R. Pablo Arribillaga
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R. Pablo |
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Arribillaga |
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Affiliations
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Universidad Nacional de San Luis
/ Instituto de Matemática Aplicada San Luis (IMASL)
/ Grupo de Teoría de Juegos
Research profile
author of:
- Comparing Voting by Committees According to Their Manipulability (RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:9:y:2017:i:4:p:74-107)
by R. Pablo Arribillaga & Jordi Massó - Regret-free truth-telling voting rules (RePEc:aep:anales:4543)
by Agustín G. Bonifacio & R. Pablo Arribillaga & Marcelo Fernández - Regret-Free Truth-Telling Voting Rules (RePEc:aoz:wpaper:166)
by R. Pablo Arribillaga & Agustín G. Bonifacio & Marcelo A. Fernandez - Obvious Manipulations of tops-only Voting Rules (RePEc:aoz:wpaper:191)
by R. Pablo Arribillaga & Agustin Bonifacio - All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy-proof (RePEc:aoz:wpaper:49)
by Pablo Arribillaga & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme - Regret-free truth-telling voting rules (RePEc:arx:papers:2208.13853)
by R. Pablo Arribillaga & Agust'in G. Bonifacio & Marcelo Ariel Fernandez - Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules (RePEc:arx:papers:2210.11627)
by R. Pablo Arribillaga & Agustin G. Bonifacio - Obvious Manipulations in Matching with and without Contracts (RePEc:arx:papers:2306.17773)
by R. Pablo Arribillaga & E. Pepa Risma - On the Structure of Cooperative and Competitive Solutions for a Generalized Assignment Game (RePEc:aub:autbar:940.13)
by R. Pablo Arribillaga & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme - Comparing Generalized Median Voter Schemes According to their Manipulability (RePEc:aub:autbar:946.14)
by R. Pablo Arribillaga & Jordi Massó - All Sequential Allotment Rules Are Obviously Strategy-proof (RePEc:aub:autbar:966.19)
by R. Pablo Arribillaga & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme - On Obvious Strategy-proofness and Single-peakedness (RePEc:aub:autbar:967.19)
by R. Pablo Arribillaga & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme - All Sequential Allotment Rules Are Obviously Strategy-Proof (RePEc:bge:wpaper:1108)
by R. Pablo Arribillaga & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme - On Obvious Strategy-Proofness and Single-Peakedness (RePEc:bge:wpaper:1122)
by R. Pablo Arribillaga & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme - On the Structure of Cooperative and Competitive Solutions for a Generalized Assignment Game (RePEc:bge:wpaper:740)
by R. Pablo Arribillaga & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme - Comparing Generalized Median Voter Schemes According to their Manipulability (RePEc:bge:wpaper:753)
by R. Pablo Arribillaga & Jordi Massó - On obvious strategy-proofness and single-peakedness (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:186:y:2020:i:c:s002205311930119x)
by Arribillaga, R. Pablo & Massó, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro - On the Structure of Cooperative and Competitive Solutions for a Generalized Assignment Game (RePEc:hin:jnljam:190614)
by R. Pablo Arribillaga & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme - Cooperative and axiomatic approaches to the knapsack allocation problem (RePEc:pra:mprapa:91719)
by Arribillaga, Pablo & Bergantiños, Gustavo - Cooperative and axiomatic approaches to the knapsack allocation problem (RePEc:spr:annopr:v:318:y:2022:i:2:d:10.1007_s10479-021-04315-6)
by R. Pablo Arribillaga & G. Bergantiños - Convergence of the approximate cores to the aspiration core in partitioning games (RePEc:spr:topjnl:v:23:y:2015:i:2:p:521-534)
by R. Arribillaga - Comparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability (RePEc:the:publsh:1910)
by Arribillaga, R. Pablo & Massó, Jordi - All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy-proof (RePEc:the:publsh:5111)
by Arribillaga, R. Pablo & Massó, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro