Jeffrey Scot Banks
Names
| first: |
Jeffrey |
| middle: |
Scot |
| last: |
Banks |
Identifer
Contact
| postal address: |
Jeff Banks passed away too young at the age of 42 in 2000. This profile is maintained by a third party in his honor. |
Research profile
author of:
- Monopoly Pricingand Regulatory Oversight (RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:1:y:1992:i:1:p:203-233)
by Jeffrey S. Banks - Monopoly Pricing and Regulatory Oversight (RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:1:y:1992:i:1:p:203-33)
by Banks, Jeffrey S - A Bargaining Model of Collective Choice (RePEc:clt:sswopa:1053)
by Banks, Jeffrey S. & Duggan, John - A bargaining model of legislative policy-making (RePEc:clt:sswopa:1162)
by Banks, Jeffrey S. & Duggan, John - A Social Choice Lemma on Voting over Lotteries with Applications to a Class of Dynamic Games (RePEc:clt:sswopa:1163)
by Banks, Jeffrey S. & Duggan, John - Price-Conveyed Information vs. Observed Insider Behavior: A Note on Rational Expectations Convergence (RePEc:clt:sswopa:523)
by Banks, Jeffrey S. - Sophisticated Voting Outcomes and Agenda Control (RePEc:clt:sswopa:524)
by Banks, Jeffrey S. - Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games (RePEc:clt:sswopa:565)
by Banks, Jeffrey S. & Sobel, Joel. - An Experimental Analysis of Public Goods Provision Mechanisms with and without Unanimity (RePEc:clt:sswopa:595)
by Banks, Jeffrey S. & Plott, Charles R. & Porter, David P. - Endogenous Agenda Formation in Three-Person Committees (RePEc:clt:sswopa:603)
by Banks, Jeffrey S. & Gasmi, Farid. - Liability Rules and Pretrial Settlememt (RePEc:clt:sswopa:608)
by Banks, Jeffrey S. - Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes (RePEc:clt:sswopa:643)
by Austen-Smith, David & Banks, Jeffrey. - The Design of Mechanisms to Allocate Space Station Resources (RePEc:clt:sswopa:648)
by Banks, Jeffrey S. & Ledyard, John O. & Porter, David P. - Allocating Uncertain and Unresponsive Resources (RePEc:clt:sswopa:680)
by Banks, Jeffrey S. & Ledyard, John O. & Porter, David P. - An Experimental Analysis of Nash Refinements in Signaling Games (RePEc:clt:sswopa:740)
by Banks, Jeffrey & Camerer, Colin & Porter, David. - An Experimental Analysis of the Two-Armed Bandit Program (RePEc:clt:sswopa:892)
by Banks, Jeffrey & Olson, Mark & Porter, David - A Bargaining Model of Collective Choice (RePEc:cuf:journl:y:2013:v:14:i:3:banks:duggan)
by Jeffrey S. Banks & John Duggan - Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes (RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:82:y:1988:i:02:p:405-422_08)
by Austen-Smith, David & Banks, Jeffrey - Stable Governments and the Allocation of Policy Portfolios (RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:84:y:1990:i:03:p:891-906_19)
by Austen-Smith, David & Banks, Jeffrey - Monotonicity in Electoral Systems (RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:85:y:1991:i:02:p:531-537_17)
by Austen-Smith, David & Banks, Jeffrey - Knowledge, Belief, and Strategic Interaction. Edited by Cristina Bicchieri and Maria Luisa Dalla Chiara. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992. 413p. $64.95. - Paradoxes of Belief and Strategic R (RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:87:y:1993:i:04:p:1000-1001_10)
by Banks, Jeffrey S. - Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem (RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:90:y:1996:i:01:p:34-45_20)
by Austen-Smith, David & Banks, Jeffrey S. - A Bargaining Model of Collective Choice (RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:94:y:2000:i:01:p:73-88_22)
by Banks, Jeffrey s. & Duggan, John - Buying Supermajorities in Finite Legislatures (RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:94:y:2000:i:03:p:677-681_22)
by Banks, Jeffrey S. - Modern Political Economy (RePEc:cup:cbooks:9780521472333)
by None - Modern Political Economy (RePEc:cup:cbooks:9780521478106)
by None - Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:55:y:1987:i:3:p:647-61)
by Banks, Jeffrey S & Sobel, Joel - Denumerable-Armed Bandits (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:60:y:1992:i:5:p:1071-96)
by Banks, Jeffrey S & Sundaram, Rangarajan K - Switching Costs and the Gittins Index (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:62:y:1994:i:3:p:687-94)
by Banks, Jeffrey S & Sundaram, Rangarajan K - Strategic aspects of political systems (RePEc:eee:gamchp:3-59)
by Banks, Jeffrey S. - Repeated games, finite automata, and complexity (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:2:y:1990:i:2:p:97-117)
by Banks, Jeffrey S. & Sundaram, Rangarajan K. - A battle-of-the-sexes game with incomplete information (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:4:y:1992:i:3:p:347-372)
by Banks, Jeffrey S. & Calvert, Randall L. - Game-Theoretic Models of Politics (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:5:y:1993:i:1:p:1-2)
by Banks Jeffrey S. & Myerson Roger B. - An Experimental Analysis of Nash Refinements in Signaling Games (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:6:y:1994:i:1:p:1-31)
by Banks Jeffrey & Camerer Colin & Porter David - A model of price promotions with consumer search (RePEc:eee:indorg:v:17:y:1999:i:3:p:371-398)
by Banks, Jeffrey & Moorthy, Sridhar - Theory, experiment and the federal communications commission spectrum auctions (RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:51:y:2003:i:3:p:303-350)
by Banks, Jeffrey & Olson, Mark & Porter, David & Rassenti, Stephen & Smith, Vernon - Introduction to Political Science (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:103:y:2002:i:1:p:1-10)
by Austen-Smith, David & Banks, Jeffrey S. & Rustichini, Aldo - Bounds for Mixed Strategy Equilibria and the Spatial Model of Elections (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:103:y:2002:i:1:p:88-105)
by Banks, Jeffrey S. & Duggan, John & Le Breton, Michel - Social choice and electoral competition in the general spatial model (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:126:y:2006:i:1:p:194-234)
by Banks, Jeffrey S. & Duggan, John & Le Breton, Michel - A model of electoral competition with incomplete information (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:50:y:1990:i:2:p:309-325)
by Banks, Jeffrey S. - Optimal Retention in Agency Problems (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:82:y:1998:i:2:p:293-323)
by Banks, Jeffrey S. & Sundaram, Rangarajan K. - Cheap Talk and Burned Money (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:91:y:2000:i:1:p:1-16)
by Austen-Smith, David & Banks, Jeffrey S. - Singularity theory and core existence in the spatial model (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:24:y:1995:i:6:p:523-536)
by Banks, Jeffrey S. - Costly signaling and cheap talk in models of political influence (RePEc:eee:poleco:v:18:y:2002:i:2:p:263-280)
by Austen-Smith, David & Banks, Jeffrey S. - Two-sided uncertainty in the monopoly agenda setter model (RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:50:y:1993:i:3:p:429-444)
by Banks, Jeffrey S. - Covering Relations, Closest Ordering and Hamiltonian Bypaths in Tournaments (RePEc:fth:aixmeq:91a05)
by Banks, J.S. & Bordes, G. - Optimal Retention in Principal/Agent Models (RePEc:fth:nystfi:98-006)
by Jeffrey S. Banks & Rangarajan K. Sundaram - A Model of Price Promotions with Consumer Search (RePEc:fth:robums:95-01)
by Banks, J. & Moorthy, S. - Social Choice and Electoral Competition in the General Spatial Model (RePEc:ide:wpaper:587)
by Banks, Jeffrey S. & Duggan, John & Le Breton, Michel - A General Bargaining Model of Legislative Policy-making (RePEc:now:jlqjps:100.00000001)
by Banks, Jeffrey S. & Duggan, John - A Dynamic Model of Democratic Elections in Multidimensional Policy Spaces (RePEc:now:jlqjps:100.00006009)
by Banks, Jeffrey S. & Duggan, John - Social Choice Theory (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1196)
by David Austen-Smith & Jeffrey S. Banks - Cheap Talk and Burned Money (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1245)
by David Austen-Smith & Jeffrey S. Banks - Cycling of Simple Rules in the Spatial Model (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1246)
by David Austen-Smith & Jeffrey S. Banks - The assessment: household saving - issues in theory and policy (RePEc:oup:oxford:v:17:y:2001:i:1:p:1-19)
by OR Attanasio & J Banks - Monopoly Agenda Control and Asymmetric Information (RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:105:y:1990:i:2:p:445-464.)
by Jeffrey S. Banks - An Experimental Analysis of Unanimity in Public Goods Provision Mechanisms (RePEc:oup:restud:v:55:y:1988:i:2:p:301-322.)
by Jeffrey S. Banks & Charles R. Plott & David P. Porter - Allocating Uncertain and Unresponsive Resources: An Experimental Approach (RePEc:rje:randje:v:20:y:1989:i:spring:p:1-25)
by Jeffrey S. Banks & John O. Ledyard & David P. Porter - Repeated Games, Finite Automata, And Complexity (RePEc:roc:rocher:183)
by Banks, J.S. & Sundaram, R.K. - General Properties Of Equilibrium Behavior In A Class Of Asymmetric Information Games (RePEc:roc:rocher:213)
by Banks, J.S. - Two-Sided Uncertainty In The Monopoly Agenda Setter Model (RePEc:roc:rocher:215)
by Banks, J.S. - Incumbents, Challengers, And Bandits: Bayesian Learning In A Dynamic Choice Model (RePEc:roc:rocher:235)
by Banks, J.S. & Sundaram, R.K. - A Class Of Bandit Problems Yielding Myopic Optimal Strategies (RePEc:roc:rocher:239)
by Banks, J.S. & Sundaram, R.K. - Denumerable-Armed Bandits (RePEc:roc:rocher:277)
by Banks, J.s. & Sunderam, R.K. - Two Index Theorems for Bandit Problems (RePEc:roc:rocher:278)
by Banks, J.s. & Sunderam, R.K. - Adverse Selection and Moral hazard in a Repeated Elections Models (RePEc:roc:rocher:283)
by Sundadam, R.K. & Banks, J. - Bounds for Mixed Strategy Equilibria and the Spatial Model of Elections (RePEc:roc:wallis:wp14)
by Jeffrey S. Banks & John Duggan & Michel LeBreton - Existence of Nash Equilibria on Convex Sets (RePEc:roc:wallis:wp20)
by Jeffrey Banks & John Duggan - A Multidimensional Model of Repeated Elections (RePEc:roc:wallis:wp24)
by Jeffrey Banks & John Duggan - Social Choice in the General Spatial Model of Politics (RePEc:roc:wallis:wp26)
by Jeffrey Banks & John Duggan & Michel Le Breton - A Dynamic Model of Democratic Elections in Multidimensional Policy Spaces (RePEc:roc:wallis:wp53)
by John Duggan & Jeffrey S. Banks - Comment on Jankowski's “Punishment in Iterated Chicken and Prisoner's Dilemma Games†(RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:3:y:1991:i:3:p:381-385)
by Jeffrey S. Banks - An experimental analysis of the bandit problem (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:10:y:1997:i:1:p:55-77)
by Jeffrey Banks & David Porter & Mark Olson - Cycling of simple rules in the spatial model (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:16:y:1999:i:4:p:663-672)
by David Austen-Smith & Jeffrey S. Banks - A Social Choice Lemma on Voting Over Lotteries with Applications to a Class of Dynamic Games (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:26:y:2006:i:2:p:285-304)
by Jeffrey Banks & John Duggan - Probabilistic Voting in the Spatial Model of Elections: The Theory of Office-motivated Candidates (RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-540-27295-3_2)
by Jeffrey S. Banks & John Duggan - Price-conveyed Information versus Observed Insider Behavior: A Note on Rational Expectations Convergence [Efficiency of Experimental Security Markets with Insider Information: An Application of Ration (RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:93:y:1985:i:4:p:807-15)
by Banks, Jeffrey S