andrea attar
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andrea |
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attar |
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Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)
Research profile
author of:
- Entry-Proofness and Discriminatory Pricing under Adverse Selection (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:111:y:2021:i:8:p:2623-59)
by Andrea Attar & Thomas Mariotti & François Salanié - Multiple Lenders, Strategic Default, and Covenants (RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:11:y:2019:i:2:p:98-130)
by Andrea Attar & Catherine Casamatta & Arnold Chassagnon & Jean-Paul Décamps - Multiple Lending and Constrained Efficiency in the Credit Market (RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:contributions.6:y:2006:i:1:n:7)
by Attar Andrea & Campioni Eloisa & Piaser Gwenael - Concurrence non exclusive et sélection adverse (RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_696_1009)
by Andrea Attar & Thomas Mariotti & François Salanié - The Social Costs of Side Trading (RePEc:ces:econwp:_34)
by Andrea Attar & Thomas Mariotti & François Salanié - Financial contracting along the business cycle (RePEc:cor:louvco:2003069)
by ATTAR, Andréa - Common agency games with separable preferences (RePEc:cor:louvco:2003102)
by ATTAR, Andrea & MAJUMDAR, Dipjyoti & PIASER, Gwenaêl & PORTEIRO, Nicolàs - Pure strategy and no-externalities with multiple agents : a comment (RePEc:cor:louvco:2004050)
by ATTAR, Andrea & CAMPIONI, Eloisa & PIASER, Gwenaël & RAJAN, Uday - Multiple lending and constrained efficiency in the credit market (RePEc:cor:louvco:2005031)
by ATTAR, Andrea & CAMPIONI, Eloisa & PIASER, Gwenaël - Trading under Asymmetric Information: Positive and Normative Implications (RePEc:cor:louvco:2017009)
by ATTAR Andrea & d’ASPREMONT Claude - Costly state verification and debt contracts: a critical resume (RePEc:cor:louvrp:1712)
by ATTAR, Andrea & CAMPIONI, Eloisa - On Competitive Nonlinear Pricing (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:10850)
by Attar, Andrea & Mariotti, Thomas & Salanié, François - Multiple Contracting in Insurance Markets (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11631)
by Attar, Andrea & Mariotti, Thomas & Salanié, François - The Social Costs of Side Trading (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13872)
by Attar, Andrea & Mariotti, Thomas & Salanié, François - Regulating Insurance Markets: Multiple Contracting and Adverse Selection (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:16531)
by Attar, Andrea & Mariotti, Thomas & Salanié, François - Keeping the Agents in the Dark: Private Disclosures in Competing Mechanisms (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:16807)
by Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Mariotti, Thomas & Pavan, Alessandro - On multiple-principal multiple-agent models of moral hazard (RePEc:crf:wpaper:07-01)
by Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Gwenaël Piaser & Uday Rajan - Moral Hazard: Messages, Delegation and Efficiency (RePEc:crf:wpaper:08-01)
by Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Gwenaël Piaser & Uday Rajan - Multiple Lending and Constrained Efficiency in the Credit Market (RePEc:ctl:louvec:2005024)
by Andrea, ATTAR & Eloisa, CAMPIONI & Gwenaël, PIASER - Nonexclusive Competition in the Market for Lemons (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:79:y:2011:i:6:p:1869-1918)
by Andrea Attar & Thomas Mariotti & François Salanié - A note on Common Agency models of moral hazard (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:95:y:2007:i:2:p:278-284)
by Attar, Andrea & Piaser, Gwenael & Porteiro, Nicolas - On competing mechanisms under exclusive competition (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:111:y:2018:i:c:p:1-15)
by Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Piaser, Gwenaël - Competing mechanisms and folk theorems: Two examples (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:125:y:2021:i:c:p:79-93)
by Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Mariotti, Thomas & Piaser, Gwenaël - On multiple-principal multiple-agent models of moral hazard (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:68:y:2010:i:1:p:376-380)
by Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Piaser, Gwenaël & Rajan, Uday - Negotiation and take-it or leave-it in common agency with non-contractible actions (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:135:y:2007:i:1:p:590-593)
by Attar, Andrea & Piaser, Gwenael & Porteiro, Nicolas - Private communication in competing mechanism games (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:183:y:2019:i:c:p:258-283)
by Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Piaser, Gwenaël - On moral hazard and nonexclusive contracts (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:45:y:2009:i:9-10:p:511-525)
by Attar, Andrea & Chassagnon, Arnold - Two-sided communication in competing mechanism games (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:49:y:2013:i:1:p:62-70)
by Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Piaser, Gwenaël - Common agency games: Indifference and separable preferences (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:56:y:2008:i:1:p:75-95)
by Attar, Andrea & Majumdar, Dipjyoti & Piaser, Gwenaël & Porteiro, Nicolás - Costly state verification and debt contracts: a critical resume (RePEc:eee:reecon:v:57:y:2003:i:4:p:315-343)
by Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa - Credit cycles in a Neo-Austrian economy (RePEc:eee:streco:v:18:y:2007:i:2:p:249-269)
by Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa - Trading under asymmetric information: Positive and normative implications (RePEc:elg:eechap:16873_15)
by Andrea Attar & Claude d’Aspremont - On competing mechanisms under exclusive competition (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01897713)
by Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Gwenaël Piaser - On competitive nonlinear pricing (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02097209)
by Andrea Attar & Thomas Mariotti & Francois Salanie - Nonexclusive competition and adverse selection (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02100442)
by Andrea Attar & Thomas Mariotti & Francois Salanie - The Social Costs of Side Trading (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03048803)
by Andrea Attar & Thomas Mariotti & François Salanié - Competing Mechanisms and Folk Theorems: Two Examples (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03106896)
by Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Thomas Mariotti & Gwenaël Piaser - Entry-proofness and discriminatory pricing under adverse selection (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03353054)
by Andrea Attar & Thomas Mariotti & François Salanié - On moral hazard and nonexclusive contracts (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00754338)
by Andrea Attar & Arnold Chassagnon - Contracting Sequentially with Multiple Lenders: The Role of Menus (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-02281995)
by Andrea Attar & Catherine Casamatta & Arnold Chassagnon & Jean Paul Décamps - Multiple Lenders, Strategic Default, and Covenants (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-02282023)
by Andrea Attar & Catherine Casamatta & Arnold Chassagnon & Jean-Paul Décamps - Multiple lenders, strategic default and debt covenants (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-03342939)
by Andrea Attar & Catherine Casamatta & Arnold Chassagnon & Jean-Paul Décamps - On moral hazard and nonexclusive contracts (RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-00754338)
by Andrea Attar & Arnold Chassagnon - Contracting Sequentially with Multiple Lenders: The Role of Menus (RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-02281995)
by Andrea Attar & Catherine Casamatta & Arnold Chassagnon & Jean Paul Décamps - On moral hazard and nonexclusive contracts (RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-00589101)
by Andrea Attar & Arnold Chassagnon - The Social Costs of Side Trading (RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-02538295)
by Andrea Attar & Thomas Mariotti & François Salanié - Keeping the Agents in the Dark: Private Disclosures in Competing Mechanisms (RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-03266804)
by Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Thomas Mariotti & Alessandro Pavan - Entry-proofness and discriminatory pricing under adverse selection (RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-03485384)
by Andrea Attar & Thomas Mariotti & François Salanié - On moral hazard and nonexclusive contracts (RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00589101)
by Andrea Attar & Arnold Chassagnon - Multiple Contracting in Insurance Markets (RePEc:ide:wpaper:28619)
by Attar, Andrea & Mariotti, Thomas & Salanié, François - On Competitive Nonlinear Pricing (RePEc:ide:wpaper:31204)
by Attar, Andrea & Mariotti, Thomas & Salanié, François - Private Information and Insurance Rejections: A comment (RePEc:ide:wpaper:31632)
by Attar, Andrea & Mariotti, Thomas & Salanié, François - Non-Exclusive Competition in the Market for Lemons (RePEc:ide:wpaper:7923)
by Attar, Andrea & Mariotti, Thomas & Salanié, François - Competing Mechanisms: Communication under Exclusivity Clauses (RePEc:ipg:wpaper:2014-48)
by Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Gwenaël Piaser - On Competing Mechanisms under Exclusive Competition (RePEc:ipg:wpaper:2015-632)
by Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Gwenaël Piaser - Non-Exclusive Competition in the Market for Lemons (RePEc:ler:wpaper:09.13.289)
by Andrea Attar & Thomas Mariotti & Francois Salanie - The Social Costs of Side Trading (RePEc:oup:econjl:v:130:y:2020:i:630:p:1608-1622.)
by Andrea Attar & Thomas Mariotti & François Salanié - Multiple Lenders, Strategic Default and Covenants (RePEc:red:sed016:701)
by Jean Paul Decamps & Catherine Casamatta & Arnold Chassagnon & Andrea Attar - Non-Exclusive Competition in the Market for Lemons (RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:159)
by Andrea Attar & Thomas Mariotti & François Salanié - Non-Exclusive Competition under Adverse Selection (RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:192)
by Andrea Attar & Thomas Mariotti & François Salanié - Competing Mechanism Games of Moral Hazard: Communication and Robustness (RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:196)
by Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Gwenael Piaser & Uday Rajan - Competing Mechanisms, Exclusive Clauses and the Revelation Principle (RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:201)
by Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Gwenael Piaser - Information Revelation in Competing Mechanism Games (RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:205)
by Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Gwenael Piaser - Multiple Lenders, Strategic Default and Covenants (RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:261)
by Andrea Attar & Catherine Casamatta & Arnold Chassagnon & Jean Paul Décamps - On Competitive Nonlinear Pricing (RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:314)
by Andrea Attar & Thomas Mariotti & François Salanié - Private Information and Insurance Rejections: A Comment (RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:403)
by Andrea Attar & Thomas Mariotti & François Salanié - On the Role of Menus in Sequential Contracting: a Multiple Lending Example (RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:409)
by Andrea Attar & Catherine Casamatta & Arnold Chassagnon & Jean Paul Décamps - On Private Communication in Competing Mechanism Games (RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:421)
by Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Gwenaël Piaser - On Competing Mechanisms under Exclusive Competition (RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:441)
by Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Gwenaël Piaser - Competing Mechanisms and Folk Theorems: Two Examples (RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:460)
by Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Thomas Mariotti & Gwenael Piaser - The Social Costs of Side Trading (RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:463)
by Andrea Attar & Thomas Mariotti & François Salanié - Keeping the Agents in the Dark: Private Disclosures in Competing Mechanisms (RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:519)
by Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Thomas Mariotti & Alessandro Pavan - On a class of smooth preferences (RePEc:spr:etbull:v:7:y:2019:i:1:d:10.1007_s40505-018-0142-y)
by Andrea Attar & Thomas Mariotti & François Salanié - Competing mechanism games of moral hazard: communication and robustness (RePEc:spr:reecde:v:16:y:2012:i:4:p:283-296)
by Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Gwenaël Piaser & Uday Rajan - Nonexclusive competition under adverse selection (RePEc:the:publsh:1126)
by , & , & , - On competitive nonlinear pricing (RePEc:the:publsh:2708)
by Attar, Andrea & Mariotti, Thomas & Salanié, François - Competing Mechanisms and Folk Theorems: Two Examples (RePEc:tse:wpaper:123080)
by Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Mariotti, Thomas & Piaser, Gwenaël - The Social Costs of Side Trading (RePEc:tse:wpaper:123102)
by Attar, Andrea & Mariotti, Thomas & Salanié, François - Private Communication in Competing Mechanism Games (RePEc:tse:wpaper:123148)
by Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Piaser, Gwenaël - Regulating Insurance Markets: Multiple Contracting and Adverse Selection (RePEc:tse:wpaper:123328)
by Attar, Andrea & Mariotti, Thomas & Salanié, François - Competitive Nonlinear Pricing under Adverse Selection (RePEc:tse:wpaper:125475)
by Attar, Andrea & Mariotti, Thomas & Salanié, François - Keeping the Agents in the Dark: Private Disclosures in Competing Mechanisms (RePEc:tse:wpaper:125751)
by Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Mariotti, Thomas & Pavan, Alessandro - Equilibrium (non-)Existence in Games with Competing Principals (RePEc:tse:wpaper:127377)
by Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Piaser, Gwenaël - Non-Exclusive Competition in the Market for Lemons (RePEc:tse:wpaper:21926)
by Attar, Andrea & Mariotti, Thomas & Salanié, François - On Competitive Nonlinear Pricing (RePEc:tse:wpaper:26891)
by Attar, Andrea & Mariotti, Thomas & Salanié, François - Multiple Contracting in Insurance Markets (RePEc:tse:wpaper:28620)
by Attar, Andrea & Mariotti, Thomas & Salanié, François - On Competing Mechanisms under Exclusive Competition (RePEc:tse:wpaper:29906)
by Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Piaser, Gwenaël - Entry-Proofness and Discriminatory Pricing under Adverse Selection (RePEc:tse:wpaper:31582)
by Attar, Andrea & Mariotti, Thomas & Salanié, François - On a Class of Smooth Preferences (RePEc:tse:wpaper:31631)
by Attar, Andrea & Mariotti, Thomas & Salanié, François - Contracting Sequentially with Multiple Lenders: the Role of Menus (RePEc:tse:wpaper:31786)
by Attar, Andrea & Casamatta, Catherine & Chassagnon, Arnold & Décamps, Jean-Paul - On Private Communication in Competing Mechanism Games (RePEc:tse:wpaper:32199)
by Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Piaser, Gwenaël - Common Agency Games with Separable Preferences (RePEc:ven:wpaper:2006_28)
by Attar Andrea & Gwen�el Piaser & Nicolas Porteiro - Multiple Lending and Constrained Efficiency in the Credit Market (RePEc:ven:wpaper:2006_29)
by Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Gwen�el Piaser - On multiple agent models of moral hazard (RePEc:ven:wpaper:2006_32)
by Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Gwena�l Piaser & Uday Rajan - A note on Common Agency models of moral hazard (RePEc:ven:wpaper:2006_36)
by Andrea Attar & Nicolas Porteiro & Gwena�l Piaser - Contracting Sequentially with Multiple Lenders: The Role of Menus (RePEc:wly:jmoncb:v:51:y:2019:i:4:p:977-990)
by Andrea Attar & Catherine Casamatta & Arnold Chassagnon & Jean Paul Décamps