Dolors Berga
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Dolors |
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Berga |
Identifer
Contact
Affiliations
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Universitat de Girona
/ Facultat de Ciències Econòmiques i Empresarials
/ Departament d'Economia
Research profile
author of:
- Group Strategy-Proofness in Private Good Economies (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:106:y:2016:i:4:p:1073-99)
by Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno - Maximal Domain for Strategy-Proof Rules with one Public Good (RePEc:aub:autbar:353.96)
by Berga, D & Serizawa, S - Voting by Committees with Exit (RePEc:aub:autbar:511.02)
by Dolors Berga & Gustavo Berganti?s & Jordi MassóAuthor-Email: jordi.masso@uab.es & Alejandro Neme - Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide? (RePEc:aub:autbar:761.09)
by Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno - Single-dipped preferences (RePEc:aub:autbar:801.09)
by Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno - Group strategy-proof social choice functions with binary ranges and arbitrary domains: characterization results (RePEc:aub:autbar:853.10)
by Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno - Two Necessary Conditions for Strategy-Proofness: on What Domains are they also Sufficient? (RePEc:aub:autbar:892.11)
by Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno - Restricted Environments and Incentive Compatibility in Interdependent Values Models (RePEc:bge:wpaper:1024)
by Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno - Arrow on domain conditions: a fruitful road to travel (RePEc:bge:wpaper:1095)
by Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno - Pairwise Justifiable Changes in Collective Choices (RePEc:bge:wpaper:1256)
by Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno & Antonio Nicolò - Strategic Requirements with Indifference: Single-Peaked versus Single-Plateaued Preferences (RePEc:bge:wpaper:325)
by Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno - Individual versus group strategy proofedness: when do they coincide? (RePEc:bge:wpaper:372)
by Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno - Domains, Ranges and Strategy-Proofness: The Case of Single-dipped Preferences (RePEc:bge:wpaper:418)
by Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno - Group Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions with Binary Ranges and Arbitrary Domains: Characterization Results (RePEc:bge:wpaper:448)
by Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno - Two Necessary Conditions for Strategy-Proofness: on What Domains are they also Sufficient? (RePEc:bge:wpaper:598)
by Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno - Group strategy-proofness in private good economies without money: matching, division and house allocation (RePEc:bge:wpaper:773)
by Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno - Group Strategy-Proofness in Private Good Economies (RePEc:bge:wpaper:801)
by Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno - Immunity to Credible Deviations from the Truth (RePEc:bge:wpaper:893)
by Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno - A maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice model (RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0809)
by Kentaro Hatsumi & Dolors Berga & Shigehiro Serizawa - On two basic properties of equilibria of voting with exit (RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-08d70024)
by Dolors Berga & Alejandro Neme & Jordi Massó & Gustavo Bergantiños - Condorcet consistent scoring rules and single-peakedness (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:181:y:2019:i:c:p:199-202)
by Berga, Dolors & Correa-Lopera, Guadalupe & Moreno, Bernardo - Preference reversal and group strategy-proofness (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:196:y:2020:i:c:s0165176520303037)
by Berga, Dolors & Moreno, Bernardo - Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:131:y:2022:i:c:p:1-28)
by Barberà, Salvador & Berga, Dolors & Moreno, Bernardo - Two necessary conditions for strategy-proofness: On what domains are they also sufficient? (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:75:y:2012:i:2:p:490-509)
by Barberà, Salvador & Berga, Dolors & Moreno, Bernardo - Individual versus group strategy-proofness: When do they coincide? (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:145:y:2010:i:5:p:1648-1674)
by Barberà, Salvador & Berga, Dolors & Moreno, Bernardo - Maximal Domain for Strategy-Proof Rules with One Public Good (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:90:y:2000:i:1:p:39-61)
by Berga, Dolors & Serizawa, Shigehiro - Strategy-proofness and single-plateaued preferences (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:35:y:1998:i:2:p:105-120)
by Berga, Dolors - An undominated Nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:54:y:2007:i:2:p:152-175)
by Berga, Dolors & Bergantinos, Gustavo & Masso, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro - Immunity to credible deviations from the truth (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:90:y:2017:i:c:p:129-140)
by Barberà, Salvador & Berga, Dolors & Moreno, Bernardo - La economía de la contaminación difusa: aspectos espaciales e información asimétrica (RePEc:ekz:ekonoz:2002107)
by Renan Goetz & Dolors Berga & Joan Ribas-Tur - Risk-Free Versus Risky Assets: Teaching a Portfolio Model with Application to the Stock Market (RePEc:jtc:journl:v:6:y:2021:i:2:p:76-94)
by Dolors Berga & Jose I. Silva - Strategic Requirements with Indifference: Single-Peaked versus Single-Plateaued Preferences (RePEc:mal:wpaper:2008-7)
by Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno - On Exiting After Voting (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:34:y:2006:i:1:p:33-54)
by D. Berga & G. Bergantiños & J. Massó & A. Neme - Group strategy-proof social choice functions with binary ranges and arbitrary domains: characterization results (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:41:y:2012:i:4:p:791-808)
by Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno - A maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice model (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:43:y:2014:i:1:p:153-168)
by Kentaro Hatsumi & Dolors Berga & Shigehiro Serizawa - Nonpoint Source Pollution in a Spatial Intertemporal Context - A Deposit Refund Approach (RePEc:spr:nrmchp:978-0-387-30056-6_7)
by Renan Goetz & Dolors Berga & Àngels Xabadia - Frontiers in Water Resource Economics (RePEc:spr:nrmpol:978-0-387-30056-6)
by None - Single-peakedness and strategy-proofness of generalized median voter schemes (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:19:y:2002:i:1:p:175-192)
by Dolors Berga - Stability and voting by committees with exit (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:23:y:2004:i:2:p:229-247)
by Dolors Berga & Gustavo Bergantiños & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme - Strategic requirements with indifference: single-peaked versus single-plateaued preferences (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:32:y:2009:i:2:p:275-298)
by Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno - Domains, ranges and strategy-proofness: the case of single-dipped preferences (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:39:y:2012:i:2:p:335-352)
by Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno - Arrow on domain conditions: a fruitful road to travel (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:54:y:2020:i:2:d:10.1007_s00355-019-01196-4)
by Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno - Undominated rules with three alternatives in an almost unrestricted domain (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:60:y:2023:i:1:d:10.1007_s00355-021-01330-1)
by Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno & Antonio Nicolò - On exiting after voting (RePEc:udc:esteco:v:30:y:2003:i:2:p:261-288)
by Dolors Berga & Gustavo Bergantiños & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme - On Exiting after Voting (RePEc:udg:wpeudg:006)
by Berga, Dolors & Bergantiños, Gustavo & Massó, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro - Nonpoint source pollution, space, time, and asymmetric information, a deposit refund approach (RePEc:udg:wpeudg:010)
by Goetz, Renan U. & Berga, Dolors