Helmut Bester

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Affiliations

• Freie Universität Berlin / Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaft
  • EDIRC entry
  • location:

Research profile

author of:

• Screening vs. Rationing in Credit Markets with Imperfect Information (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:75:y:1985:i:4:p:850-55)
  by Bester, Helmut
• Bargaining versus Price Competition in Markets with Quality Uncertainty (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:83:y:1993:i:1:p:278-88)
  by Bester, Helmut
• Delegated Bargaining And Renegotiation (RePEc:aub:autbar:440.99)
  by Helmut Bester & J?sef S?ovics
• Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle (RePEc:bef:lsbest:004)
  by Helmut Bester & Roland Strausz
• Conflict Resolution under Asymmetric Information (RePEc:bef:lsbest:006)
  by Helmut Bester & Karl Warneryd
• Delegated Bargaining and Renegotiation (RePEc:bef:lsbest:007)
  by Helmut Bester & Joszef Sakovics
• Strategic Pricing, Signalling, and Costly Information Acquisition (RePEc:bef:lsbest:008)
  by Helmut Bester & Klaus Ritzberger
• Wages and Productivity Growth in a Competitive Industry (RePEc:bef:lsbest:009)
  by Helmut Bester & Emmanuel Petrakis
• Wages and Productivity Growth in a Dynamic Monopoly (RePEc:bef:lsbest:012)
  by Helmut Bester & Emmanuel Petrakis
• Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and Noisy Communication (RePEc:bef:lsbest:017)
  by Helmut Bester & Roland Strausz
• Externalities, Communication and the Allocation of Decision Rights (RePEc:bef:lsbest:027)
  by Helmut Bester
• Random Advertising and Monopolistic Price Dispersion (RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:3:y:1994:i:3:p:545-559)
  by Helmut Bester
• Random Advertising and Monopolistic Price Dispersion (RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:3:y:1994:i:3:p:545-59)
  by Bester, Helmut
• Delegation and incentives (RePEc:bla:randje:v:39:y:2008:i:3:p:664-682)
  by Helmut Bester & Daniel Krähmer
• The optimal allocation of decision and exit rights in organizations (RePEc:bla:randje:v:48:y:2017:i:2:p:309-334)
  by Helmut Bester & Daniel Krähmer
• Signaling versus Auditing (RePEc:bla:randje:v:52:y:2021:i:4:p:859-883)
  by Helmut Bester & Matthias Lang & Jianpei Li
• Conflict and the Social Contract (RePEc:bla:scandj:v:108:y:2006:i:2:p:231-249)
  by Helmut Bester & Karl Wärneryd
• Signaling versus Auditing (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7183)
  by Helmut Bester & Matthias Lang & Jianpei Li
• Credence Goods, Costly Diagnosis, and Subjective Evaluation (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:10254)
  by Bester, Helmut & Dahm, Matthias
• Wages and Productivity Growth in a Competitive Industry (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2031)
  by Bester, Helmut & Petrakis, Emmanuel
• Strategic Pricing, Signalling and Costly Information Acquisition (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2032)
  by Bester, Helmut & Ritzberger, Klaus
• Wages and Productivity Growth in a Dynamic Monopoly (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2707)
  by Bester, Helmut & Petrakis, Emmanuel
• Externalities and the Allocation of Decision Rights in the Theory of the Firm (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3276)
  by Bester, Helmut
• Delay in Contests (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3784)
  by Bester, Helmut & Konrad, Kai A.
• Easy Targets and the Timing of Conflict (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4245)
  by Bester, Helmut & Konrad, Kai A.
• Externalities, Communication and the Allocation of Decision Rights (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5391)
  by Bester, Helmut
• Delegation and Incentives (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6042)
  by Bester, Helmut & Krähmer, Daniel
• Investments and the Holdup Problem in a Matching Market (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:7332)
  by Bester, Helmut
• Loan Sales and Screening Incentives (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9084)
  by Gehrig, Thomas & Bester, Helmut & ,
• The Role of Collateral in a Model of Debt Renegotiation (RePEc:cpr:ceprfm:0001)
  by Helmut Bester
• Wages and Productivity Growth in a Competitive Industry (RePEc:cte:werepe:4142)
  by Bester, Helmut & Petrakis, Emmanuel
• Noncooperative Bargaining and Spatial Competition (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:57:y:1989:i:1:p:97-113)
  by Bester, Helmut
• Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:69:y:2001:i:4:p:1077-98)
  by Bester, Helmut & Strausz, Roland
• Delegated Bargaining and Renegotiation (RePEc:edn:esedps:61)
  by Helmut Bester & Jozsef Sakovics
• On shareholder unanimity in the mean-variance model (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:10:y:1982:i:3-4:p:363-367)
  by Bester, Helmut
• On increasing risk in incomplete markets (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:16:y:1984:i:1-2:p:27-30)
  by Bester, Helmut
• Imperfect commitment and the revelation principle: the multi-agent case (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:69:y:2000:i:2:p:165-171)
  by Bester, Helmut & Strausz, Roland
• The role of collateral in credit markets with imperfect information (RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:31:y:1987:i:4:p:887-899)
  by Bester, Helmut
• A bargaining model of financial intermediation (RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:39:y:1995:i:2:p:211-228)
  by Bester, Helmut
• Price competition and advertising in oligopoly (RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:39:y:1995:i:6:p:1075-1088)
  by Bester, Helmut & Petrakis, Emmanuel
• Delay in contests (RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:48:y:2004:i:5:p:1169-1178)
  by Bester, Helmut & Konrad, Kai A.
• A Noncooperative Analysis of Hotelling's Location Game (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:12:y:1996:i:2:p:165-186)
  by Bester, Helmut & de Palma, Andre & Leininger, Wolfgang & Thomas, Jonathan & von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig
• Cooperation, competition, and welfare in a matching market (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:143:y:2024:i:c:p:357-369)
  by Bester, Helmut & Sákovics, József
• The incentives for cost reduction in a differentiated industry (RePEc:eee:indorg:v:11:y:1993:i:4:p:519-534)
  by Bester, Helmut & Petrakis, Emmanuel
• Coupons and oligopolistic price discrimination (RePEc:eee:indorg:v:14:y:1996:i:2:p:227-242)
  by Bester, Helmut & Petrakis, Emmanuel
• Strategic pricing, signalling, and costly information acquisition (RePEc:eee:indorg:v:19:y:2001:i:9:p:1347-1361)
  by Bester, Helmut & Ritzberger, Klaus
• Wages and productivity growth in a dynamic monopoly (RePEc:eee:indorg:v:22:y:2004:i:1:p:83-100)
  by Bester, Helmut & Petrakis, Emmanuel
• Optimal procurement of a credence good under limited liability (RePEc:eee:indorg:v:61:y:2018:i:c:p:96-129)
  by Bester, Helmut & Ouyang, Yaofu
• Price commitment in search markets (RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:25:y:1994:i:1:p:109-120)
  by Bester, Helmut
• Is altruism evolutionarily stable? (RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:34:y:1998:i:2:p:193-209)
  by Bester, Helmut & Guth, Werner
• Delegated bargaining and renegotiation (RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:45:y:2001:i:4:p:459-473)
  by Bester, Helmut & Sakovics, Jozsef
• Wages and productivity growth in a competitive industry (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:109:y:2003:i:1:p:52-69)
  by Bester, Helmut & Petrakis, Emmanuel
• Contracting with imperfect commitment and noisy communication (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:136:y:2007:i:1:p:236-259)
  by Bester, Helmut & Strausz, Roland
• Exit options in incomplete contracts with asymmetric information (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:147:y:2012:i:5:p:1947-1968)
  by Bester, Helmut & Krähmer, Daniel
• Increasing risk and equilibrium under uncertainty (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:33:y:1984:i:2:p:378-386)
  by Bester, Helmut
• Wage bargaining, productivity growth and long-run industry structure (RePEc:eee:labeco:v:19:y:2012:i:6:p:923-930)
  by Bester, Helmut & Milliou, Chrysovalantou & Petrakis, Emmanuel
• Investments and the holdup problem in a matching market (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:49:y:2013:i:4:p:302-311)
  by Bester, Helmut
• The Role Of Collateral In A Model Of Debt Renegotiation (RePEc:fth:tilbur:9060)
  by Bester, H.
• Bargaining V.S. Price Competition in a Market with Quality Uncertainty (RePEc:fth:tilbur:9113)
  by Bester, H.
• The Incentives for Cost Reduction in a Differentiated Industry (RePEc:fth:tilbur:9136)
  by Bester, H. & Petrakis, E.
• A Model of price Advertising and Sales (RePEc:fth:tilbur:9158)
  by Bester, H.
• The Missing Equilibria in Hotelling's Location Game (RePEc:fth:tilbur:9163)
  by Bester, H. & de Palma, A. & Leininger, W.
• Price Advertising and Advertising in Oligopoly (RePEc:fth:tilbur:9222)
  by Bester, H. & Petrakis, E.
• Price Commitment in Search Markets (RePEc:fth:tilbur:9309)
  by Bester, H.
• Unknown item RePEc:got:cegedp:21 (book)
• Conflict Resolution Under Asymmetric Information (RePEc:hhs:hastef:0264)
  by Bester, Helmut & Wärneryd, Karl
• Bertrand Equilibrium in a Differentiated Duopoly (RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:33:y:1992:i:2:p:433-48)
  by Bester, Helmut
• Der Umschlag fixen Kapitals im Marxschen Zwei-Abteilungen-Modell / The Turnover of Fixed Capital in Marx's Two-Department-Model (RePEc:jns:jbstat:v:195:y:1980:i:4:p:351-368:n:5)
  by Bester Helmut
• Signalling Rivalry and Quality Uncertainty in a Duopoly (RePEc:kap:jincot:v:15:y:2015:i:2:p:135-154)
  by Helmut Bester & Juri Demuth
• The Role of Collateral in a Model of Debt Renegotiation (RePEc:mcb:jmoncb:v:26:y:1994:i:1:p:72-86)
  by Bester, Helmut
• Book Review (RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(412)157:2001_689:br_2.0.tx_2-5)
  by Helmut Bester
• Credence Goods, Costly Diagnosis, and Subjective Evaluation (RePEc:not:notcdx:2014-13)
  by Helmut Bester & Matthias Dahm
• The Missing Equilibria in Hotelling's Location Game (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:975)
  by Helmut Bester
• Bargaining, Search Costs and Equilibrium Price Distributions (RePEc:oup:restud:v:55:y:1988:i:2:p:201-214.)
  by Helmut Bester
• Specific Skills, Imperfect Information and Job Rationing (RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-52337-1_5)
  by Helmut Bester
• Signaling versus Auditing (RePEc:rco:dpaper:286)
  by Bester, Helmut & Lang, Matthias & Li, Jianpei
• Fairness and Competition in a Bilateral Matching Market (RePEc:rco:dpaper:287)
  by Bester, Helmut
• Cooperation, Competition, and Welfare in a Matching Market (RePEc:rco:dpaper:332)
  by Bester, Helmut & Sákovics, József
• Quality Uncertainty Mitigates Product Differentiation (RePEc:rje:randje:v:29:y:1998:i:winter:p:828-844)
  by Helmut Bester
• Easy Targets and the Timing of Conflict (RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:17:y:2005:i:2:p:199-215)
  by Helmut Bester & Kai A. Konrad
• Externalities, communication and the allocation of decision rights (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:41:y:2009:i:2:p:269-296)
  by Helmut Bester
• Subjective evaluation versus public information (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:61:y:2016:i:4:d:10.1007_s00199-016-0953-8)
  by Helmut Bester & Johannes Münster
• The Incentives for Cost Reduction in a Differentiated Industry (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:3bdcf79c-47bf-491d-a88a-61923d4ebdd2)
  by Bester, H. & Petrakis, E.
• Price commitment in search markets (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:4139ac22-1b34-4821-8b24-bcb0e687060c)
  by Bester, H.
• A bargaining model of financial intermediation (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:5286db18-6d4b-4fe6-a267-430ba1655823)
  by Bester, H.
• A Model of Price Advertising and Sales (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:80bc93a0-a23d-4f7a-87a5-ea16aba2f511)
  by Bester, H.
• Coupons and Oligopolistic Price Discrimination (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:8da8ef6b-5dd5-46ee-9cbf-4c9b8c45d43c)
  by Bester, H. & Petrakis, E.
• The Missing Equilibria in Hotelling's Location Game (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:9a9c1f60-c135-416c-b5c4-8f6398b2bfd7)
  by Bester, H. & de Palma, A. & Leininger, W. & Thomas, J.P.
• The Role of Collateral in a Model of Debt Renegotiation (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:c3595a51-2a58-40d7-9128-a892526f7e7c)
  by Bester, H.
• Price Advertising and Advertising in Oligopoly (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:d9f79213-4574-4568-bcee-0a58c408885f)
  by Bester, H. & Petrakis, E.
• Is altruism evolutionarily stable ? (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:da7857c6-47e7-428d-9ca2-4605e26fa5fd)
  by Bester, H. & Güth, W.
• Bargaining vs. price competition in a market with quality uncertainty (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:f56af471-9cf9-456a-b6cd-9d9978d55b0a)
  by Bester, H.
• Bargaining versus price competition in markets with quality uncertainty (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:18a53327-837f-4e75-8fd7-96f8933d8c7b)
  by Bester, H.
• The Incentives for Cost Reduction in a Differentiated Industry (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:3bdcf79c-47bf-491d-a88a-61923d4ebdd2)
  by Bester, H. & Petrakis, E.
• Bertrand equilibrium in a differentiated duopoly (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:3d34cb58-5163-4a5d-87d0-dd8014bd6d62)
  by Bester, H.
• Price commitment in search markets (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:4139ac22-1b34-4821-8b24-bcb0e687060c)
  by Bester, H.
• A bargaining model of financial intermediation (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:5286db18-6d4b-4fe6-a267-430ba1655823)
  by Bester, H.
• A Model of Price Advertising and Sales (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:80bc93a0-a23d-4f7a-87a5-ea16aba2f511)
  by Bester, H.
• Coupons and Oligopolistic Price Discrimination (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:8da8ef6b-5dd5-46ee-9cbf-4c9b8c45d43c)
  by Bester, H. & Petrakis, E.
• The Missing Equilibria in Hotelling's Location Game (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:9a9c1f60-c135-416c-b5c4-8f6398b2bfd7)
  by Bester, H. & de Palma, A. & Leininger, W. & Thomas, J.P.
• The Role of Collateral in a Model of Debt Renegotiation (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:c3595a51-2a58-40d7-9128-a892526f7e7c)
  by Bester, H.
• Price Advertising and Advertising in Oligopoly (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:d9f79213-4574-4568-bcee-0a58c408885f)
  by Bester, H. & Petrakis, E.
• Is altruism evolutionarily stable ? (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:da7857c6-47e7-428d-9ca2-4605e26fa5fd)
  by Bester, H. & Güth, W.
• The role of collateral in a model of debt renegotiation (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:efe919a3-7b33-4c98-93d1-294180b4b9e2)
  by Bester, H.
• Bargaining vs. price competition in a market with quality uncertainty (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:f56af471-9cf9-456a-b6cd-9d9978d55b0a)
  by Bester, H.
• Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and Noisy Communication (RePEc:trf:wpaper:2)
  by Bester, Helmut & Strausz, Roland
• Externalities and the Allocation of Decision Rights in the Theory of the Firm (RePEc:trf:wpaper:23)
  by Bester, Helmut
• Exit Options in Incomplete Contracts with Asymmetric Information (RePEc:trf:wpaper:251)
  by Bester, Helmut & Krähmer, Daniel
• Investments and the Holdup Problem in a Matching Market (RePEc:trf:wpaper:263)
  by Bester, Helmut
• Wages and Productivity Growth in a Dynamic Oligopoly (RePEc:trf:wpaper:287)
  by Bester, Helmut & Milliou, Chrysovalantou & Petrakis, Emmanuel
• Subjective Evaluation versus Public Information (RePEc:trf:wpaper:399)
  by Bester, Helmut & Münster, Johannes
• Signalling Rivalry and Quality Uncertainty in a Duopoly (RePEc:trf:wpaper:400)
  by Bester, Helmut & Demuth, Juri
• Exit Options and the Allocation of Authority (RePEc:trf:wpaper:401)
  by Bester, Helmut & Krähmer, Daniel
• Credence Goods, Costly Diagnosis, and Subjective Evaluation (RePEc:trf:wpaper:483)
  by Bester, Helmut & Dahm, Matthias
• Externalities, Communication and the Allocation of Decision Rights (RePEc:trf:wpaper:69)
  by Bester, Helmut
• Conflict and the Social Contract (RePEc:trf:wpaper:94)
  by Bester, Helmut & Wärneryd, Karl
• Incentive-Compatible Long-term Contracts and Job Rationing (RePEc:ucp:jlabec:v:7:y:1989:i:2:p:238-55)
  by Bester, Helmut
• Credence Goods, Costly Diagnosis and Subjective Evaluation (RePEc:wly:econjl:v:128:y:2018:i:611:p:1367-1394)
  by Helmut Bester & Matthias Dahm
• Easy targets and the timing of conflict (RePEc:zbw:cegedp:21)
  by Bester, Helmut & Konrad, Kai A.
• Externalities, communication and the allocation of decision rights (RePEc:zbw:fubsbe:200521)
  by Bester, Helmut
• Delegation and incentives (RePEc:zbw:fubsbe:20071)
  by Bester, Helmut & Krähmer, Daniel
• Exit options in incomplete contracts with asymmetric information (RePEc:zbw:fubsbe:200823)
  by Bester, Helmut & Krähmer, Daniel
• Wages and productivity growth in a dynamic oligopoly (RePEc:zbw:fubsbe:200918)
  by Bester, Helmut & Milliou, Chrysovalantou & Petrakis, Emmanuel
• Investments and the holdup problem in a matching market (RePEc:zbw:fubsbe:20097)
  by Bester, Helmut
• Signalling rivalry and quality uncertainty in a duopoly (RePEc:zbw:fubsbe:201120)
  by Bester, Helmut & Demuth, Juri
• Exit options and the allocation of authority (RePEc:zbw:fubsbe:20135)
  by Bester, Helmut & Krähmer, Daniel
• Subjective evaluation versus public information (RePEc:zbw:fubsbe:20136)
  by Bester, Helmut & Münster, Johannes
• Credence goods, costly diagnosis, and subjective evaluation (RePEc:zbw:fubsbe:201429)
  by Bester, Helmut & Dahm, Matthias
• Optimal procurement of a credence good under limited liability (RePEc:zbw:fubsbe:20181)
  by Bester, Helmut & Yaofu, Ouyang
• Signaling versus costly information acquisition (RePEc:zbw:fubsbe:201811)
  by Bester, Helmut & Lang, Matthias & Li, Jianpei
• Fairness and competition in a bilateral matching market (RePEc:zbw:fubsbe:202111)
  by Bester, Helmut
• Cooperation, competition, and welfare in a matching market (RePEc:zbw:fubsbe:20226)
  by Bester, Helmut & Sákovics, József
• Delay in contests
  [Verzögerung in Konfliktsituationen] (RePEc:zbw:wzbmpg:fsiv0220)
  by Bester, Helmut & Konrad, Kai A.
• Easy targets and the timing of conflict
  ["Leichte Beute" und der Zeitpunkt eines Konflikts] (RePEc:zbw:wzbmpg:spii200328)
  by Bester, Helmut & Konrad, Kai A.