Winand Emons
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Emons |
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Universität Bern
/ Department Volkswirtschaftlehre
Research profile
author of:
- The Market for Used Cars: A New Test of the Lemons Model (RePEc:ags:hwwadp:26353)
by Emons, Winand & Sheldon, George - Expertise, Contingent Fees, and Excessive Litigation (RePEc:aub:autbar:356.96)
by Emons, W - Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders (RePEc:bep:alecam:1005)
by Winand Emons - Penalty Structures And Deterrence In A Two-Stage Model: Experimental Evidence (RePEc:bla:ecinqu:v:55:y:2017:i:4:p:1833-1867)
by Lisa R. Anderson & Gregory DeAngelo & Winand Emons & Beth Freeborn & Hannes Lang - The Theory of Warranty Contracts (RePEc:bla:jecsur:v:3:y:1989:i:1:p:43-57)
by Emons, Winand - On the Limitation of Warranty Duration (RePEc:bla:jindec:v:37:y:1989:i:3:p:287-301)
by Emons, Winand - Imperfect Tests and Natural Insurance Monopolies (RePEc:bla:jindec:v:49:y:2001:i:3:p:247-268)
by Winand Emons - Holler, Manfred und Illing, Gerhard: Einführung in die Spieltheorie. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer‐Verlag 1991. 366 S. DM 49.80 (RePEc:bla:kyklos:v:44:y:1991:i:3:p:478-479)
by Winand Emons - Genetic Tests and Inter-Temporal Screening in Competitive Insurance Markets (RePEc:bpj:bejeap:v:9:y:2009:i:1:n:26)
by Emons Winand - Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Testimony (RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_713_0429)
by Winand Emons & Claude Fluet - Truth-Bonding and Other Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts [technical version] (RePEc:cdl:oplwec:qt3587v9sv)
by Cooter, Robert D. & Emons, Winand - Truth-Bonding and Other Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts (RePEc:cdl:oplwec:qt35j9s08h)
by Cooter, Robert D. & Emons, Winand - Credence Goods Monopolists (RePEc:cdl:oplwec:qt9c5508x4)
by Emons, Winand - Non-comparative versus Comparative Advertising of Quality (RePEc:cir:cirwor:2011s-75)
by Winand Emons & Claude Denys Fluet - Strategic Communication with Reporting Costs (RePEc:cir:cirwor:2016s-06)
by Winand Emons & Claude Denys Fluet - Optimal Leniency Programs when Firms Have Cumulative and Asymmetric Evidence (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:10106)
by Emons, Winand & Sticher, Silvio & Blatter, Marc - Penalty Structures and Deterrence in a Two-Stage Model: Experimental Evidence (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:10576)
by Emons, Winand & Anderson, Lisa R. & Freeborn, Beth & Lang, Jan - Strategic Communication with Reporting Costs (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11105)
by Emons, Winand & Fluet, Claude - The Effectiveness of Leniency Programs when Firms choose the Degree of Collusion (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13262)
by Emons, Winand - Rebating Antitrust Fines to Encourage Private Damages Actions (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:14369)
by Emons, Winand & Lenhard, Severin - Expertise, Contingent Fees, and Excessive Litigation (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:1487)
by Emons, Winand - Imperfect Tests and Natural Insurance Monopolies (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:1644)
by Emons, Winand - The Economics of Advice (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:17840)
by Emons, Winand & Lenhard, Severin - Product Differentiation and Price Competition Between a Safe and a Risky Seller (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2041)
by Emons, Winand - The Market for Used Cars: A New Test of the Lemons Model (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3360)
by Emons, Winand & Sheldon, George - Subgame Perfect Punishment for Repeat Offenders (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3667)
by Emons, Winand - Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4131)
by Emons, Winand - The Economics of US-Style Contingent Fees and UK-Style Conditional Fees (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4473)
by Emons, Winand & Garoupa, Nuno - Conditional versus Contingent Fees (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4532)
by Emons, Winand - Playing it Safe with Low Conditional Fees versus Being Insured by High Contingent Fees (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4841)
by Emons, Winand - The Optimal Amount of Falsified Testimony (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5124)
by Emons, Winand & Fluet, Claude - Genetic Tests and Intertemporal Screening in Competitive Insurance Markets (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6047)
by Emons, Winand - Accuracy versus Falsification Costs: The Optimal Amount of Evidence under Different Procedures (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6150)
by Emons, Winand & Fluet, Claude - Non-comparative versus Comparative Advertising as a Quality Signal (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:7109)
by Emons, Winand & Fluet, Claude - Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Testimony (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:7476)
by Emons, Winand & Fluet, Claude - Incentive Compatible Reimbursement Schemes for Physicians (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:7659)
by Emons, Winand - Why Plaintiffs' Attorneys Use Contingent and Defense Attorneys Fixed Fee Contracts (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9727)
by Emons, Winand & Fluet, Claude - Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts (RePEc:ecm:wc2000:0211)
by Robert Cooter & Winand Emons - Asset prices and public information : An empirical investigation in the market for automobiles (RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:35:y:1991:i:8:p:1529-1542)
by Emons, Winand & von Hagen, Jurgen - Good times, bad times, and vertical upstream integration (RePEc:eee:indorg:v:14:y:1996:i:4:p:465-484)
by Emons, Winand - Credence goods monopolists (RePEc:eee:indorg:v:19:y:2001:i:3-4:p:375-389)
by Emons, Winand - Non-comparative versus comparative advertising of quality (RePEc:eee:indorg:v:30:y:2012:i:4:p:352-360)
by Emons, Winand & Fluet, Claude - The effectiveness of leniency programs when firms choose the degree of collusion (RePEc:eee:indorg:v:70:y:2020:i:c:s0167718720300424)
by Emons, Winand - The provision of environmental protection measures under incomplete information: An introduction to the theory of mechanism design (RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:14:y:1994:i:4:p:479-491)
by Emons, Winand - 12th Annual EALE Conference, Bern, September 6-9, 1995 (RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:17:y:1997:i:1:p:1-2)
by Emons, Winand & Van Den Bergh, Roger - Expertise, contingent fees, and insufficient attorney effort (RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:20:y:2000:i:1:p:21-33)
by Emons, Winand - A note on the optimal punishment for repeat offenders (RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:23:y:2003:i:3:p:253-259)
by Emons, Winand - Escalating penalties for repeat offenders (RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:27:y:2007:i:2:p:170-178)
by Emons, Winand - Why plaintiffs’ attorneys use contingent and defense attorneys fixed fee contracts (RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:47:y:2016:i:c:p:16-23)
by Emons, Winand & Fluet, Claude - Warranties, moral hazard, and the lemons problem (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:46:y:1988:i:1:p:16-33)
by Emons, Winand - Efficient liability rules for an economy with non-identical individuals (RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:42:y:1990:i:1:p:89-104)
by Emons, Winand - The optimal amount of distorted testimony when the arbiter can and cannot commit (RePEc:elg:eechap:14720_9)
by Winand Emons & Claude Fluet - Good Times, Bad Times, And Vertical Upstream Integration (RePEc:fth:tilbur:9023)
by Emons, W. - Truth-Bonding and Other Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts (RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:17:y:2004:i:3:p:307-327)
by Robert Cooter & Winand Emons - Market power, uncertainty, and the level of trade (RePEc:kap:openec:v:5:y:1994:i:3:p:261-274)
by Winand Emons - Optimal Leniency Programs When Firms Have Cumulative and Asymmetric Evidence (RePEc:kap:revind:v:52:y:2018:i:3:d:10.1007_s11151-017-9586-8)
by Marc Blatter & Winand Emons & Silvio Sticher - Strategic communication with reporting costs (RePEc:kap:theord:v:87:y:2019:i:3:d:10.1007_s11238-019-09709-4)
by Winand Emons & Claude Fluet - The Optimal Amount of Falsified Testimony (RePEc:lvl:lacicr:0520)
by Winand Emons & Claude Fluet - Accuracy versus Falsification Costs: the Optimal Amount of Evidence under Different Procedures (RePEc:lvl:lacicr:0703)
by Winand Emons & Claude Fluet - Non-comparative versus Comparative Advertising as a Quality Signal (RePEc:lvl:lacicr:0902)
by Winand Emons & Claude Fluet - Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Testimony (RePEc:lvl:lacicr:1122)
by Winand Emons & Claude Fluet - Non-Comparative versus Comparative Advertising of Quality (RePEc:lvl:lacicr:1139)
by Winand Emons & Claude Fluet - Why Plaintiffs' Attorneys Use Contingent and Defense Attorneys Fixed Fee Contracts (RePEc:lvl:lacicr:1338)
by Winand Emons & Claude Fluet - Product Differentiation and Price Competition Between a Safe and a Risky Seller (RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200009)156:3_431:pdapcb_2.0.tx_2-l)
by Winand Emons - Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts (RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200306)159:2_259:tmfc_2.0.tx_2-i)
by Robert Cooter & Winand Emons - Perjury versus Truth Revelation: Quantity or Quality of Testimony (RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200509)161:3_392:pvtrqo_2.0.tx_2-g)
by Winand Emons - Incentive-Compatible Reimbursement Schemes for Physicians (RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(201312)169:4_605:irsfp_2.0.tx_2-9)
by Winand Emons - Rebating Antitrust Fines to Encourage Private Damages Negotiations (RePEc:oup:amlawe:v:24:y:2023:i:2:p:589-613.)
by Winand Emons & Severin Lenhard - Playing It Safe with Low Conditional Fees versus Being Insured by High Contingent Fees (RePEc:oup:amlawe:v:8:y:2006:i:1:p:20-32)
by Winand Emons - Subgame-Perfect Punishment for Repeat Offenders (RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:42:y:2004:i:3:p:496-502)
by Winand Emons - Conditional versus contingent fees (RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:59:y:2007:i:1:p:89-101)
by Winand Emons - On the Effectiveness of Liability Rules when Agents are not Identical (RePEc:oup:restud:v:58:y:1991:i:2:p:375-390.)
by Winand Emons & Joel Sobel - Swiss Competition Policy in the Last Decade (RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-349-25875-8_3)
by Damien Neven & Thomas Ungern-Sternberg & Winand Emons & Pierre Tercier - Credence Goods and Fraudelent Experts (RePEc:rje:randje:v:28:y:1997:i:spring:p:107-119)
by Winand Emons - An Introduction to the Legal and Economic Theories of Torts (RePEc:ses:arsjes:1993-iv-3)
by Winand Emons - The market for used cars: new evidence of the lemons phenomenon (RePEc:taf:applec:v:41:y:2009:i:22:p:2867-2885)
by Winand Emons & George Sheldon - Good times, bad times, and vertical upstream integration (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:a457817c-5eda-43c8-877a-c65e6ce290b9)
by Emons, W. - Good times, bad times, and vertical upstream integration (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:a457817c-5eda-43c8-877a-c65e6ce290b9)
by Emons, W. - Perjury versus Truth-Revelation: Quantity or Quality of Testimony (RePEc:ube:dpvwib:dp0103)
by Winand Emons - A Note on the Optimal Punishment for Repeat Offenders (RePEc:ube:dpvwib:dp0104)
by Winand Emons - The Market for Used Cars: A New Test of the Lemons Model (RePEc:ube:dpvwib:dp0202)
by Winand Emons & George Sheldon - Subgame Perfect Punishment for Repeat Offenders (RePEc:ube:dpvwib:dp0211)
by Winand Emons - Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders (RePEc:ube:dpvwib:dp0315)
by Winand Emons - The Economics of US-style Contingent Fees and UK-style Conditional Fees (RePEc:ube:dpvwib:dp0407)
by Winand Emons & Nuno Garoupa - Conditional versus Contingent Fees (RePEc:ube:dpvwib:dp0409)
by Winand Emons - Playing It Safe with Low Conditional Fees versus Being Insured by High Contingent Fees (RePEc:ube:dpvwib:dp0419)
by Winand Emons - The Optimal Amount of Falsfied Testimony (RePEc:ube:dpvwib:dp0506)
by Winand Emons & Claude Fluet - Genetic Tests and Intertemporal Screening in Competitive Insurance Markets (RePEc:ube:dpvwib:dp0605)
by Winand Emons - Accuracy versus Falsification Costs: The optimal Amount of Evidence under different Procedures (RePEc:ube:dpvwib:dp0702)
by Winand Emons & Claude Fluet - Non-comparative versus Comparative Advertising as a Quality Signal (RePEc:ube:dpvwib:dp0805)
by Winand Emons & Claude Fluet - Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Testimony (RePEc:ube:dpvwib:dp0904)
by Winand Emons & Claude Fluet - Incentive Compatible Reimbursement Schemes for Physicians (RePEc:ube:dpvwib:dp1001)
by Winand Emons - Why Plaintiffs' Attorneys Use Contingent and Defense Attorneys Fixed Fee Contracts (RePEc:ube:dpvwib:dp1306)
by Winand Emons & Claude Fluet - Optimal Leniency Programs when Firms Have Cumulative and Asymmetric Evidence (RePEc:ube:dpvwib:dp1405)
by Marc Blatter & Winand Emons & Silvio Sticher - Penalty Structures and Deterrence in a Two-Stage Model: Experimental Evidence (RePEc:ube:dpvwib:dp1505)
by Lisa R. Anderson & Gregory DeAngelo & Winand Emons & Beth Freeborn & Hannes Lang - Strategic Communication with Reporting Costs (RePEc:ube:dpvwib:dp1601)
by Claude Fluet & Winand Emons - The Effectiveness of Leniency Programs when Firms choose the Degree of Collusion (RePEc:ube:dpvwib:dp1816)
by Winand Emons - Rebating Antitrust Fines to Encourage Private Damages Actions (RePEc:ube:dpvwib:dp2002)
by Winand Emons & Severin Lenhard - The Economics of Advice (RePEc:ube:dpvwib:dp2214)
by Winand Emons & Severin Lenhard - Good Times, Bad Times, and Vertical Upstream Integration (RePEc:ube:dpvwib:dp9308)
by Winand Emons - Market Power, Uncertainty, and the Level of Trade (RePEc:ube:dpvwib:dp9309)
by Winand Emons - The Provision of Environmental Protection Measures under Incomplete Information: An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design (RePEc:ube:dpvwib:dp9310)
by Winand Emons - Credence Goods and Fraudulent Experts (RePEc:ube:dpvwib:dp9402)
by Winand Emons - Credence Goods Monopolists (RePEc:ube:dpvwib:dp9501)
by Winand Emons - Expertise, Contingent Fees, and Excessive Litigation (RePEc:ube:dpvwib:dp9608)
by Winand Emons - Imperfect Tests and Natural Insurance Monopolies (RePEc:ube:dpvwib:dp9704)
by Winand Emons - Product Differentiation and Price Competition between a Safe and a Risky Seller (RePEc:ube:dpvwib:dp9808)
by Winand Emons - US-style contingent fees and UK-style conditional fees: agency problems and the supply of legal services (RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:5:p:379-385)
by Winand Emons & Nuno Garoupa - The market for used cars: A new test of the lemons model (RePEc:zbw:hwwadp:26353)
by Emons, Winand & Sheldon, George - Non-comparative versus Comparative Advertising as a Quality Signal (RePEc:zbw:vfsc11:48713)
by Emons, Winand & Fluet, Claude - The Economics of Advice (RePEc:zbw:vfsc23:277611)
by Emons, Winand & Lenhard, Severin - Information, Märkte, Zitronen und Signale: Zum Nobelpreis an George Akerlof, Michael Spence und Joseph Stiglitz (RePEc:zbw:wirtdi:40806)
by Emons, Winand - Neue Regeln guter Unternehmensführung (RePEc:zbw:wirtdi:42207)
by Hopt, Klaus J. & von Werder, Axel & Zimmermann, Jochen & Emons, Winand