Sylvain Béal
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Sylvain |
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Béal |
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Contact
Affiliations
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Université de Franche-Comté
/ UFR des Sciences Juridiques, Économiques, Politiques et de Gestion
/ Centre de Recherche sur les Stratégies Économiques (CRESE) (weight: 90%)
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Université Jean-Monnet
/ Centre de Recherches Économiques de l'Université de Saint-ETienne (CREUSET) (weight: 10%)
Research profile
author of:
- Bounded Rationality and Repeated Network Formation (RePEc:ags:feemct:12169)
by Beal, Sylvain & Querou, Nicolas - Axiomatic characterizations of the family of Weighted priority values (RePEc:bla:ijethy:v:19:y:2023:i:4:p:787-816)
by Sylvain Béal & Sylvain Ferrières & Adriana Navarro‐Ramos & Philippe Solal - Comparable Axiomatizations of Two Allocation Rules for Cooperative Games with Transferable Utility and Their Subclass of Data Games (RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:18:y:2016:i:6:p:992-1004)
by Sylvain Béal & Marc Deschamps & Philippe Solal - Les effets d'une réglementation sur la concurrence et l'innovation : première analyse de la réglementation européenne REACH (RePEc:cai:ecoldc:ecop_197_0063)
by Sylvain Béal & Marc Deschamps & Joël Thomas Ravix & Olivier Sautel - Rationalité limitée et jeux de machines (RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_565_1033)
by Sylvain Béal - Règles d'allocation pour les programmes de pass culturel. Allocation rules for museum pass programs (RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_616_1099)
by Sylvain Béal & Philippe Solal - Comportements adaptatifs sans croyances (RePEc:cai:reidbu:rei_114_0007)
by Sylvain Béal & Jacques Durieu - La mise en place de la législation européenne REACH. Une analyse des effets anticoncurrentiels (RePEc:cai:reofsp:reof_118_0113)
by Sylvain Béal & Marc Deschamps & Joël Thomas Ravix & Olivier Sautel - Les informations exigées par la législation REACH : Analyse du partage des coûts (RePEc:cai:repdal:redp_206_0991)
by Sylvain Béal & Marc Deschamps & Joël Thomas Ravix & Olivier Sautel - Introduction (RePEc:cai:repdal:redp_335_0651)
by Catherine Baumont & Sylvain Béal & Lionel Védrine - Axioms of Invariance for TU-games (RePEc:crb:wpaper:2012-01)
by Sylvain Béal & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal - The Sequential Equal Surplus Division for Sharing International Rivers with Bifurcations (RePEc:crb:wpaper:2012-02)
by Sylvain Béal & Amandine Ghintran & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal - Freezeout, Compensation Rules and Voting Equilibria (RePEc:crb:wpaper:2013-04)
by Christian At & Sylvain Béal & Pierre-Henri Morand - A Decomposition of the Space of TU-games Using Addition and Transfer Invariance (RePEc:crb:wpaper:2013-08)
by Sylvain Béal & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal - Preserving or removing special players: what keeps your payoff unchanged in TU-games? (RePEc:crb:wpaper:2013-09)
by Sylvain Béal & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal - On compensation schemes for data sharing within the european REACH legislation (RePEc:crb:wpaper:2014-01)
by Sylvain Béal & Marc Deschamps - Balanced collective contributions, the equal allocation of non-separable costs and application to data sharing games (RePEc:crb:wpaper:2014-02)
by Sylvain Béal & Marc Deschamps & Philippe Solal - Veto players, the kernel of the Shapley value and its characterization (RePEc:crb:wpaper:2014-03)
by Sylvain Béal & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal - Characterization of the Average Tree solution and its kernel (RePEc:crb:wpaper:2014-04)
by Sylvain Béal & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal - Decomposition of the space of TU-games, Strong Transfer Invariance and the Banzhaf value (RePEc:crb:wpaper:2014-05)
by Sylvain Béal & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal - Efficient extensions of the Myerson value (RePEc:crb:wpaper:2015-01)
by Sylvain Béal & André Casajus & Frank Huettner - Two-step values for games with two-level communication structure (RePEc:crb:wpaper:2015-02)
by Sylvain Béal & Anna Khmelnitskaya & Philippe Solal - A Class of Solidarity Allocation Rules for TU-games (RePEc:crb:wpaper:2015-03)
by Sylvain Béal & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal - Efficient extensions of communication values (RePEc:crb:wpaper:2015-04)
by Sylvain Béal & André Casajus & Frank Huettner - Characterizations of three linear values for TU games by associated consistency: simple proofs using the Jordan normal form (RePEc:crb:wpaper:2015-05)
by Sylvain Béal & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal - Axiomatic characterizations under players nullification (RePEc:crb:wpaper:2015-06)
by Sylvain Béal & Sylvain Ferrières & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal - A strategic implementation of the sequential equal surplus division rule for digraph cooperative games (RePEc:crb:wpaper:2015-07)
by Sylvain Béal & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal - Discounted Tree Solutions (RePEc:crb:wpaper:2015-18)
by Sylvain Béal & Eric Rémila & Phillippe Solal - The proportional Shapley value and an application (RePEc:crb:wpaper:2016-08)
by Sylvain Béal & Sylvain Ferrières & Eric Rémila & Phillippe Solal - An axiomatization of the iterated h-index and applications to sport rankings (RePEc:crb:wpaper:2016-11)
by Sylvain Béal & Sylvain Ferrières & Eric Rémila & Phillippe Solal - Coalitional desirability and the equal division value (RePEc:crb:wpaper:2017-08)
by Sylvain Béal & Eric Rémila & Phillippe Solal - Axiomatic and bargaining foundations of an allocation rule for ordered tree TU-games (RePEc:crb:wpaper:2017-11)
by Sylvain Béal & Sylvain Ferrières & Eric Rémila & Phillippe Solal - Games With Identical Shapley Values (RePEc:crb:wpaper:2018-03)
by Sylvain Béal & Mihai Manea & Eric Rémila & Phillippe Solal - Harsanyi power solutions for cooperative games on voting structures (RePEc:crb:wpaper:2018-05)
by Encarnaciön Algaba & Sylvain Béal & Eric Rémila & Phillippe Solal - Cooperative games on intersection closed systems and the Shapley value (RePEc:crb:wpaper:2018-06)
by Sylvain Béal & Issofa Moyouwou & Eric Rémila & Phillippe Solal - Relationship between labeled network games and museum pass games (RePEc:crb:wpaper:2019-02)
by Encarnaciön Algaba & Sylvain Béal & Vito Fragnelli & Natividad Llorca & Joaquin Sänchez-Soriano - Cohesive efficiency in TU-games: Two extensions of the Shapley value (RePEc:crb:wpaper:2019-03)
by Sylvain Béal & André Casajus & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal - Examination design: an axiomatic approach (RePEc:crb:wpaper:2019-05)
by Sylvain Béal & Sylvain Ferrière - Necessary versus equal players in axiomatic studies (RePEc:crb:wpaper:2020-01)
by Sylvain Béal & Florian Navarro - The Priority Value for Cooperative Games with a Priority Structure (RePEc:crb:wpaper:2020-02)
by Sylvain Béal & Sylvain Ferrières & Philippe Solal - Inconsistent weighting in weighted voting games (RePEc:crb:wpaper:2021-01)
by Sylvain Béal & Marc Deschamps & Mostapha Diss & Issofa Moyouwou - A Core-partition solution for coalitional rankings with a variable population domain (RePEc:crb:wpaper:2021-06)
by Sylvain Béal & Sylvain Ferrières & Philippe Solal - Lexicographic solutions for coalitional rankings based on individual and collective performances (RePEc:crb:wpaper:2021-07)
by Sylvain Béal & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal - Axiomatic characterizations of the core without consistency (RePEc:crb:wpaper:2022-02)
by Sylvain Béal & Stéphane Gonzalez & Philippe Solal & Peter Sudhölter - A characterization of the family of Weighted priority values (RePEc:crb:wpaper:2022-03)
by Sylvain Béal & Sylvain Ferrières & Adriana Navarro-Ramos & Philippe Solal - Early contributors, cooperation and fair rewards in crowdfunding (RePEc:crb:wpaper:2022-07)
by Sylvain Béal & Marc Deschamps & Catherine Refait-Alexandre & Guillaume Sekli - Sharing the cost of hazardous transportation networks and the Priority Shapley value (RePEc:crb:wpaper:2023-03)
by Sylvain Béal & Adriana Navarro-Ramos & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal - Cooperative games with diversity constraints (RePEc:crb:wpaper:2024-06)
by Sylvain Béal & Marc Deschamps & Mostapha Diss & Rodrigue Tido Takeng - Multiwinner elections with diversity constraints on individual preferences (RePEc:crb:wpaper:2024-07)
by Sylvain Béal & Marc Deschamps & Mostapha Diss & Rodrigue Tido Takeng - Fairness and fairness for neighbors: The difference between the Myerson value and component-wise egalitarian solutions (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:117:y:2012:i:1:p:263-267)
by Béal, Sylvain & Rémila, Eric & Solal, Philippe - Solidarity within a fixed community (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:125:y:2014:i:3:p:440-443)
by Béal, Sylvain & Casajus, André & Huettner, Frank & Rémila, Eric & Solal, Philippe - On the existence of efficient and fair extensions of communication values for connected graphs (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:146:y:2016:i:c:p:103-106)
by Béal, Sylvain & Casajus, André & Huettner, Frank - Relationship between labeled network games and other cooperative games arising from attributes situations (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:185:y:2019:i:c:s0165176519303520)
by Algaba, Encarnación & Béal, Sylvain & Fragnelli, Vito & Llorca, Natividad & Sánchez-Soriano, Joaquin - Rooted-tree solutions for tree games (RePEc:eee:ejores:v:203:y:2010:i:2:p:404-408)
by Béal, Sylvain & Rémila, Eric & Solal, Philippe - The proportional Shapley value and applications (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:108:y:2018:i:c:p:93-112)
by Béal, Sylvain & Ferrières, Sylvain & Rémila, Eric & Solal, Philippe - An optimal bound to access the core in TU-games (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:80:y:2013:i:c:p:1-9)
by Béal, Sylvain & Rémila, Eric & Solal, Philippe - Freezeout, compensation rules, and voting equilibria (RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:41:y:2015:i:c:p:91-102)
by At, Christian & Béal, Sylvain & Morand, Pierre-Henri - Lexicographic solutions for coalitional rankings based on individual and collective performances (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:102:y:2022:i:c:s0304406822000726)
by Béal, Sylvain & Rémila, Eric & Solal, Philippe - Characterization of the Average Tree solution and its kernel (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:60:y:2015:i:c:p:159-165)
by Béal, Sylvain & Rémila, Eric & Solal, Philippe - Cooperative games on intersection closed systems and the Shapley value (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:104:y:2020:i:c:p:15-22)
by Béal, Sylvain & Moyouwou, Issofa & Rémila, Eric & Solal, Philippe - Bounded rationality and repeated network formation (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:54:y:2007:i:1:p:71-89)
by Beal, Sylvain & Querou, Nicolas - Farsighted coalitional stability in TU-games (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:56:y:2008:i:3:p:303-313)
by Béal, Sylvain & Durieu, Jacques & Solal, Philippe - Weighted component fairness for forest games (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:64:y:2012:i:2:p:144-151)
by Béal, Sylvain & Rémila, Eric & Solal, Philippe - Preserving or removing special players: What keeps your payoff unchanged in TU-games? (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:73:y:2015:i:c:p:23-31)
by Béal, Sylvain & Rémila, Eric & Solal, Philippe - Axiomatic characterizations under players nullification (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:80:y:2016:i:c:p:47-57)
by Béal, Sylvain & Ferrières, Sylvain & Rémila, Eric & Solal, Philippe - Axiomatization of an allocation rule for ordered tree TU-games (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:93:y:2018:i:c:p:132-140)
by Béal, Sylvain & Ferrières, Sylvain & Rémila, Eric & Solal, Philippe - Informational Advantage and Influence of Communicating Central Banks (RePEc:fce:doctra:1004)
by Sylvain Béal & Marc Deschamps & Joël Thomas Ravix & Olivier Sautel - Bounded Rationality and Repeated Network Formation (RePEc:fem:femwpa:2006.74)
by Nicolas Querou & Sylvain Beal - Partial Cooperative Equilibria: Existence and Characterization (RePEc:gam:jgames:v:1:y:2010:i:3:p:338-356:d:9657)
by Sylvain Béal & Subhadip Chakrabarti & Amandine Ghintran & Philippe Solal - The Sequential Equal Surplus Division for Rooted Forest Games and an Application to Sharing a River with Bifurcations (RePEc:gat:wpaper:1440)
by Sylvain Béal & Amandine Ghintran & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal - Average tree solution for graph games (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00332537)
by Richard Baron & Sylvain Béal & Philippe Solal & Éric Rémila - Average tree solutions for graph games (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00332570)
by Richard Baron & Sylvain Béal & Éric Rémila & Philippe Solal - Farsighted Coalitional Stability in TU-games (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00334049)
by Sylvain Béal & Jacques Durieu & Philippe Solal - Rationalité limitée et jeux de machines (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00372470)
by Sylvain Béal - Perceptron versus Automaton (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00375344)
by Sylvain Béal - Perceptron versus Automaton (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00375356)
by Sylvain Béal - Necessary versus equal players in axiomatic studies (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03252179)
by Sylvain Béal & Florian Navarro - The priority value for cooperative games with a priority structure (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03422935)
by Sylvain Béal & Sylvain Ferrières & Philippe Solal - Allocation rules for cooperative games with restricted communication and a priori unions based on the Myerson value and the average tree solution (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03422939)
by Sylvain Béal & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal - Cohesive efficiency in TU-games: axiomatizations of variants of the Shapley value, egalitarian values and their convex combinations (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03422949)
by Sylvain Béal & André Casajus & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal - Farsighted coalitional stability in TU-games (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03423048)
by Sylvain Béal & Jacques Durieu & Philippe Solal - Allocation rules for cooperative games with restricted communication and a priori unions based on the Myerson value and the average tree solution (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04053211)
by Sylvain Béal & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal - Axiomatic characterizations of the core without consistency (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04053219)
by Sylvain Béal & Stéphane Gonzalez & Philippe Solal & Peter Sudhölter - Lexicographic solutions for coalitional rankings based on individual and collective performances (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04053283)
by Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal & Sylvain Béal - Axiomatic characterizations of the family of Weighted priority values (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04053363)
by Sylvain Ferrières & Adriana Navarro-Ramos & Philippe Solal & Sylvain Béal - A Core-Partition Ranking Solution to Coalitional Ranking Problems (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04114152)
by Sylvain Béal & Sylvain Ferrières & Philippe Solal - Inconsistent weighting in weighted voting games (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04416052)
by Sylvain Béal & Marc Deschamps & Issofa Moyouwou & Mostapha Diss - Taxing congestion of the space commons (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04417722)
by Hervé Moulin & Sylvain Béal & Marc Deschamps - Relationship between labeled network games and other cooperative games arising from attributes situations (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04417764)
by Encarnación Algaba & Vito Fragnelli & Natividad Llorca & Joaquin Sánchez-Soriano & Sylvain Béal - Théorie des jeux coopératifs et non-coopératifs (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04418653)
by Sylvain Béal & Yannick Gabuthy - Games with Identical Shapley Values (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04418687)
by Mihai Manea & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal & Sylvain Béal - Partial Cooperative Equilibria : Existence and Characterization (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00530580)
by Sylvain Béal & Subhadip Chakrabarti & Amandine Ghintran & Philippe Solal - Perceptron versus Automaton in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00530593)
by Sylvain Béal - Rooted-tree Solutions for Tree Games (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00530595)
by Sylvain Béal & Éric Rémila & Philippe Solal - Compensations in the Shapley value and the compensation solutions for graph games (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00530600)
by Sylvain Béal & Éric Rémila & Philippe Solal - Compensations in the Shapley value and the compensation solutions for graph games (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00530602)
by Sylvain Béal & Éric Rémila & Philippe Solal - Compensations in the Shapley Value and the Compensation Solutions for Graph Games (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00530607)
by Sylvain Béal & Philippe Solal & Éric Rémila - Average Tree Solutions and the Distribution of Harsanyi Dividends (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00530610)
by Richard Baron & Sylvain Béal & Philippe Solal & Éric Rémila - Règles d'allocation pour les programmes de pass culturels (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00554811)
by Sylvain Béal & Philippe Solal - Average Tree Solutions and the Distribution of Harsanyi Dividends (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00617708)
by Richard Baron & Sylvain Béal & Éric Rémila & Philippe Solal - Compensations in the Shapley value and the compensation solutions for graph games (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00662476)
by Sylvain Béal & Éric Rémila & Philippe Solal - On the number of blocks required to access the core (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00662489)
by Sylvain Béal & Éric Rémila & Philippe Solal - Average Tree Solutions and the Distribution of Harsanyi Dividends (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00674425)
by Richard Baron & Sylvain Béal & Éric Rémila & Philippe Solal - On the Number of Blocks Required to Access the Core (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00674426)
by Sylvain Béal & Éric Rémila & Philippe Solal - The Average Tree Solution for Multi-Choice Forest Games (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00674431)
by Sylvain Béal & Aymeric Lardon & Éric Rémila & Philippe Solal - Weighted component fairness for forest games (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00678832)
by Sylvain Béal & Éric Rémila & Philippe Solal - The Average Tree Solution for Multi-choice Forest Games (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00690676)
by Sylvain Béal & Aymeric Lardon & Éric Rémila & Philippe Solal - Fairness and Fairness for Neighbors: The Difference between the Myerson Value and Component-Wise Egalitarian Solutions (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00699641)
by Sylvain Béal & Éric Rémila & Philippe Solal - The River Sharing Problem : a Survey (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00708467)
by Sylvain Béal & Amandine Ghintran & Éric Rémila & Philippe Solal - Les informations exigées par la législation REACH : analyse du partage des coûts (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00726514)
by Joël-Thomas Ravix & Sylvain Béal & Marc Deschamps & Olivier Sautel - La mise en place de la législation européenne REACH : Une analyse des effets anticoncurrentiels (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00726526)
by Joël-Thomas Ravix & Sylvain Béal & Marc Deschamps & Olivier Sautel - An optimal bound to acces the core of TU-games (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00756547)
by Philippe Solal & Sylvain Béal & Éric Rémila - An Optimal Bound to Access the Core in TU-Games (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00756559)
by Éric Rémila & Sylvain Béal & Philippe Solal - An optimal bound to access the core in TU-games (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00795480)
by Sylvain Béal & Éric Rémila & Philippe Solal - Accessibility and stability of the coalition structure core (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00817008)
by Sylvain Béal & Éric Rémila & Philippe Solal - Les effets d'une réglementation sur la concurrence et l'innovation : première analyse de la réglementation européenne REACH (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00859130)
by Sylvain Béal & Joël-Thomas Ravix & Olivier Sautel & Marc Deschamps - An optimal bound to access the core in TU-games (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00945315)
by Sylvain Béal & Éric Rémila & Philippe Solal - An optimal bound to access the core in TU-games (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00945317)
by Sylvain Béal & Éric Rémila & Philippe Solal - The sequential surplus division for sharing a river with bifurcations (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00945341)
by Sylvain Béal & Amandine Ghintran & Philippe Solal - Solidarity within a Fixed Community (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01090487)
by Sylvain Béal & André Casajus & Frank Huettner & Éric Rémila & Philippe Solal - Preserving or removing special players: What keeps your payoff unchanged in TU-games? (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01090493)
by Sylvain Béal & Éric Rémila & Philippe Solal - Axioms of Invariance for TU-games (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01096552)
by Sylvain Béal & Éric Rémila & Philippe Solal - A Decomposition of the Space of TU-games Using Addition and Transfer Invariance (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01096559)
by Sylvain Béal & Éric Rémila & Philippe Solal - Decomposition of the space of TU-games, Strong Transfer Invariance and the Banzhaf value (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01097165)
by Sylvain Béal & Éric Rémila & Philippe Solal - On compensation schemes for data sharing within the European REACH legislation (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01111885)
by Sylvain Béal & Marc Deschamps - Characterizations of three linear values for TU games by associated consistency: simple proofs using the Jordan normal form (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01196553)
by Eric Rémila & Sylvain Béal & Philippe Solal - Characterizations of three linear values for TU games by associated consistency: simple proofs using the Jordan normal form (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01196561)
by Eric Rémila & Sylvain Béal & Philippe Solal - Characterization of the Average Tree solution and its kernel (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01196615)
by Sylvain Béal & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal - Characterizations of Weighted and Equal Division Values (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01212085)
by Sylvain Béal & André Casajus & Frank Huettner & Éric Rémila & Philippe Solal - Characterization of the Average Tree solution and its kernel (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01212115)
by Sylvain Béal & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal - The sequential equal surplus division for rooted forest games and an application to sharing a river with bifurcations (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01212167)
by Sylvain Béal & Amandine Ghintran & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal - Characterizations of three linear values for TU games by associated consistency: simple proofs using the Jordan normal form (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01264726)
by Eric Rémila & Sylvain Béal & Philippe Solal - Axiomatic characterizations under players nullification (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01293700)
by Sylvain Béal & Sylvain Ferrières & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal - Freezeout, Compensation Rules, and Voting Equilibria (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01308314)
by Christian At & Sylvain Béal & Pierre-Henri Morand - Comparable Axiomatizations of Two Allocation Rules for Cooperative Games with Transferable Utility and their Subclass of Data Games (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01328888)
by Sylvain Béal & Philippe Solal & Marc Deschamps - A strategic implementation of the sequential equal surplus division rule for digraph cooperative games (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01381379)
by Sylvain Béal & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal - Discounted Tree Solutions (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01413007)
by Sylvain Béal & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal - Discounted Tree Solutions (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01413021)
by Sylvain Béal & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal - Discounted Tree Solutions (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01413033)
by Sylvain Béal & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal - A Class of Solidarity Allocation Rules for TU-games (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01413042)
by Sylvain Béal & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal - Axiomatization and implementation of a class of solidarity values for TU-games (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01446583)
by Sylvain Béal & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal - The proportional Shapley value and applications (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01612092)
by Sylvain Béal & Éric Rémila & Philippe Solal & Sylvain Ferrières - Axiomatic and bargaining foundation of an allocation rule for ordered tree TU-games (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01644797)
by Sylvain Béal & Sylvain Ferrières & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal - Axiomatic and bargaining foundation of an allocation rule for ordered tree TU-games (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01644811)
by Philippe Solal & Sylvain Béal & Sylvain Ferrières & Eric Rémila - The proportional Shapley value and applications (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01644830)
by Philippe Solal & Sylvain Béal & Sylvain Ferrières & Éric Rémila - Two-step values for games with two-level communication structure (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01659422)
by Sylvain Béal & Anna Khmelnitskaya & Philippe Solal - REACH legislation (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01660722)
by Sylvain Béal & Philippe Solal & Marc Deschamps - Axiomatization of an allocation rule for ordered tree TU-games (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01763073)
by Sylvain Béal & Sylvain Ferrières & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal - Coalitional desirability and the equal division value (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01951010)
by Sylvain Béal & Éric Rémila & Philippe Solal - Harsanyi Power Solutions for Cooperative Games on Voting Structures (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-02129929)
by Encarnación Algaba & Sylvain Béal & Éric Rémila & Philippe Solal - Harsanyi power solutions for cooperative games on voting structures (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-02409438)
by Encarnacion Algaba & Sylvain Béal & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal - Cooperative games on intersection closed systems and the Shapley value (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-02510071)
by Sylvain Béal & Issofa Moyouwou & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal - Bounded rationality and repeated network formation (RePEc:hal:journl:ujm-00162449)
by Sylvain Béal & Nicolas Quérou - Farsighted Coalitional Stability in TU-Games (RePEc:hal:journl:ujm-00162456)
by Sylvain Béal & Jacques Durieu & Philippe Solal - Farsighted Coalitional Stability in TU-Games (RePEc:hal:journl:ujm-00176488)
by Sylvain Béal & Jacques Durieu & Philippe Solal - Farsighted Coalitional Stability in TU-Games (RePEc:hal:journl:ujm-00176491)
by Sylvain Béal & Jacques Durieu & Philippe Solal - The proportional Shapley value and an application (RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01362228)
by Sylvain Béal & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal & Sylvain Ferrières - Efficient extension of the Myerson value (RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01376904)
by Sylvain Béal & André Casajus & Frank Huettner - A class of solidarity allocation rules for TU-games (RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01376906)
by Sylvain Béal & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal - Efficient extensions of communication values (RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01376907)
by Sylvain Béal & André Casajus & Frank Huettner - Characterizations of three linear values for TU games by associated consistency: simple proofs using the Jordan normal form (RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01376909)
by Sylvain Béal & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal - A strategic implementation of the sequential equal surplus division rule for digraph cooperative games (RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01376910)
by Sylvain Béal & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal - Axiomatic characterizations under players nullification (RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01376911)
by Sylvain Béal & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal & Sylvain Ferrières - Discounted Tree Solutions (RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01377923)
by Sylvain Béal & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal - Unknown item RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01377925 (paper)
- Balanced collective contributions, the equal allocation of non-separable costs and application to data sharing games (RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01377926)
by Sylvain Béal & Marc Deschamps & Philippe Solal - Veto players, the kernel of the Shapley value and its characterization (RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01377927)
by Sylvain Béal & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal - Characterization of the Average Tree solution and its kernel (RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01377928)
by Sylvain Béal & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal - Decomposition of the space of TU-games, Strong Transfer Invariance and the Banzhaf value (RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01377929)
by Sylvain Béal & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal - An axiomatization of the iterated h-index and applications to sport rankings (RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01394818)
by Sylvain Béal & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal & Sylvain Ferrières - Sharing the cost of hazardous transportation networks and the Priority Shapley value (RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-04222245)
by Sylvain Béal & Adriana Navarro-Ramos & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal - Early contributors, cooperation and fair rewards in crowdfunding (RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-04222321)
by Sylvain Béal & Marc Deschamps & Catherine Refait-Alexandre & Guillaume Sekli - A characterization of the family of Weighted priority values (RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-04222371)
by Sylvain Béal & Sylvain Ferrières & Adriana Navarro-Ramos & Philippe Solal - Axiomatic characterizations of the core without consistency (RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-04222384)
by Sylvain Béal & Stéphane Gonzalez & Philippe Solal & Peter Sudhölter - Inconsistent weighting in weighted voting games (RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-04229250)
by Sylvain Béal & Marc Deschamps & Issofa Moyouwou & Mostapha Diss - The Priority Value for Cooperative Games with a Priority Structure (RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-04252076)
by Sylvain Béal & Sylvain Ferrières & Philippe Solal - Cooperative games with diversity constraints (RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-04447373)
by Sylvain Béal & Marc Deschamps & Mostapha Diss & Rodrigue Tido Takeng - Multiwinner elections with diversity constraints on individual preferences (RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-04447392)
by Sylvain Béal & Marc Deschamps & Mostapha Diss & Rodrigue Tido Takeng - The sequential equal surplus division for rooted forest games and an application to sharing a river with bifurcations (RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01098766)
by Sylvain Béal & Amandine Ghintran & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal - Axiomatic characterizations of the core without consistency (RePEc:hhs:sdueko:2022_002)
by Béal, Sylvain & Sudhölter, Peter & Solal, Philippe & Gonzalez, Stéphane - On compensation schemes for data sharing within the European REACH legislation (RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:41:y:2016:i:1:p:157-181)
by Sylvain Béal & Marc Deschamps - Inconsistent weighting in weighted voting games (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:191:y:2022:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-021-00951-5)
by Sylvain Béal & Marc Deschamps & Mostapha Diss & Issofa Moyouwou - Perceptron versus automaton in the finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma (RePEc:kap:theord:v:69:y:2010:i:2:p:183-204)
by Sylvain Béal - The sequential equal surplus division for rooted forest games and an application to sharing a river with bifurcations (RePEc:kap:theord:v:79:y:2015:i:2:p:251-283)
by Sylvain Béal & Amandine Ghintran & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal - Characterizations of weighted and equal division values (RePEc:kap:theord:v:80:y:2016:i:4:d:10.1007_s11238-015-9519-7)
by Sylvain Béal & André Casajus & Frank Huettner & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal - Axiomatization and implementation of a class of solidarity values for TU-games (RePEc:kap:theord:v:83:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s11238-017-9586-z)
by Sylvain Béal & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal - Coalitional desirability and the equal division value (RePEc:kap:theord:v:86:y:2019:i:1:d:10.1007_s11238-018-9672-x)
by Sylvain Béal & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal - Perceptron versus automaton (RePEc:mnh:spaper:2510)
by Béal, Sylvain - Farsighted coalitional stability in TU-games (RePEc:mnh:spaper:2511)
by Béal, Sylvain & Durieu, Jacques & Solal, Philippe - Average tree solutions for graph games (RePEc:pra:mprapa:10189)
by Baron, Richard & Béal, Sylvain & Remila, Eric & Solal, Philippe - Weighted Component Fairness for Forest Games (RePEc:pra:mprapa:17455)
by Béal, Sylvain & Rémila, Eric & Solal, Philippe - Average tree solutions and the distribution of Harsanyi dividends (RePEc:pra:mprapa:17909)
by Béal, Sylvain & Rémila, Eric & Solal, Philippe - Allocation rules for museum pass programs (RePEc:pra:mprapa:20103)
by Béal, Sylvain & Solal, Philippe - Compensations in the Shapley value and the compensation solutions for graph games (RePEc:pra:mprapa:20955)
by Béal, Sylvain & Rémila, Eric & Solal, Philippe - On the number of blocks required to access the core (RePEc:pra:mprapa:26578)
by Béal, Sylvain & Rémila, Eric & Solal, Philippe - The Average Tree Solution for Multi-choice Forest Games (RePEc:pra:mprapa:28739)
by Béal, Sylvain & Lardon, Aymeric & Rémila, Eric & Solal, Philippe - On the number of blocks required to access the coalition structure core (RePEc:pra:mprapa:29755)
by Béal, Sylvain & Rémila, Eric & Solal, Philippe - Fairness and fairness for neighbors: the difference between the Myerson value and component-wise egalitarian solutions (RePEc:pra:mprapa:36857)
by Béal, Sylvain & Rémila, Eric & Solal, Philippe - The sequential equal surplus division for sharing a river (RePEc:pra:mprapa:37346)
by Béal, Sylvain & Rémila, Eric & Solal, Philippe - An optimal bound to access the core in TU-games (RePEc:pra:mprapa:38972)
by Béal, Sylvain & Rémila, Eric & Solal, Philippe - Axioms of invariance for TU-games (RePEc:pra:mprapa:41530)
by Béal, Sylvain & Rémila, Eric & Solal, Philippe - Les effets d’une réglementation sur la concurrence et l’innovation : première analyse de la réglementation européenne REACH (RePEc:prs:ecoprv:ecop_0249-4744_2011_num_197_1_8079)
by Olivier Sautel & Joël-Thomas Ravix & Marc Deschamps & Sylvain Béal - The average tree solution for multi-choice forest games (RePEc:spr:annopr:v:196:y:2012:i:1:p:27-51:10.1007/s10479-012-1150-1)
by S. Béal & A. Lardon & E. Rémila & P. Solal - A strategic implementation of the sequential equal surplus division rule for digraph cooperative games (RePEc:spr:annopr:v:253:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s10479-016-2290-5)
by Sylvain Béal & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal - Efficient extensions of communication values (RePEc:spr:annopr:v:264:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1007_s10479-017-2661-6)
by Sylvain Béal & André Casajus & Frank Huettner - Cohesive efficiency in TU-games: axiomatizations of variants of the Shapley value, egalitarian values and their convex combinations (RePEc:spr:annopr:v:302:y:2021:i:1:d:10.1007_s10479-021-04005-3)
by Sylvain Béal & André Casajus & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal - A Core-Partition Ranking Solution to Coalitional Ranking Problems (RePEc:spr:grdene:v:32:y:2023:i:4:d:10.1007_s10726-023-09832-2)
by Sylvain Béal & Sylvain Ferrières & Philippe Solal - Two-step values for games with two-level communication structure (RePEc:spr:jcomop:v:35:y:2018:i:2:d:10.1007_s10878-017-0194-1)
by Sylvain Béal & Anna Khmelnitskaya & Philippe Solal - Allocation rules for cooperative games with restricted communication and a priori unions based on the Myerson value and the average tree solution (RePEc:spr:jcomop:v:43:y:2022:i:4:d:10.1007_s10878-021-00811-4)
by Sylvain Béal & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal - Average tree solutions and the distribution of Harsanyi dividends (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:40:y:2011:i:2:p:331-349)
by Richard Baron & Sylvain Béal & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal - Compensations in the Shapley value and the compensation solutions for graph games (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:41:y:2012:i:1:p:157-178)
by Sylvain Béal & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal - Axioms of invariance for TU-games (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:44:y:2015:i:4:p:891-902)
by Sylvain Béal & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal - The priority value for cooperative games with a priority structure (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:51:y:2022:i:2:d:10.1007_s00182-021-00799-5)
by Sylvain Béal & Sylvain Ferrières & Philippe Solal - Axiomatic characterizations of the core without consistency (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:52:y:2023:i:3:d:10.1007_s00182-022-00835-y)
by Sylvain Béal & Stéphane Gonzalez & Philippe Solal & Peter Sudhölter - Accessibility and stability of the coalition structure core (RePEc:spr:mathme:v:78:y:2013:i:2:p:187-202)
by Sylvain Béal & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal - Efficient extensions of the Myerson value (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:45:y:2015:i:4:p:819-827)
by Sylvain Béal & André Casajus & Frank Huettner - The River Sharing Problem: A Survey (RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:15:y:2013:i:03:n:s0219198913400161)
by Sylvain Beal & Amandine Ghintran & Eric Remila & Philippe Solal - Characterizations of Three Linear Values for TU Games by Associated Consistency: Simple Proofs Using the Jordan Normal Form (RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:18:y:2016:i:01:n:s0219198916500031)
by Sylvain Béal & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal - Farsighted Coalitional Stability in TU-games (RePEc:xrs:sfbmaa:07-57)
by Béal, Sylvain & Durieu, Jacques & Solal, Philippe - Perceptron Versus Automaton∗ (RePEc:xrs:sfbmaa:07-58)
by Béal, Sylvain