Auditor in a Double Moral Hazard Setting: Efficiency through Contingent Fees and Insurance Contracts (RePEc:fra:franaf:24)
by Eberhard Feess & Martin Nell - Credit Scoring and Incentives for Loan Officers in a Principal Agent Model (RePEc:fra:franaf:30)
by Eberhard Feess & Michael Schieble - Safety regulation and monitor liability (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00459892)
by Ulrich Hege & Eberhard Feess - Safety monitoring, capital structure, and "financial responsibility" (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00459915)
by Ulrich Hege & Eberhard Feess - The role of insurance in the adjudication of multiparty accidents (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00481706)
by Ulrich Hege & Eberhard Feess - The Basel Accord and The Value of Bank Differentiation (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00738261)
by Ulrich Hege & Eberhard Feess - Environmental Harm and Financial Responsibility (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00759748)
by Ulrich Hege & Eberhard Feess - The Role of Insurance in the Adjudication of Multi-Party Accidents (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00759753)
by Ulrich Hege & Eberhard Feess - Efficient Liability Rules for Multi-Party Accidents with Moral Hazard (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00759758)
by Ulrich Hege & Eberhard Feess - Basel II and the Value of Bank Differentiation (RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00584526)
by Ulrich Hege & Eberhard Feess - Basel II: Internal Ratings and Bank Differentiation (RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00759771)
by Ulrich Hege & Eberhard Feess - Competing Trade Mechanisms and Monotone Mechanism Choice (RePEc:inn:wpaper:2014-28)
by Eberhard Feess & Christian Grund & Markus Walzl & Ansgar Wohlschlegel - Incentive schemes, private information and the double-edged role of competition for agents (RePEc:inn:wpaper:2016-20)
by Christina Bannier & Eberhard Feess & Natalie Packham & Markus Walzl - Differentiation and Risk-Aversion in Imperfectly Competitive Labor Markets (RePEc:inn:wpaper:2020-15)
by Christina E. Bannier & Eberhard Feess & Natalie Packham & Markus Walzl - Legal Restrictions on Buyout Fees: Theory and Evidence from German Soccer (RePEc:iza:izadps:dp1180)
by Feess, Eberhard & Frick, Bernd & Muehlheusser, Gerd - Moral Transgressions by Groups: What Drives Individual Voting Behavior? (RePEc:iza:izadps:dp13383)
by Feess, Eberhard & Kerzenmacher, Florian & Muehlheusser, Gerd - Contracts as Rent Seeking Devices: Evidence from German Soccer (RePEc:iza:izadps:dp3834)
by Feess, Eberhard & Gerfin, Michael & Muehlheusser, Gerd - Transfer Fee Regulations in European Football (RePEc:iza:izadps:dp423)
by Feess, Eberhard & Muehlheusser, Gerd - The Impact of Fine Size and Uncertainty on Punishment and Deterrence: Theory and Evidence from the Laboratory (RePEc:iza:izadps:dp9388)
by Feess, Eberhard & Schildberg-Hörisch, Hannah & Schramm, Markus & Wohlschlegel, Ansgar - Porter's Hypothesis on Environmental Policy in an Oligopoly Model with Cost Asymmetry Caused by Innovation / Porter's Hypothese zur Umweltpolitik in einem Oligopol mit asymmetrischen Kosten (RePEc:jns:jbstat:v:220:y:2000:i:1:p:18-31)
by Feess Eberhard & Taistra Gregor - Economic Consequences of Transfer Fee Regulations in European Football (RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:13:y:2002:i:3:p:221-237)
by Eberhard Feess & Gerd Mühlheußer - Environmental liability under uncertain causation (RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:28:y:2009:i:2:p:133-148)
by Eberhard Feess & Gerd Muehlheusser & Ansgar Wohlschlegel - Negligence standards and care levels when damages depend on sales prices (RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:36:y:2013:i:2:p:389-405)
by Eberhard Feess - On the interplay of public and private law enforcement with multiple victims (RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:39:y:2015:i:1:d:10.1007_s10657-014-9457-9)
by Eberhard Feess - Academic copyright in the publishing game: a contest perspective (RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:42:y:2016:i:2:d:10.1007_s10657-016-9528-1)
by Eberhard Feess & Marc Scheufen - Lender Liability for Environmental Harm: An Argument Against Negligence Based Rules (RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:8:y:1999:i:3:p:231-250)
by Eberhard Feess - Strategic Environmental Policy, Clean Technologies and the Learning Curve (RePEc:kap:enreec:v:23:y:2002:i:2:p:149-166)
by Eberhard Feess & Gerd Muehlheusser - Optimal Self-Reporting Schemes with Multiple Stages and Option Values (RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:12:y:2005:i:3:p:265-279)
by Eberhard Feess & Markus Walzl - Unfair contests (RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:93:y:2008:i:3:p:267-291)
by E. Feess & Gerd Muehlheusser & M. Walzl - Bank capital requirements and mandatory deferral of compensation (RePEc:kap:regeco:v:53:y:2018:i:2:d:10.1007_s11149-018-9352-3)
by Eberhard Feess & Ansgar Wohlschlegel - All-Unit Discounts and the Problem of Surplus Division (RePEc:kap:revind:v:37:y:2010:i:3:p:161-178)
by Eberhard Feess & Ansgar Wohlschlegel - Implementing Efficient Market Structures: The Role of Information Transmission (RePEc:mhr:finarc:urn:sici:0015-2218(201506)71:2_240:iemstr_2.0.tx_2-s)
by Eberhard Feess & Michael Paust - Information and Externalities in Sequential Litigation (RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:doi:10.1628/0932456054193559)
by Eberhard Feess - Differentiation and Risk Aversion in Imperfectly Competitive Labor Markets (RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:doi:10.1628/jite-2020-0044)
by Christina E. Bannier & Eberhard Feess & Natalie Packham & Markus Walzl - Efficient Liability Rules for Multi-Party Accidents With Moral Hazard (RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(199806)154:2_422:elrfma_2.0.tx_2-i)
by Eberhard Feess & Ulrich Hege - Independent Safety Controls with Moral Hazard (RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200209)158:3_408:iscwmh_2.0.tx_2-4)
by Eberhard Feess & Martin Nell - Heterogeneity and Optimal Self-Reporting (RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200606)162:2_277:haos_2.0.tx_2-6)
by Eberhard Feess & Markus Walzl - Evidence Dependence of Fine Reductions in Corporate Leniency Programs (RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(201012)166:4_573:edofri_2.0.tx_2-v)
by Eberhard Feess & Markus Walzl - The Influence of Ability, Rank, and Gender on Risk-Taking in Contests: Evidence from the Ski World Cup (RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(201612)172:4_573:tioara_2.0.tx_2-z)
by Eberhard Feess & Peter J. Jost & Helge Müller - Screening in Courts: On the Joint Use of Negligence and Causation Standards (RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:27:y::i:2:p:350-375)
by Eberhard Feess & Gerd Muehlheusser & Ansgar Wohlschlegel - Favoritism towards High-Status Clubs: Evidence from German Soccer (RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:38:y:2022:i:2:p:422-478.)
by Paul Bose & Eberhard Feess & Helge Mueller - The Basel Accord and the Value of Bank Differentiation (RePEc:oup:revfin:v:16:y:2012:i:4:p:1043-1092)
by Eberhard Feess & Ulrich Hege - Competition, Bonuses, and Risk-taking in the Banking Industry (RePEc:oup:revfin:v:17:y:2013:i:2:p:653-690)
by Christina E. Bannier & Eberhard Feess & Natalie Packham - Environmental Harm and Financial Responsibility* (RePEc:pal:gpprii:v:25:y:2000:i:2:p:220-234)
by Eberhard Feess & Ulrich Hege - Bank Capital Requirements and Mandatory Deferral of Compensation (RePEc:pra:mprapa:59456)
by Feess, Eberhard & Wohlschlegel, Ansgar - The Impact of Fine Size and Uncertainty on Punishment and Deterrence: Evidence from the Laboratory (RePEc:pra:mprapa:59463)
by Feess, Eberhard & Schramm, Markus & Wohlschlegel, Ansgar - Why Higher Price Sensitivity of Consumers May Increase Average Prices: An Analysis of the European Electricity Market (RePEc:ris:fcnwpa:2010_016)
by Paulun, Tobias & Feess, Eberhard & Madlener, Reinhard - The Impact of Truth-Telling and Limited Wealth in a Principal-Agent-Model (RePEc:sbr:abstra:v:57:y:2005:i:1:p:29-45)
by Eberhard Feess & Sonja Ossig & Markus Walzl - Malpractice liability, technology choice and negative defensive medicine (RePEc:spr:eujhec:v:13:y:2012:i:2:p:157-167)
by Eberhard Feess - original papers : Safety regulation and monitor liability (RePEc:spr:reecde:v:7:y:2002:i:2:p:173-185)
by Ulrich Hege & Eberhard Feess - Ability, Team Composition, and Moral Hazard: Evidence from the Laboratory (RePEc:spr:schmbr:v:18:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s41464-016-0025-4)
by Dominik Doll & Eberhard Feess & Alwine Mohnen - The elasticity of demand for wagering in an unregulated market (RePEc:taf:applec:45:y:2013:i:15:p:2083-2090)
by E. Feess & C. R. Schumacher - Reimbursement schemes for hospitals: the impact of case and firm characteristics (RePEc:taf:applec:v:51:y:2019:i:15:p:1647-1665)
by Eberhard Feess & Helge Müller & Ansgar Wohlschlegel - Marx on Ricardo: an explanation of some important misunderstandings (RePEc:taf:eujhet:v:5:y:1998:i:2:p:276-291)
by Eberhard Feess - Auditor liability rules under imperfect information and costly litigation: the welfare-increasing effect of liability insurance (RePEc:taf:euract:v:9:y:2000:i:3:p:371-385)
by Ralf Ewert & Eberhard Feess & Martin Nell - The German Capital Markets Model Case Act (KapMuG): a European role model for increasing the efficiency of capital markets? Analysis and suggestions for reform (RePEc:taf:eurjfi:v:20:y:2014:i:4:p:361-379)
by Eberhard Feess & Axel Halfmeier - Safety Monitoring, Capital Structure, and "Financial Responsibility" (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:3705f485-8463-48c7-a622-343f9905437b)
by Feess, E. & Hege, U. - Safety Monitoring, Capital Structure, and "Financial Responsibility" (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:3705f485-8463-48c7-a622-343f9905437b)
by Feess, E. & Hege, U. - Environmental harm and financial responsibility (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:7122a4d0-683c-49ed-a55f-0c2468d97ba2)
by Feess, E. & Hege, U. - Efficient liability rules for multi-party accidents with moral hazard (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:e216300c-126c-4e48-ad1f-20a58f7f94cd)
by Hege, U. & Feess, E. - The impact of fine size and uncertainty on punishment and deterrence: Theory and evidence from the laboratory (RePEc:trf:wpaper:526)
by Feess, Eberhard & Schildberg-Hörisch, Hannah & Schramm, Markus & Wohlschlegel, Ansgar - Legal Restrictions on Buyout Fees: Theory and Evidence from German Soccer (RePEc:ube:dpvwib:dp0411)
by Eberhard Feess & Bernd Frick & Gerd Muehlheusser - Contracts as Rent-Seeking Devices: Evidence from German Soccer (RePEc:ube:dpvwib:dp1015)
by Eberhard Feess & Michael Gerfin & Gerd Muehlheusser - Judicial Effort and the Appeals System: Theory and Experiment (RePEc:ucp:jlstud:doi:10.1086/699391)
by Eberhard Feess & Roee Sarel - Regulating Product Return Policies: The Trade-off between Efficiency and Distribution (RePEc:ucp:jlstud:doi:10.1086/718911)
by Shmuel I. Becher & Eberhard Feess & Roee Sarel - An analysis of corporte leniency programs and lessons to learn for EU and US policies (RePEc:unm:umamet:2004037)
by Feess, E. & Walzl, M. - When should principals acquire verifiable information? (RePEc:unm:umamet:2004047)
by Feess, E. & Schieble, M. & Walzl, M. - Unfair contests (RePEc:unm:umamet:2004048)
by Feess, E. & Muehlheusser, G. & Walzl, M. - Why it pays to conceal - on the optimal timing of acquiring verifiable information (RePEc:unm:umamet:2006020)
by Feess, E. & Walzl, M. - Quid-pro-quo or winner-takes-it-all? : an analysis of corporate leniency programs and lessons to learn for EU and US policies (RePEc:unm:umamet:2008057)
by Feess, E. & Walzl, M. - Do Capitation‐based Reimbursement Systems Underfund Tertiary Healthcare Providers? Evidence from New Zealand (RePEc:wly:hlthec:v:26:y:2017:i:12:p:e81-e102)
by Somi Shin & Christoph Schumacher & Eberhard Feess - Negotiating with Terrorists: The Costs of Compliance (RePEc:wly:soecon:v:86:y:2019:i:1:p:305-317)
by Kerim Peren Arin & Eberhard Feess & Torben Kuhlenkasper & Otto F. M. Reich - When Bidding More is Not Enough: All-Pay Auctions with Handicaps (RePEc:zbw:bonedp:142002)
by Feess, Eberhard & Muehlheusser, Gerd & Walzl, Markus - Incentive schemes, private information and the double-edged role of competition for agents (RePEc:zbw:cfswop:475)
by Bannier, Christina E. & Feess, Eberhard & Packham, Natalie - When high-powered incentive contracts reduce performance: choking under pressure as a screening device (RePEc:zbw:fsfmwp:135)
by Bannier, Christina E. & Feess, Eberhard - Gender behavior in betting markets (RePEc:zbw:vfsc11:48697)
by Müller, Helge & Schumacher, Christoph & Feess, Eberhard - Reimbursement Schemes for Hospitals: The Impact of Case and Firm Characteristics (RePEc:zbw:vfsc16:145776)
by Wohlschlegel, Ansgar & Feess, Eberhard & Mueller, Helge - Der konjunkturelle Impuls im Konzept des Sachverständigenrats: Einige kritische Anmerkungen (RePEc:zbw:wirtdi:137534)
by Feess-Dörr, Eberhard